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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for 
studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two 
philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. 
In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person 
approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the 
dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. 
In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less 
reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main errors 
and limitations in making phenomenal judgements are due to domain-general factors, 
which are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal judgements 
may still be statistically less reliable than perceptual judgements, though I provide 
reasons for thinking that Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical 
unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable 
phenomenal judgements, hence defending phenomenal judgements against general 
introspective scepticism.  
Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal judgements, in 
chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments can be used to control for these 
errors. I provide examples, and discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual 
errors, minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability.   
In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use first-person experiments and 
empirical findings to argue that distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as 
an awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or retinal image size). I 
also discuss how an awareness of uninstantiated objective properties cannot 
adequately account for the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides 
support for a subjectivist account of variance in size experience.  
In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish between a weak sense 
of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of self in which there is a polarity between 
subject and object. I use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to 
demonstrate an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at where others 
see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is not explained by inference, thoughts, 
feelings, imagination nor the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of 
experience that I seem to be looking from here. 
Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The question of chapter 6 
is whether there can be a direct experience of the self. I argue that to function as a 
bearer of experience the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself. I 
use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where I cannot 
see my head. I argue that it conforms to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate 
for being the subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem to be 
looking from the same location, provides prima facie evidence for the reality of the 
subject. I hold then that contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can 
be a direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
 
Despite the great success of third-person science in explaining the natural 
world, consciousness has remained stubbornly baffling. The hard problem of 
consciousness is explaining why brain processes are associated with phenomenal 
consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). That third-person science could theoretically give a 
complete physical explanation of the world without ever invoking consciousness, 
suggests that the third-person paradigm is incomplete. Another way of putting it is 
that physical theories do not even predict the existence of consciousness. One 
potential reason for this is that the phenomenal consciousness of another simply 
cannot be observed from the third-person perspective. I cannot literally open up 
someone else’s brain and see their thoughts, feelings, imaginings etc. Since 
consciousness is a first-person phenomenon, the only direct way of investigating it is 
by careful introspection of one’s own experience. 
Recent times have seen a resurgence of interest in first-person methods of 
investigating consciousness (Jack & Roepstorff, 2003; Shear & Varela, 1999). A first-
person approach to conscious experience is certainly not without precedent. For 
centuries meditation has been used in the East as a method of self-inquiry. In the 
West, we owe much of our conceptions of consciousness to first-person observations 
made by philosophers such as Berkeley and Hume, polymaths such as Goethe, and 
those within the traditions of experimental psychology (Helmholtz), introspective 
psychology (Wundt, Titchener, Külpe), the Gestalt psychologists (Koffka, Kohler, 
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Wertheimer) and philosophical phenomenology (Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty). William James has been particularly influential and his Principles of 
Psychology (James, 1890) continue to be a source of phenomenological insights.
1
 
Zahavi (2005) and Gallagher (2005) have recently developed a form of neo-
phenomenology, and phenomenological approaches are now used in conjunction with 
cognitive science (e.g., Neurophenomenology: Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Varela, 
1996). A phenomenological approach has also been pursued in recent analytic 
philosophy (Dainton, 2000; Hatfield, 2009; Strawson, 2009; Velmans, 2000a). For 
reviews of first-person methods see: Gallagher and Sørensen (2006); Overgaard, 
Gallagher, and Ramsøy, (2008); Varela & Shear (1999); Vermersch (1999).  
While first-person methods have often been used, many philosophers are deeply 
sceptical of their reliability (Dennett, 1991, 2003; Irvine, 2012; Lyons, 1986; 
Piccinini, 2010). They point to lack of agreement between introspectors, lack of 
repeatable methods, and many forms of bias. According to Daniel Dennett (2001a): 
‘First-person science of consciousness is a discipline with no methods, no data, no 
results, no future, no promise. It will remain a fantasy’. 
Are reliable first-person methods possible or are they just a fantasy as Dennett 
contends? These criticisms should be taken seriously and I attempt to address them in 
chapters 2 and 3. The general aim of this dissertation is twofold: (1) to defend the 
reliability of some first-person methods, in particular first-person experiments and (2) 
to apply these methods to two philosophical problems - size experience and the 
experience of the self. 
 
                                                 
1
 By ‘phenomenology’ and ‘phenomenological’ I will not usually be referring specifically to 
Philosophical Phenomenology in the Husserlian tradition, but rather I use them in a broad sense of any 
rigorous method of arriving at a description of experience. I also occasionally use phenomenology to 
refer to phenomenal experience as is common within analytical philosophy. 
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1.2. Investigating Conscious Experience Itself 
 
My conscious experience is what I know most intimately. No one else can 
experience my sense of nostalgia when I think about building cubby houses as a child.  
Phenomenal consciousness can be characterised as what it is like to be a subject 
(Nagel, 1974). There is something it is like for me to see the colours of a sunset, to 
taste pumpkin pie, to hear Beethoven’s 7th symphony. I use ‘phenomenal 
consciousness’ (consciousness for short) and ‘experience’ interchangeably. The 
particular feel of an experience is its phenomenal character. The experience of seeing 
red and seeing green differ in the phenomenal character of colour. Some think that 
phenomenal character is exhausted by affective and sensory characters. Others think 
that there are non-sensory phenomenal characters such as for understanding 
experience (Pitt, 2004; Siewert, 1998; Strawson, 1994, p. 5-13), and subjectivity 
(Kriegel, 2005, 2009; Levine, 2001, p. 105-111, 167-174). I use phenomenal character 
to cover all of these possible experiential types. ‘Phenomenal character’ is meant to be 
neutral on metaphysical questions as to what that character consists of. Phenomenal 
character may consist in internal properties of the subject, or properties external to the 
subject. It is hence compatible for instance with direct realism in which phenomenal 
character is constituted by mind-independent properties of the environment. 
Why take a first-person approach to consciousness? Phenomenal experience 
exists, and we have at least some knowledge of it, hence it can be studied in its own 
right. As conscious experience cannot be directly observed from the third-person 
perspective, a first-person approach is essential in any scientific investigation of 
consciousness. 
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Too often however conscious experience has not been taken seriously. It has 
been treated as an annoyance to materialism, something that is to be explained away. 
According to Max Velmans: 
 
In accounts of consciousness the influence of pre-existing theory on 
phenomenal descriptions has been extreme. Dualists describe consciousness as 
consisting of immaterial ‘qualia’, physicalists attempt to redescribe those 
qualia in terms of brain states, functionalists insist that they can be described 
as a set of causal relationships, and so on. In developing such accounts, the 
protagonists do, of course, make reference to examples of conscious 
phenomenology. But with some notable exceptions, they have been more 
intent on squeezing the phenomenology into some pre-existing theory than on 
broadening existing theories to encompass the fullness of the phenomenology 
itself (Velmans, 2000a, p. 103). 
 
To take consciousness seriously, we need a phenomenological approach, a first-
person science of consciousness that proceeds independently of other disciplines. 
A science of consciousness requires that we investigate conscious experience as an 
independent realm of enquiry. As Searle states it we need ‘a serious examination of 
consciousness on its own terms’ (Searle, 1994, p. xi). David Chalmers also 
emphasizes the need for rigorous first-person methods: 
  
In my opinion, the development of more sophisticated methodologies for 
investigating first-person data and of formalisms for expressing them is the 
greatest challenge now facing a science of consciousness. Only by developing 
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such methodologies and formalisms will we be able to collect and express 
first-person data in such a way that it is on a par with third-person data, so that 
we can find truly systematic and detailed connections between the two. 
(Chalmers, 1999, p. 10). 
Many studies in the new area of consciousness studies are aimed at relating 
conscious states with brain states, in particular finding neural correlates of 
consciousness. While this provides such important evidence for a science of 
consciousness, the limitation with this approach is that it provides relational 
knowledge about consciousness, rather than knowledge of the properties of the relata. 
If one is trying to explain how consciousness relates to the world we need a detailed 
description of its character and structure. Nor indeed do we understand the mind-body 
problem without understanding the nature of the mind. We cannot understand how the 
physical relates with consciousness unless we understand the relata. Hence we need a 
systematic description of both before they can be related (Dainton, 2000, p. xiv-xv, 
Nagel, 1974, p. 437; Zahavi, 2005, p. 4).  
A science of consciousness that does not directly investigate the character and 
structure of experience would be like a science of biology that refuses to observe and 
describe cells.  If we took the same attitude to biology that is often taken towards 
consciousness, if we tried to reduce it at all costs to physics, we would know very 
little about biology. Biology, rather, is its own discipline and can proceed without 
being concerned with how it relates to physics. In fact, a phenomenological approach 
can proceed while being neutral about the possibility of the reduction of experience, 
just as biology can proceed while being neutral about whether or not cells can be 
reduced to physics. 
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1.3. Background Assumptions 
  
 My Background assumptions in the thesis are: (1) Consciousness Realism, and 
(2) Scientific Realism  
 (1) Consciousness Realism. Taking consciousness seriously means being a 
realist about phenomenal experience, and I will assume realism here. My phenomenal 
experience is what I know most certainly. Even if the world does not exist because I 
am in the Matrix, it seems to exist, so my experience at least exists. As Descartes 
(1641) states it in the Second Meditation: ‘I certainly seem to see, to hear and to get 
warm. This cannot be false’ (Descartes, 1641, p. 27). This does not yet involve a 
judgement, and hence there is no possibility of error at this point.
2
 That I am having 
experiences in general seems undeniable. I suppose that it is conceivable that there is 
a conscious being with a radical insanity who may deny that it has experiences (this is 
a logical possibility).
3
 It could think to itself ‘I am not conscious’ and genuinely 
believe this. It is inconceivable to me that I am one of those beings. Compare again 
the possibility that I am in the Matrix. This is something I can consider as a genuine 
possibility, as it is consistent with all of my experiential evidence. I cannot do that 
when it comes to experience itself.
 
If I know anything at all, then I know that 
experience exists. This does not however entail that I am infallible or near infallible in 
                                                 
2
 In fact, Descartes did not endorse ‘Cartesian infallibility’ of phenomenal judgements. For instance, in 
the Principles of Human Knowledge (Descartes, 1644) he maintains that we can even be wrong in our 
judgement of strong pain since ‘people commonly confuse this perception with their obscure 
judgement about the nature of something that, they think, is in the painful part of the body and 
resembles the sensation of pain, which is the only thing they perceive clearly’ (p. 129). See Newman 
(2014, section 5.2) for more on Descartes not subscribing to infallibility. 
3
 Even someone who is suffering from a delusion such as thinking that they are made of glass believes 
this because it feels to them as if they are made of glass (BBC News, May 8, 2015). This is not a 
standard type of insanity we are being asked to conceive of, but a radical thorough-going insanity. If 
someone really insists that I don’t know that I’m not radically insane then I cannot argue with them. 
However this cognitive form of scepticism will generalise to all beliefs including beliefs about the 
world. Even logic would not escape its grasp. I can be a sceptic about the existence of the external 
world and other minds, but still maintain belief in experience and logic. I cannot be a sceptic about 
experience without being sceptical of absolutely everything. 
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making judgements about my individual experiences. I regularly make errors in 
judgement about my experience. In fact, I may be mistaken about most of the 
individual token experiences because their details are elusive (Schwitzgebel, 2011) 
but that experience in general is occurring would still be what I would know with 
most certainty (see Smithies, 2013a). Realism about consciousness is inconsistent 
with the eliminative reduction of consciousness. The eliminativist dispenses with 
experience by replacing it with brain processes, just as the vital force of vitalism was 
dispensed with from biology (Churchland, 1984). However there is a disanalogy in 
that the vital force was a theoretical posit to explain how organisms functioned.  
Experience on the other hand is not a theoretical posit but an explanandum in itself 
(Chalmers, 1995, p. 126).
4
   
(2) Scientific Realism. I assume realism about the entities of third-person 
science (cells, atoms etc.). I also draw upon third-person scientific methods of 
cognitive science particularly in chapter 2. In my view, any metaphysical theory 
should be consistent with the main findings of science such as physics and the theory 
of evolution. An empirical approach to the world should take seriously anything that 
can be investigated empirically (or can be inferred from empirical investigations). 
Conscious experience can also be investigated empirically. First-person science is 
itself an empirical approach. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Realism about consciousness is consistent with (non-eliminative) reduction of consciousness. I also in 
fact believe that experience cannot be reduced to non-experiential properties. In particular, experience 
is ontologically distinct from standard physical properties such as structures and causal relations. There 
are good reasons for thinking that physicalism, the view that everything is physical or supervenes on 
the physical (Stoljar, 2010, 2016) is false. Physicalism is an elegant theory, but it is inadequate for 
explaining consciousness (though see Strawson, 2006 on ‘realistic physicalism’). This has been argued 
for elsewhere (Chalmers, 1996; Jackson, 1982; McGinn, 1991; Foster, 1982). However, this belief is 
dispensable for the purposes of the first-person investigations themselves, as these are neutral about the 
possibility of reduction. 
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1.4. Autophenomenology and Heterophenomenology 
 
My approach can be considered a version of Max Velman’s ‘critical 
phenomenology’ (Velmans, 2000a, 2000b, 2007) which also assumes realism about 
consciousness, that first-person and third-approaches are complementary and both 
indispensable, and that first-person judgements are not incorrigible (see the next 
section). This approach can be understood by contrast with Daniel Dennett’s 
Heterophenomenology (Dennett, 1991, 2003, 2007). Daniel Dennett promotes an 
exclusively third-person approach to consciousness in which the researcher uses 
others’ verbal reports about experience for investigating consciousness. Dennett says 
that we should take a person’s speech acts about experiences as indicating beliefs 
about experiences rather than experiences themselves (Dennett, 2003, p. 20). Thus if 
the person reports that they are visualising a house we should take this as data about 
their belief that they are visualising a house. This is not just because they may be 
wrong about the token experience, but because there may have no experiences at all – 
other subjects, and even ourselves, may well be phenomenal zombies (Dennett, 1991, 
p. 73).
5
 However, the assumption of common sense and most researchers is that 
phenomenal experience does exist. Dennett wants us to be neutral about whether or 
not a person is a phenomenal zombie. When someone reports that one line in the 
Müller-Lyer illusion looks longer than another the researcher assumes that the subject 
is describing their experience. The research question is not about the subject’s beliefs 
or verbal reports, but about their experiences. I accept realism about experience and 
hence my approach differs from Dennett’s heterophenomenology.6  
                                                 
5
 A phenomenal zombie is a person that is physically, behaviourally and functionally just like other 
people but lacks conscious experience. 
6
 For critiques of Heterophenomenology see: Beenfeldt (2008), Marbach (2007), Piccinini (2010), 
Velmans (2007), Zahavi (2007). 
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My approach is also distinct from Dennett’s in that I explicitly make 
judgements about my own experience (what Dennett refers to as 
‘autophenomenology’). In fact, many of the investigations of this dissertation involve 
autophenomenology.
 
 Dennett (1991, 2003, 2007) and Piccinini (2010) both agree that 
autophenomenology is unscientific. As Piccinini states it ‘I couldn’t agree more that 
lone-wolf autophenomenology - regardless of its heuristic value, which may well be 
significant - is no scientific method’ (Piccinini, 2010, p. 101). This has the 
consequence that standard practices in psychology such as researchers piloting 
experiments on themselves are unscientific or at best prescientific. However, it is a 
common practice for psychologists to self-pilot their experiments. Their experience of 
what it is like to do the experiment is often used to both alter the parameters of an 
experiment, and also to generate hypotheses about what other subjects are doing. In 
fact, the development of illusions would likely be impossible without the 
experimenter refining the illusions by testing ‘what works’ based upon their own 
experience. According to Dennett and Piccinini these practices are not scientific. It is 
autophenomenology and hence pre-scientific. By contrast, I maintain that these 
autophenomenological practices should not be swept under the carpet but accepted as 
standard scientific practice in conjunction with intersubjective verification, data 
analysis etc. (Velmans, 2007, p. 228).  
It also seems odd that my own judgements about an illusion only count as 
scientific data if I verbalise them and someone else uses these judgements as data. 
Rather I hold that both my first-person judgements and those of others are scientific 
data, just as a linguist’s own judgements and others’ judgements about language are 
data for linguistics. Although this dissertation involves a good deal of 
autophenomenology, I also draw upon the phenomenal judgements of others and 
10 
 
third-person data (e.g., behaviour, physiology, reaction time and brain activity). These 
are all valid sources of data for science.  
I also ask that the reader conducts the first-person experiments described here 
for themselves to see if my phenomenal descriptions generalise to their own 
experience. The results of these experiments provide phenomenological evidence for 
the philosophical arguments in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Without doing the experiments the 
reader will not understand the phenomenological descriptions provided. Hence, 
whatever its scientific credibility, autophenomenology is important as a philosophical 
method.
7
  
 
1.5. The Question of the Reliability of Phenomenal Judgements 
  
 One may accept that a first-person approach is required for a science of 
consciousness, but also maintain the view that phenomenal judgements are generally 
unreliable. Eric Schwitzgebel (2011, p. 118) holds this combination of views. This 
introspective scepticism poses a major threat to first-person methods. 
I reject the Cartesian view that all conscious states are known infallibly.  
However this does not entail treating all phenomenal judgements as untrustworthy. 
This is an overreaction to the falsity of Cartesianism. It is compelling that I know for 
instance when I am in extreme pain. Rather than treating phenomenal judgements as 
infallible or completely untrustworthy, I take a middle ground and treat them (with 
some qualifications) as having a prima facie, and hence defeasible, warrant (Goldman, 
2004; Siewert, 1998; Velmans, 2007). When looking at the Müller-Lyer illusion the 
subject’s report is prima facie (and hence defeasible) evidence that things look that 
                                                 
7
 From here on I drop the term ‘autophenomenology’ and rather talk about phenomenology and 
phenomenological methods. 
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way to them. Likewise, a subject’s reports about mental images provide prima facie 
evidence about their properties.  
Of course, if phenomenal judgements are demonstrated to be globally 
unreliable then they will lose even the status of having prima facie warrant (Goldman, 
2004, p. 4). Schwitzgebel (2011) presents problem cases for naïve introspective 
judgements (judgements without training or the assistance of first-person methods), 
and uses them to motivate the conclusion that naïve phenomenal judgements are 
generally unreliable. I argue against the global unreliability of phenomenal 
judgements in chapter 2. In particular, I claim that the main errors in making 
phenomenal judgements stem from attentional and conceptual errors. When I am 
attentive and adequate concepts having been activated then my judgement will be 
highly reliable. There is no reason for mistrusting these judgements. The 
establishment of criteria of reliability and unreliability provides a qualification to the 
prima facie warrant thesis. Some phenomenal judgements will lose the status of 
having prima facie warrant (Goldman, 2004). For example, in chapter 2, I argue that 
judgements about unattended/partly attended experiences, complex experiences and 
very brief experiences are likely to be low in reliability. This does not mean that we 
necessarily need to discard these judgements as sources of data, but rather more 
sophisticated techniques will be needed such as employed in psychophysics research. 
 
1.6. First-Person Experiments 
 
First-person experiments are the methodological backbone of this dissertation. 
These are intraperspective experiments which typically use apparatus for enhancing a 
phenomenal judgement. These are experiments on experience, not thought 
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experiments. The use of such experiments puts this dissertation within the tradition of 
experimental phenomenology, which originated with Stumpf and was developed by 
the Gestalt psychologists (Albertazzi, 2013; Vicario, 1993). My other major influence 
is Douglas Harding who developed a first-person experimental approach to 
investigating the self (chapter 5 and 6).
8
 
An early historical example of the use of a first-person experiment was Edme 
Mariotte’s discovery of the visual blind spot in 1668. The lens of the eye projects light 
onto the retina at the back of the eye. The optic nerve takes up a portion of the optic 
disc in the centre of the retina such that there are no photoreceptors at this location. 
The prevailing view at the time was that the optic nerve was the most light sensitive 
part of the eye. Mariotte tested this hypothesis by performing an experiment in which 
the light from an object was projected onto the optic nerve. He placed a small circle of 
white paper on a dark background at eye level, and a larger circle of 4 inches which 
he placed lower and to the right. He closed his left eye, and keeping his right eye 
fixated on the small circle he walked backwards. When he was approximately ten feet 
away the large circle disappeared. He repeated the experiment with his left eye and 
obtained the same result. Mariotte’s discovery of a visual blind spot, which could only 
derive from the optic nerve, disconfirmed the prevailing view that the optic nerve was 
light sensitive (Grzybowski & Aydin, 2007). A variation on his experiment is below.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 Douglas Harding was a British philosopher and a mystic. His main occupation was as an architect, 
although he also taught comparative religion at Cambridge. Though he wrote many books, his 
philosophy was developed almost exclusively outside of academia and is virtually unknown by 
philosophers. As far as I know, the only place his writings can be found in mainstream philosophy is in 
The Minds I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul (Hofstadter & Dennett, 1982) which presents 
excerpts from Harding (1986a). His other academic publications include: Harding (1967) and Harding 
(1986b). His main work in philosophy was The Hierarchy of Heaven and Earth (Harding, 1998). His 
first-person experiments do not seem to have appeared in detail in any academic contexts. 
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Experiment 1.1: The Visual Blind Spot 
 
Close your left eye and with your right eye focus on the X. Maintain this focus and 
move your head towards the page until the O disappears. You have found the visual 
blind spot. Moving away and towards the page see how it appears and disappears. 
 
 
 
X                                                          O 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The Visual Blind Spot 
 
This demonstration takes place in your first-person conscious experience – it 
is a first-person experiment. The question asked in the experiment is not whether an O 
is always present or absent on the page as you move towards and away from it, but 
whether an O seems to be present at all distances. It is an experiment on the visual 
experience of X’s and O’s. This finding substantiates that theory that the optic nerve 
is not receptive to visual stimulation. It also has extraordinary implications for how 
visual experience is constructed. The experience is that the O disappears but that there 
is not a hole in its place, rather the white background is ‘filled in’.9 
The experiment is replicable both within subjects at different times and across 
subjects (with the same eye anatomy). As long as I carefully follow the instructions, 
                                                 
9
 Dennett (1991, p. 356) argues that the visual blind spot is not in fact filled in but rather ignored. See 
Churchland and Ramachandran (1994) for empirical evidence that filling in does occur.  
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the phenomenon occurs whether I believe in it or not. It is not apparently affected by 
expectations. It is a reliable phenomenological experiment. Even if I was the only 
human alive the experiment would demonstrate existence of a visual blind spot. 
Helmholtz (1860, p. 205-216) discusses a number of variations on this experiment. I 
provide a characterisation of first-person experiments in chapter 3 and defend their 
methodological reliability. 
 
1.7. Applications of First-Person Methods to Philosophical Problems 
 
Arguing that first-person experiments can be reliable is one thing, but 
establishing that they are generally relevant as philosophical methods
10
 is more 
difficult. Perhaps they cannot be used beyond a small number of standard areas such 
as illusion research and in some rare cases in perception research. In Part II of the 
thesis I show how these first-person methods can be applied to two philosophical 
problems. 
Our conscious experience is central in perceiving the world, in particular in 
answering the question of whether it is a direct relation (the problem of perception: 
Crane & French, 2016). Experience is also essential in why we think that there is a 
self, and hence in answering what the self is. A first-person approach hence provides 
vital information for both of these problems in philosophy. In fact, in grappling with 
these problems we arguably need to investigate phenomenology before we can 
proceed onto epistemological and metaphysical questions. Further arguments will be 
required once we have the first-person data, but without this data apriori arguments 
will be blind. 
                                                 
10
 Examples of philosophical methods include: arguments, thought experiments, analogies, conceptual 
analysis. 
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A question in the philosophy of perception is whether the properties that show 
up in perceptual experience are in the mind or in a mind-independent world. In 
chapter 4, I investigate the experience of size, in particular the question of whether 
distant things looking smaller can be treated as the awareness of objective properties, 
such as visual angle and retinal image size. To answer this question we need methods 
for deciding whether these objective properties do in fact show up in experience. 
Merely assuming that they do or appealing to common sense is an unsatisfactory 
approach. I investigate this question in chapter 4. 
Experience is not just what it is like, but what it is like for me. I seem to be 
seeing this page, but what am I? This problem stems from phenomenology. There is a 
sense of self, which is arguably built into the structure of experience. Before I can 
answer whether there is a self, and what it is, I first need to clarify what it is like to be 
me. Phenomenology needs to come before metaphysics (Strawson, 1997). Ignoring 
experience in this area would be like doing physics by appealing to common sense or 
by conceptual analysis, rather than observing the phenomena themselves. In chapters 
5 and 6, I employ systematic phenomenological methods from Douglas Harding for 
investigating the experience of the self. These experimental methods use apparatus 
such as a pointing finger for orienting attention and for experiencing the contrast 
between objects of experience and myself as subject - in particular the looker.  
 
1.8. Overview of the Dissertation 
 
The general aim of this dissertation is to defend the reliability of first-person 
methods and to apply these methods to two philosophical problems. Corresponding to 
these overall aims, the dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I is methodological 
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and part II is an application of these methods. Specifically, in the first part of the 
dissertation, I argue for the reliability of judgements about experience (phenomenal 
judgements) (chapter 2), particularly when they are enhanced by conducting a first-
person experiment (chapters 3). In the second part of the dissertation, I show how 
first-person experiments can be applied in investigating size experience (chapter 4) 
and the experience of the self (chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the present chapter, I discussed the motivations for taking a first-person 
approach to consciousness, and the background assumptions of the dissertation 
consciousness realism and scientific realism. I also outlined the general 
methodological approach as it contrasts with Heterophenomenology and the initial 
assumption that phenomenal judgements provide prima facie evidence. I also 
introduced first-person experiments and argued that the use of a first-person approach 
is an essential preliminary to investigating problems in the perception of size 
experience and the problem of the self.  
 
Part I: Methodology 
 
Chapter 2: Dimensions of Reliability in Phenomenal Judgement 
 
Schwitzgebel (2011) presents a large number of problem cases for the 
reliability of phenomenal judgements which threaten to undermine a first-person 
approach to consciousness. In chapter 2, I draw upon psychological research to argue 
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that the production of phenomenal judgements and perceptual judgements involves 
the same underlying attentional, working memory and conceptual mechanisms. This 
has the consequence that phenomenal judgements are not produced by faulty 
processes, at least this view cannot be maintained without scepticism also generalising 
to perceptual judgements. Phenomenal judgements may still be statistically less 
reliable than perceptual judgements, but this outcome is consistent with the possibility 
of reliable first-person methods. Finally, this account defends phenomenal judgements 
against general scepticism by providing criteria for distinguishing between reliable 
and unreliable phenomenal judgements. 
 
Chapter 3: First-Person Experiments 
 
Having identified attentional and conceptual processes as the main sources of 
error in making phenomenal judgements, the goal of first-person methods should be 
to control for these sources of error. In chapter 3, I argue that first-person experiments 
are effective means of achieving this, and hence reliable first-person methods. I 
distinguish between first-person methods and third-person methods by the former 
using phenomenal judgements and the latter using perceptual or objectival 
judgements. I provide a characterisation of first-person experiments and discuss 
examples. I then argue that many such first-person experiments overcome attentional 
and conceptual errors, as well as minimising negative response biases, attentional and 
conceptual interference, and that some do not suffer from the problem of 
intersubjective variability. I also respond to the criticism that first-person experiments 
are not different from behavioural methods. 
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Part II: Applications 
 
Chapter 4: Variance and Constancy in Size Experience 
 
Do objective (mind-independent) or subjective (mind-dependent) properties 
show up in perceptual experience? In chapter 4, I investigate the question of whether 
distant things looking smaller (phenomenal size variance) is an awareness of objective 
properties or subjective properties. I use first-person experiments to demonstrate 
instances in which perceptual size variance cannot be accounted for by visual angle or 
retinal image size. I also draw upon empirical findings to argue that this finding 
generalises to typical experiences of size variance. I also argue that the awareness of 
uninstantiated properties is metaphysically implausible. As size variance cannot be 
accounted for by plausible instantiated properties in the environment nor by the 
awareness of uninstantiated properties, I conclude that it is an awareness of subjective 
properties. 
 
Chapter 5: The Sense of Self 
 
What is it like to be me? An arguably essential aspect of ordinary experience 
is in the sense of self. In chapter 5, I distinguish between a weak sense of self (for-me-
ness) and a strong sense of self in which there is a polarity between subject and 
object. I use first-person experiments from (and variations on) Douglas Harding to 
investigate the sense of self. I claim that when I point at where others see my face that 
there is an explicit strong sense of self. I also argue that this sense of looking from 
here is not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor the viewpoint. 
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The results of the experiments also includes a gap-experience which is distinct from 
the sense of self which I suggest may be a candidate for the subject of experience. 
 
Chapter 6: Self-Experience 
 
Can there be a direct experience of the self (a self-experience)? In chapter 6, I 
continue the enquiry begun in the previous chapter. I argue that if the subject is a 
bearer of experience that it should be single and non-sensory. A self-experience 
should then be as of these properties. A self-experience should also be non-
objectifying in that the target should not seem to be an object for me, but should seem 
to be myself. I use Harding’s first-person experiments and some of my own to show 
that the gap where I cannot see my head meets the above criteria. I also argue that 
when I attend to this location it is not a mere visual blind spot (complete lack of visual 
experience), but that there is a phenomenal character of spacious emptiness. I hold 
then that contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a self-
experience, if one knows which direction to attend. 
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Methodology 
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Chapter 2 
2. Dimensions of Reliability in 
Phenomenal Judgement 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) claims that introspective judgements about 
conscious experience are generally unreliable, and are far less reliable than perceptual 
judgements about the world. Some of the cases Schwitzgebel presents against 
reliability include the failure to distinguish details about our own phenomenology, 
such as the basic details of visual imagery (Schwitzgebel, 2011, chapter 3). In chapter 
7, he highlights the uncertainty we have about the character and location of our 
emotions and that sometimes we may not notice our emotions at all such as that I’m 
feeling grumpy. Another case is that we tend to fail to notice broad features of our 
visual experience such as the fact that it is not clear all the way to the edges. Rather 
there is only a small central region of clarity. Philosophers also disagree about what 
visual patterns manifest when one’s eyes are closed (ibid., chapter 8).11  
Based upon the weight of such problem cases, Schwitzgebel (2011) draws the 
pessimistic conclusion that naïve introspection
12
 is ‘faulty, untrustworthy, and 
misleading – not just sometimes a little mistaken, but frequently and massively 
mistaken’ (ibid., p. 129). More specifically Schwitzgebel (2011) makes the 
                                                 
11
 The present chapter is a modified version of the published paper: Ramm, B. J. (2016). Dimensions of 
reliability in phenomenal judgment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23(3-4) 101-127. 
12
 Naïve introspection involves phenomenal judgements which have not been supplemented by training 
or first-person methods. These are the type of phenomenal judgements I will focus on in this chapter. In 
what follows I drop the term ‘naïve’ and simply refer to phenomenal judgements. 
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comparative claim that phenomenal judgements are in general far less reliable than 
perceptual judgements. He holds ‘Descartes, I think, had it quite backward when he 
said the mind – including especially current conscious experience – was better known 
than the outside world’. (ibid., p. 136) and ‘Our judgements about the world tend to 
drive our judgements about our experience. Properly so, since the former are the more 
secure’ (ibid., p. 137). It is this comparative claim that I will be focusing on here.  
What does Schwitzgebel’s comparative pessimistic thesis amount to? We can 
distinguish between two pessimistic theses: 
 
The Process Unreliability Thesis: Errors in the formation of phenomenal 
judgements are due to factors specific to the formation of phenomenal 
judgements. 
 
The Statistical Unreliability Thesis: Phenomenal judgements are less reliable 
 than perceptual judgements overall in terms of proportion of errors. 
 
Here I will argue against the process unreliability interpretation of introspective 
pessimism by showing how a domain-general framework can account for the main 
introspective errors and limitations. My alternative claim will be: 
 
The Domain-General Thesis: Errors and limitations in the formation of 
phenomenal judgements are due to factors that are domain-general in the sense 
that they are shared with the formation of perceptual judgements.  
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The domain general thesis is compatible with a statistical version of the comparative 
pessimistic thesis. I focus on defending the domain-general thesis in this chapter, and 
I discuss the statistical unreliability thesis in section 2.8. 
The distinction between process unreliability and statistical unreliability needs 
to be made explicit, as this has important consequences for questions about the 
reliability of phenomenal judgements. In particular, if the process unreliability thesis 
is true, then the errors are likely to infect introspection alone. If the alternative 
domain-general thesis is true, then perceptual judgements will be prone to the very 
same errors as phenomenal judgements. This will also have consequences for the 
statistical unreliability of phenomenal judgements.  
It is not clear in Schwitzgebel (2008, 2011) which thesis the problem cases are 
meant to provide evidence for. That it is the statistical unreliability thesis is implicit 
in Schwitzgebel (2012) where he argues for a domain-general account of 
introspection. Although we hence agree on a domain-general account, I think that this 
is in tension with a large statistical difference in reliability. In particular, according to 
the domain-general view judgements about perceptual experience should be as 
reliable as perceptual judgements in the same modality. For example, judging that a 
rose looks red should be at least as reliable as the judgement that the rose is red on the 
domain-general view. I evaluate the question of statistical unreliability in section 8. I 
argue that while there are reasons for holding that some phenomenal judgements are 
statistically less reliable than perceptual judgements, Schwitzgebel overstates the size 
of the difference. 
I propose that the production of phenomenal judgements involves a number of 
domain-general factors such as attention, working memory, and conceptualization. In 
the domain-general framework developed here attention selects experienced features 
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or objects,
13
 and activates/forms concepts in working memory which produce (or 
perhaps partly constitute) judgements about the experience.  
Previous authors have suggested that attentional and conceptual processes can 
account for many introspective processes (Bayne and Spener, 2010; Block, 2007; 
Carruthers, 2011; Engelburt & Carruthers, 2010; Hill, 2011; Prinz, 2004; 
Schwitzgebel, 2012; Watzl & Wu, 2012), with a central role for domain-general 
processes (Carruthers, 2011; Prinz, 2004; Schwitzgebel, 2012). It remains unclear 
however whether such explanations are capable of accounting for most errors and 
limitations in making phenomenal judgements. 
The best defence of the reliability of introspection may be to give up on a 
separate introspective process altogether, and rather just talk of phenomenal 
judgements that involve the same domain-general processes as perceptual and rational 
judgements. One may well think that a domain-general account puts pressure on the 
need to posit a special domain-specific self-monitoring mechanism (Armstrong, 1968; 
Goldman, 2006; Lycan, 1996; Nichols & Stich, 2003). Previous authors use a domain-
general account to motivate scepticism about the existence of a special introspective 
process (Carruthers, 2011; Prinz, 2004; Schwitzgebel, 2012). However, I do not 
pursue this question here. The aim of the chapter will not be to assess arguments for 
and against particular philosophical theories of introspection. Rather, here I focus 
upon discussing empirical evidence for and against the domain-general thesis. 
Furthermore, a domain-general account of errors is consistent with the existence of 
domain-specific introspective processes, as long as these are not strongly modular and 
                                                 
13
 I am neutral here as to whether experience is transparent such that the features and objects which 
engage attention are only ever external (perhaps represented) properties and objects (Harman, 1990; 
Tye, 1995, 2000), or whether properties of experience can (at least sometimes) be directly attended 
(Block, 1996; Kind, 2003). 
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hence preclude a role of domain-general processes in producing phenomenal 
judgements.  
Here I attempt to give a scientifically informed account of domain-general 
processes that could plausibly account for the major classes of introspective errors and 
limitations. Accounting for all errors is obviously beyond the scope of a single 
chapter. The aim here is rather to develop a general framework which could in 
principle account for most of the introspective errors and limitations. This project 
should also be of general interest to cognitive scientists as the assumption is that the 
same processes are also involved in making conscious judgements in general, and will 
hence be involved in most psychological tasks ranging from perceptual judgement to 
moral judgement, to mathematical calculation. 
As an empirical hypothesis I cannot claim to establish the necessary truth of 
the domain-general thesis. Evidence which undermines the hypothesis can be 
uncovered at any time. Rather my claim is that there is currently enough supporting 
evidence to make the thesis more sufficiently probable than the process unreliability 
thesis.  
The aim of the chapter will not be to argue for an exhaustive theoretical 
account of every problem case considered here, thus deciding whether it is definitely 
an error or not. Rather the goal is to argue for the disjunction: problem cases for 
phenomenal judgements either do not count as errors or if they do count as errors then 
they can be accounted for by domain-general factors. 
The plan for the chapter is as follows: In section 2.2, I discuss the motivation 
for using a domain-general approach as a response to introspective scepticism. In 
section 2.3, I characterise the difference between phenomenal and perceptual 
judgements. In sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, I investigate in detail how domain-general 
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factors (respectively, attention, working memory and conceptualization) can account 
for problem cases for phenomenal judgements. I discuss cognitive dissociations and 
their challenge to a domain-general framework in section 2.7. In section 2.8, I discuss 
the statistical unreliability thesis and argue against general scepticism towards 
phenomenal judgements. In section 2.9, I conclude by summarising the case for the 
domain-general thesis.      
 
2.2. Background Motivations 
 
That phenomenal judgements are generally untrustworthy (or at least exhibit 
very high levels of unreliability) are motivations for Daniel Dennett’s (1991, 2001a) 
rejection of first-person methods and for Schwitzgebel to take a pessimistic position 
towards the possibility of reliable methods (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007; 
Schwitzgebel, 2011, p. 129, p. 167, though see chapter 4). Philosophers, in 
conversation with me, have also professed pessimism about first-person methods on 
the basis of Schwitzgebel’s problem cases, presumably because they interpret them as 
establishing the general untrustworthiness of introspection. 
One motivation for the chapter is to provide an initial defence of the 
possibility of reliable first-person methods as part of a science of consciousness. That 
there can be reliable first-person methods is compatible with holding that naïve 
introspection is statistically less reliable than perceptual judgements. Hence the truth 
or falsity of the statistical unreliability thesis is not a concern from the point of view 
of a researcher in the science of consciousness, on the condition that phenomenal 
judgements are sufficiently reliable when assisted by first-person methods. Titchener 
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for example held that introspective judgements are only reliable after subjects have 
undergone extensive training (Schwitzgebel, 2011, p. 74-75).  
If Schwitzgebel’s cases are taken as establishing that all phenomenal 
judgements are untrustworthy – ‘introspective scepticism’ (Bayne & Spener, 2010) – 
then this result arguably undermines the possibility of reliable first-person methods. 
This may be the case because phenomenal judgements stem from pervasively faulty 
processes. Thus no amount of training nor use of methods would be expected to 
improve them.  
Introspective scepticism also presents a danger to the many everyday 
phenomenal judgements that are prima facie highly reliable: For example, judging 
that I feel hungry, feel an intense toothache, foveal colour judgements, and similarity 
judgements such as orange seems more similar to yellow than to blue. As Bayne and 
Spener (2010, p. 8) point out, it seems perverse to doubt the reliability of these 
phenomenal judgements. No amount of philosophical argument will convince some 
one, for example, that they should doubt the fact that they are experiencing a severe 
toothache. Even Schwitzgebel (2011, p. 139) pulls back from distrusting these 
judgements, yet without a positive reason for trusting these judgements general 
introspective scepticism looms as threat. 
Introspective scepticism based upon faulty processes can be undermined (or at 
least rendered unattractive) by showing that errors in phenomenal judgements stem 
from domain-general processes. However, if the number of errors was high enough 
then this could still provide a reason for introspective scepticism. I respond to this 
further threat in section 2.8.  
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2.3. Phenomenal Judgements and Perceptual Judgements 
 
The term ‘introspection’ suggests some sort of ‘inner looking’ as opposed to 
perception or ‘outer looking’. However, I have doubts that there is a substantially 
separate faculty of introspection apart from those processes which produce perceptual 
and intellectual judgements. So as to remain neutral about the underlying processes, 
following Chalmers (1996, p. 173-176), I generally use the term ‘phenomenal 
judgement’ rather than introspection.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, a ‘phenomenal judgement’ is a judgement 
about one’s current phenomenology, formed using attentional resources, on the basis 
of (or intended to be on the basis of) current relevant experience.
14
 This includes 
judgements about thoughts, emotions, pain, mental imagery, and sensory experiences 
(for example, how things seem, look, appear, feel). Some examples of judgements 
about experience are ‘the rose looks red’, 15 ‘the stove feels hot’, ‘the town looks far 
away’. Thus one may judge that ‘the stove feels hot’ on the basis of the stove feeling 
hot. I say ‘intended to be on the basis of’ because I want to allow that one could base 
their judgement upon the wrong experience such as the stove feeling cold. Otherwise 
the possibility of erroneous phenomenal judgements may be ruled out by definition. I 
say ‘relevant experience’ because that the stove feels hot should not be based upon the 
stove looking hot, but rather upon the stove feeling hot. 
                                                 
14
 The standard view of the basing relation is that it is a type of causal relation between the reason for 
having the belief (here the experience) and the belief (Korcz, 2010). An alternative to a causal relation 
is a constitutive relation, for instance if the concept red is partly constituted by a presently experienced 
phenomenal character of red. This direct phenomenal concept can in turn be part of a direct 
phenomenal belief such as ‘the apple looks red’ (Chalmers, 2010). Though this constitutive relation 
would only apply to a small set of beliefs. This is not the place to defend a theory of the basing-
relation. It should be sufficient for current purposes if the reader understands ‘basing’ as a form of 
causal relation or constitutive relation between the reason for the belief (i.e., experience) and the belief.  
15
 The full phrase would be ‘the rose looks red to me’. which distinguishes it from ‘the rose looks red 
(for the average person)’.  
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The relevant class of ‘perceptual judgement’ are noninferential judgements 
about objects, events and properties of the world, formed using attentional resources, 
on the basis of (or intended to be on the basis of) current relevant conscious 
perception. For example, ‘the rose is red’, ‘the stove is hot’, and ‘the town is far 
away’. Thus one may judge that ‘the stove is hot’ on the basis of the stove feeling hot 
(perhaps looking hot also counts, if hotness is a property of visual experience). 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation judging that ‘the stove is hot’ on the 
basis of seeing smoke coming from the chimney would not count, as the conscious 
perception does not include the stove and hotness, but rather these are derived by 
inference from a conscious perception. 
Schwitzgebel (2012, p. 34-35) points out that it is easy to confuse judgements 
about sensory experience and judgements about properties of the world. For example, 
in a psychophysics experiment one may make repeated judgements about colour 
experience (the colour things look to have). In this case it is easy to slip into making a 
judgement about properties of the world (e.g., about the stimuli on the screen). Thus a 
judgement that the rose ‘looks red’ and ‘is red’ are often interchangeable in ordinary 
circumstances.  
Importantly for present purposes, even though confusion can happen, 
phenomenal and perceptual judgements are nevertheless conceptually distinct. With 
enough effort or when I think an illusion may be involved ‘looks red’ and ‘is red’ are 
sharply distinguishable. When I look at a white rose through red tinted glasses I may 
judge that ‘the rose looks pink’ but, having seen it without the glasses, nevertheless 
also believe that ‘the rose is actually white’.16 
 
                                                 
16
 This latter belief would not count as a perceptual judgement in the sense I am using it here. 
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2.4. Attention 
 
In the next three sections I discuss how errors and limitations in making 
phenomenal judgements can be accounted for by domain-general factors. I discuss 
attention in this section. By ‘attention’ I mean the allocation of a limited pool of 
processing resources (Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kahneman, 1973). On this view there 
are degrees of attention, rather than attention being fully on or off like in some 
spotlight models. This being said, most of what I argue will be consistent with other 
theories of attention.   
Inattention is responsible for errors in both perceptual and phenomenal 
judgements. The effect of failing to attend in making judgements about the world is 
dramatically evident in studies of inattentional blindness in which subjects fail to 
notice unexpected events such as a gorilla walking through a basketball game when 
their attention is distracted. (Simons & Chabris, 1999: see also, Mack & Rock, 1998; 
Most, Scholl & Clifford & Simons, 2005; Simons, 2000).  
An introspective case that is plausibly explained by inattention is my failure to 
notice the degree of acuity of my visual field. Schwitzgebel (2011, p. 125-127) and 
Dennett (1991, p. 53-54, 68, 2001, 2002)
 
point out that many people believe that their 
visual field is clear all the way to the edges, whereas objects in the periphery actually 
appear indistinct and blurry. Furthermore there is only a small central region of clarity 
of two degrees, whereas most would judge it to be a large window of clarity. That 
subjects possess a false belief about their visual field is evidenced by the surprise 
people express upon been shown the low resolution for shapes and colours in 
peripheral vision (Dennett, 1991, p. 68, 2001b). 
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This case seems to be at least in part a failure in attentional orienting, in 
particular a failure to attend to objects in peripheral vision while keeping their eyes 
fixated on an unmoving central point (Schwitzgebel, 2011; Engelburt & Carruthers, 
2010; Hill, 2011; Waltz & Wu, 2012). In particular, we tend to shift our eyes to a 
peripheral object when we attend to it. It is has also been previously argued that 
subject’s belief in a large window of clarity is due to them making a judgement about 
dynamic vision in contrast to gaze fixed vision (see, Hill, 2011, p. 27; Engelburt & 
Carruthers, 2010, p. 251). In normal vision, the eyes perform a saccade a few times a 
second (e.g., Land, 1999), which the visual system combines into a single visual 
scene. We would not expect subjects to be aware of information at such short 
durations any more than we would expect them to see the images of a film as static 
rather than moving, or a spinning flame on the end of a pole as a point of light rather 
than a circle of flame. Dennett’s and Schwitzgebel’s subjects were only mistaken then 
if their beliefs were about fixed gaze vision. If their belief in a large window of clarity 
referred to typical, dynamic vision, then they (and most of us) were correct after all.
17
  
Another challenge to the reliability of first-person judgements is the apparent 
fact that I often fail to notice some of my experiences, such as being angry, sad, 
depressed or anxious. Schwitzgebel (2011, p. 122-123) gives the case of my partner 
mentioning that I seem to be grumpy about doing the dishes. I carefully reflect on this 
and deny that I am feeling grumpy. But from the look on my face, and the way I bang 
the dishes about, it is evident that I am grumpy. Perhaps upon further reflection I do 
actually detect feelings of grumpiness. It seems that my initial judgement was 
mistaken. Even though I attempt to carefully reflect, it is likely that the anger will 
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 Interestingly, both Schwitzgebel and Dennett provide first-person methods for keeping one’s eyes 
fixated while orienting attention to the periphery. An example would be focusing on one’s thumbnail 
held at arm’s length while attending to peripheral vision (Hill, 2011, p. 27). Upon doing this, the lack 
of acuity becomes highly evident. This shows that, while naïve first-person observations often fail, 
more sophisticated first-person techniques can succeed. See chapter 3 for more on this method. 
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cause me to be disposed to reject the accusation that I am grumpy without attending 
sufficiently carefully. If I am repressing the emotion then I may be disposed (have an 
attentional bias) to attend briefly to the emotion and then rapidly disengage attention, 
hence inhibiting explicit recognition of its presence (Derakshan, Eysenck & Myers, 
2007). 
Alternatively no error may have occurred at all. Other possibilities are that the 
emotion did not reach consciousness, or was merely dispositional, or perhaps I did not 
really feel grumpy at T1, but only felt so after the fact when my partner suggested that 
I am grumpy. Also even if I retrospectively recall that I did seem to feel grumpy at the 
time, my initial judgement may still be correct, as this may be a false memory created 
by the suggestion that I am grumpy.  
Even if the above explanations of these errors are correct, it does not follow 
that the attention used in making phenomenal judgements is a domain-general faculty. 
Perhaps there is a special faculty of ‘introspective attention’ that is responsible for 
these errors. For examples of the use of this term see: Bayne & Spener, (2010, p. 12), 
Hohwy, (2011, p. 270), Schwitzgebel (2011, p. 126, 175).  
A reason for rejecting this hypothesis is the observation that attending to 
visual images, pains, thoughts and emotions can distract someone from making 
correct perceptual judgements and vice versa. If there is a separate introspective 
attention then I should be able to fully attend to my thoughts and the world 
simultaneously without any interference. For example, on this view it is difficult to 
account for why I am more likely to walk into street poles when I am absorbed in my 
thoughts. This strongly suggests that in attending to my thoughts I was withdrawing 
attention from the world.  
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There is also evidence for a single attentional mechanism in the domains of 
emotion and pain. For example, it has been found that felt pain is reduced when 
attention is distracted (e.g., Buhle & Wager, 2010; Legrain, Damme, Eccleston, Daris, 
Seminowicz & Crombez, 2009) and high working memory load reduces negative 
affective responses to negative images (Schmeichel, Volokhov & Demaree, 2008; 
Van Dillen & Koole, 2007) and reduces attentional capture by pain (Legrain, 
Crombez, Verhoeven & Mouraux, 2011). The best explanation of these findings 
seems to be that judgements about emotions, and pains (so-called introspections) 
utilise the same attentional system.  
Of course, there are exceptions when I do not seem to be interfered with by 
attending to multiple domains, for instance when attending to my thoughts or feelings 
and the traffic as I am driving. Musing that I feel happy today does not always seem 
to interfere with my ability to drive efficiently. However, such cases do not 
necessitate that there are domain-specific attentional mechanisms, as they can be 
explained by rapid switches of attention between the two activities, or by one of the 
activities continuing ‘on autopilot’ while the other consumes my attention.  
Furthermore, on a resources theory, attention is a single limited cognitive 
resource that can be flexibly allocated between multiple domains (Just & Carpenter, 
1992; Kahneman, 1973). On this view significant interference only occurs when 
attentional resources are exhausted. For example, it has been found that talking on a 
hands-free cell phone while driving significantly reduces driving performance even 
though the two activities rely upon different sensory modalities (Strayer & Johnston, 
2001). Finally, while there is empirical evidence in favour of a single domain-general 
selection process, I am unaware of any empirical research which supports the 
existence of a special introspective attentional mechanism. 
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2.5. Working Memory Limitations 
 
 What about unreliability in judging aspects of experience that I am in fact 
currently attending to, such as thoughts and emotions? My claim here is that the 
limitations of working memory explain the difficulty of judging features of complex 
and dynamic events such as emotions and much of our mental imagery.  
Working memory is usually thought to have a central capacity-limited 
component or an upper limit in processing resources (e.g., Baddeley, 2000, 2003; 
Cowan, 2001; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998), and time-
limited short-term memory stores (e.g., phonological, visual-spatial) which are subject 
to decay and interference. Some theorists include a short-term store for affective 
information (Mikels, Reuter-Karenz & Beyer, 2008). I suggest that limits in judging 
complex phenomena stems from an upper limit to the number of concepts that can be 
formed/activated at any one time in working memory (Block 2007, p. 487-489).
18
 
Furthermore, the unreliability in judging dynamic phenomena stems from the failure 
to maintain concepts active in working memory. 
  
2.5.1 Complexity and the Capacity Limits of Working Memory 
 
 Unsurprisingly in vision and other modalities, when phenomena are highly 
complex, it is more difficult to categorise all of their properties. For instance, it is 
difficult to report all of the items in a complex scene. This can be explained by the 
limits of working memory. Cowan (2001) presents a large amount of experimental 
evidence that there is a capacity limit to working memory of approximately four items 
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 Ramm and Halford (2012) provide evidence that conceptual combination draws upon capacity-
limited processing resources, and thus that new concepts are formed in working memory. 
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(chunks). For example, there is a limit of approximately four items in visual working 
memory (Luck and Vogel, 1997), recall of verbal material (Broadbent, 1975), in the 
discrimination of complex aromas (Laing & Francis, 1989), and in recalling items 
from visual iconic memory (Sperling, 1960). That a capacity limit of four holds 
between so many domains, including at least some paradigmatically introspective 
processes, suggests a single central capacity limit. 
An alternative interpretation is to posit that there are modality-specific 
resources such as separate capacities for visual and auditory information rather than a 
central attentional resource (Wickens, 1984, 2002). However, importantly Saults and 
Cowan (2007) found that for a simultaneously presented visual and auditory array 
recall was limited to 3-4 items, thus providing evidence for a single capacity limit 
which goes across sensory modalities. This finding is difficult to account for by a 
multiple capacities view.  
As discussed above, research in emotion and pain provides some evidence for 
the domain-general hypothesis. There has been far more extensive research in visual 
imagery and iconic memory, and hence more evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
these draw upon the same capacity-limited resources as visual perception. For 
example, it has been found that mental imagery is associated with many of the same 
brain areas as high-level visual perception (Ishai & Sagi, 1995; Kosslyn, Ganis & 
Thompson, 2001; Kosslyn, Thompson & Alpert, 1997), and so it is plausible that 
mental imagery relies upon the same capacity limits as visual perception. It has also 
been found that it takes longer to generate a more complex imagined letter or shape 
than a simple one (Bruyer & Scailquin, 1998; Kosslyn, 1980; Dror & Kosslyn, 1994). 
Furthermore, the generation and rotation of images is interfered with more by random 
letter generation (a task that requires capacity-limited resources) than articulatory 
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suppression (which is considered to be a relatively automatic process) (Bruyer & 
Scailquin, 1998).  
The capacity limits in extracting information from experiences also accounts 
for the classic problem case of why I do not know how many spots are on a perceived 
speckled hen (Ayer, 1940; Chisholm, 1942).
19
 Studies on subitizing (automatic 
recognition of number) show a limit of approximately four in subitizing items in 
briefly viewed displays (Mandler & Shebo, 1982; Trick & Pylyshyn 1994) and after 
images (Atkinson, Campbell & Francis, 1976; Simon & Vaisnavi, 1996). Again, 
whilst such evidence shows that knowledge of experience is not infallible, neither in 
such cases is there a reason to believe that it is more fallible than perceptual 
knowledge in cases of equivalent complexity. Judging the number of spots on a 
briefly perceived speckled hen is just as difficult as judging the number of spots on an 
imagined hen (although the instability of mental images probably contributes an 
additional source of errors/limits).   
The evidence suggests then a capacity limit to our phenomenological 
judgements. Importantly, this limit applies to both phenomenological and perceptual 
judgements (see also Hill 2011, p. 28-31). This hypothesis also partly explains the 
variability in subject’s reports regarding the patterns seen when one’s eyes are closed. 
As these visual patterns are both complex and dynamic, inaccuracy and variability 
would be expected in reports. This is no different from the fact that we would not 
expect subjects to give a perfectly accurate account of the colours and patterns of a 
fireworks display. When the ‘inner light show’ and ‘outer light show’ share the same 
degree of complexity one would expect both to lead to similar levels of inaccuracy in 
reports. One may also expect more individual variability in eyes closed patterns than 
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 For recent discussions of the speckled hen, see: Fumerton (2005), Markie, (2009), Poston, (2007), 
Sosa (2003a, 2003b), Tye (2009). 
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fireworks, due to differences in lighting conditions, and perhaps even differences in 
visual systems.  
Of course, this cannot be the whole story in accounting for disagreements in 
describing eyes closed phenomenology. It is odd for instance that historically Goethe, 
Purkinje, Muller and Helmholtz all report ‘wandering cloudy stripes’, but such 
descriptions disappear after the early 19
th
 century (Schwitzgebel, 2011. p. 142-149). It 
seems like theory must have been driving these descriptions, in particular influence 
from reading previous authors such as Purkinje.  
 
2.5.2 Dynamicity and the Failure to Maintain Activation of Concepts 
 
If a phenomenon is rapidly changing over time this adds further difficulties to 
making a phenomenal judgement. In fact, emotions, thoughts and pains seem to be 
more like sounds in their dynamically changing character. Visual imagery also seems 
to be unstable, which can be considered a form of dynamicity. Schwitzgebel asks 
what are the gross and fine features of emotion and pain? Although these are often 
difficult questions to answer, we seem to be reliable at identifying broad features of 
emotions, pleasures and pains such as intensity, pleasantness, unpleasantness, and 
often use dynamic terms such as surging, crescendo, fading etc. (Lambie & Marcel, 
2002, p. 230).  
I propose here that limitations in making phenomenal judgements about 
dynamic experiences are due to failures in retaining concepts active in short-term 
memory. Suppose that there are rapidly flashing coloured lights (green, red, yellow, 
blue, green, yellow, red). I am attending to them and they are not so brief that I am 
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unaware of them
20
. Yet I fail to judge that ‘there was a blue light’. One possibility is 
that blue was not encoded in short-term memory and thus I was unable to report it. 
Another possibility is that blue was encoded in short-term memory, but it was 
interfered with by preceding or subsequent concepts such as red. Or finally blue was 
encoded but the information was lost due to decay. In all cases, it is a failure to 
maintain a concept active which explains the oversight. The same limitations also 
would presumably apply to comparable perceptual judgements about the dynamically 
changing shape of ripples on a lake, the topology of flame shape, and the number of 
forks on flashes of lightning.
21
 Overall then, errors and limitations involving 
complexity and dynamicity do not seem to derive from domain-specific introspective 
processes. 
 
2.6. Conceptual Errors 
 
 I have proposed that working memory places a limit on how many concepts 
can be formed/activated at a time, and thus how much information I can extract from 
an experience, and how long concepts remain active. Two other ways in which 
conceptual errors/limitations may occur include: 1. Missing concepts, 2. Uncertainty 
in using concepts.
22
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 At very short durations the phenomena may be masked and not even reach consciousness at all: 
Breitmeyer & Ogmen (2006); Kouider & Dehaene (2007). 
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 Watzl and Wu (2012) also emphasize this point. 
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 A third type of conceptual error which I do not discuss here is the activation of incorrect concepts, 
For example, suppose I am exposed to something cold such as ice, but I have been primed to expect a 
sensation of heat and hence I briefly mistakenly judge that I am feeling heat. Again this type of error 
affects both phenomenal and perceptual judgements. 
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2.6.1 Missing Concepts 
 
As Schwitzgebel points out there are many aspects of the character of 
emotions that I cannot decide upon. Even holding fixed working memory limitations 
there are many details of my emotion and pain experiences that I simply cannot 
categorise. The main reason for this is that I usually lack the appropriate concepts for 
delineating the details of these experiences. For example, I may not possess adequate 
concepts for distinguishing between annoyance and jealousy, and thus think that I am 
merely feeling annoyed rather than jealous. It’s not a matter of just possessing the 
words. It may come to a surprise to me when I realise that I feel jealous. I may have 
an incomplete concept of jealousy, for example I know how people act when jealous, 
but presumably I do not know what it’s like to feel jealous until I actually experience 
it (and realise what it is I’m feeling). The same applies to feelings such as love, grief, 
awe, aesthetic pleasure etc. I can possess the words for these without possessing a 
phenomenal concept for these feelings.  
Does the difficulty in acquiring concepts of certain emotions suggest that there 
is a domain-specific limitation here? In a sense it does, but this does not entail the 
existence of a faulty or more limited domain-specific process. As to why we may 
possess fewer concepts in one domain than another it is helpful to consider how we 
often acquire phenomenal concepts. An example is colour experience. I can easily 
acquire the phenomenal concept of turquoise because someone can point to something 
that is turquoise, such as a turquoise opal. By doing this I am provided with a 
phenomenal sample of turquoise. I learn what it is like to experience it and how it 
relates to other colours (e.g., that it is a greenish-blue). I can then identify it again on 
other occasions.  
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Emotions on the other hand are more difficult to learn presumably because it 
is more difficult to provide a phenomenal sample. Someone cannot simply flick a 
switch and turn on my feeling of tenderness. They may set up the appropriate 
situation or show a scene from a movie where characters are portraying this feeling, 
but it is not guaranteed that I will thereby feel tenderness, and certainly not as reliably 
as I can be made to experience turquoise. Thus it seems that I will be unlikely to 
acquire concepts for the myriad of affective subtleties, like anger 22 versus anger 23, 
as I can potentially do for colour experience. This does not show that that there is a 
unique process for making judgements about emotions that is less reliable or more 
limited than for making judgements about colours. Rather there is a non-introspective 
limitation here. If colours were as difficult to manipulate as emotions and as unstable 
then they would be just as difficult to learn. 
 
2.6.2 Uncertainty in Using Concepts 
 
On other occasions, I possess the appropriate concept, and it is currently 
activated, but I am uncertain as to how to employ it. An example, given by 
Schwitzgebel is in making judgements about visual imagery. Schwitzgebel asks if you 
can give medium-level details of your mental image of a house (Schwitzgebel, 2011, 
chapter 3). How clear is it? How detailed is it? How stable is it? Your uncertainty in 
answering these questions suggests that you are an unreliable introspector.  
A recent study provides support for the view that subjects can in fact 
accurately report the vividness of their visual imagery (Pearson, Rademaker & Tong, 
2011). In an ingenious task, subjects were asked to imagine either an image of green 
vertical or red horizontal grating and subsequently rate the vividness of the image. 
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This was followed by a binocular rivalry trial in which green vertical grating or red 
horizontal grating was presented to each eye (or a mock rivalry trial). Subjects then 
decided whether they saw primarily the red or green grating or a combination of both. 
It was found that ratings of vividness (but not effort) significantly predicted the 
subsequent perceptual bias in the rivalry task, thus providing support for the 
hypothesis that subjects are reliable at judging the vividness of their visual images. A 
subsequent study also found that subjects can improve this metacognitive ability with 
training (Rademaker & Pearson, 2012). This provides evidence against 
Schwitzgebel’s claim that we are poor at judging details of our visual images such as 
vividness.
23
 
Even though we presumably do get such questions wrong on occasion, there 
are analogous examples of perceptual judgements where there are similar amounts of 
uncertainty. For example: ‘where exactly does that haystack begin and end?’ ‘How 
large is that bus?’ ‘How bushy is that tree?’ These are difficult questions to answer. 
Yet this does not show that my perception of haystacks, buses or trees is unreliable, 
only that I am not always sure how to apply these categories. Of course, the instability 
and low resolution of visual images most likely makes answering many questions 
about them more difficult than many visual perceptions. 
 
2.7. Cognitive Dissociations 
  
Cognitive dissociations present a challenge to a domain-general theory as they 
provide examples of deficits in making judgements within specific modalities, while 
leaving general cognitive abilities intact. For example, visual associative agnosia is 
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 My thanks to Helen Yetter-Chappell for pointing me towards these studies. 
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the inability to identify visually perceived ordinary objects such as cups despite intact 
visual perception (Farah, 2004). Subjects with this condition can also recognise a 
familiar object as a cup if they are allowed to touch it, thus showing that the 
conceptual system is intact, and that the deficit is specific to visual recognition. Such 
neurological conditions suggest that there are domain-specific informational links 
between different sensory modalities and the activation of concepts in working 
memory.  
One particularly relevant example for the present inquiry is Alexithymia 
which is a clinical condition which literally means ‘no words for feelings’ (Samur, 
Tops, Schlinkert, Quirin, Cuijpers & Koole, 2013).
24
 It is characterized by a subject’s 
difficulty in describing emotions. For example sufferers may not be able distinguish 
whether they are feeling angry, sad or anxious, or distinguish whether they are feeling 
a bodily sensation or an emotional state, and they also may not be able to identify 
other’s emotions. Alexithymia is a challenge for a domain-general cognitive theory 
because sufferers have difficulties describing their emotions even though their 
attentional and working memory systems and other conceptual abilities remain intact, 
thereby suggesting the existence of a domain-specific process.  
In fact, two types of alexithymia have been distinguished (Larsen, Brand, 
Bermond & Hijman, 2003). Type I is associated with a lack of emotional experience. 
Since sufferers feel a blunting or an absence of emotions, this has a flow on effect to 
the cognitive processing of emotions in general. An analogy here is colour-blindness 
(Lane et al. 1996). A subject that is colour-blind has problems identifying colour, but 
this is due to not experiencing them in the first place, not due to a general attentional 
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 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Consciousness Studies for pressing me on 
this case. 
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or conceptual malfunction. Hence this form of Alexithymia is not problematic for the 
current hypothesis.  
Type II alexithymia appears to be analogous to visual associative agnosia. It is 
characterized by no deficit in feeling emotions, but predominantly in identifying and 
describing them. This form of Alexithymia is associated with damage to the person’s 
corpus callosum and hence a disorder in interhemispheric communication. This 
suggests that there can be a domain-specific disruption between the experiencing of 
an emotion and the activation of a concept for the emotion in working memory.  
This is compatible with the present domain-general framework for three 
reasons: Firstly, it does not entail that identifying emotions relies upon a special 
introspective attentional mechanism, working memory resource or conceptual system, 
only that there is an additional domain-specific informational link (particularly in 
interhemispheric communication). 
 Secondly, the existence of domain-specific processes does not invalidate the 
present framework because the hypothesis was that most errors can be accounted for 
by domain-general processes (not that there are no domain-specific processes which 
contribute to phenomenal judgements). This is consistent with domain-specific 
processes also contributing to the judgement as long as their role in producing errors 
in neurally typical individuals is relatively small. While I cannot conclusively prove 
that this is in fact the case, I think that there can be indirect evidence for this 
hypothesis. In particular, in accounting for the unreliability of different phenomenal 
judgements I have drawn upon attentional, working memory and conceptual factors, 
as well as properties of the target phenomenal states such as complexity and 
dynamicity. There has so far been no need to posit any other significant sources of 
error in accounting for problem cases in typical individuals.  
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Thirdly, alexithymia is also associated with a difficulty in identifying other’s 
emotional states (a judgement about the world) as well as one’s own emotional states 
(a phenomenal judgment). Lane et al. (1996) present evidence that individuals with 
Alexithymia have difficulty in recognising the emotions displayed by faces. That is, it 
is not just a deficit unique to identifying one’s own emotional states, but in emotion 
processing in general. Goldman (2006) also reviews evidence that a deficit in feeling 
a specific emotion is paired with a deficit in recognising the same specific emotion in 
others. This suggests that making judgements about one’s own emotions and those of 
others share underlying processes, which is a version of the domain-general thesis.
 
Thus even if evidence was found that these informational links were significantly 
unreliable in neurally typical subjects, alexithymia still does not provide evidence for 
a separate introspective process apart from processes involved in making judgements 
about the world. Rather it is consistent with the domain-general thesis. 
 
2.8. Statistical Unreliability and Introspective Scepticism 
 
In sections 2.4-2.6, I argued that most errors and limitations of phenomenal 
judgements can in principle be accounted for by the domain-general dimensions of 
attention, working memory limitations and conceptualization. If true then this account 
undermines the process unreliability thesis - the view that errors in the formation of 
phenomenal judgements are due to factors specific to the formation of phenomenal 
judgements. I provide reasons in support of the domain-general thesis in the next 
section. 
What about the statistical unreliability thesis? It can still be held that 
phenomenology is in general more complex, dynamic and elusive, and thus we will 
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always be less reliable at judging it than facts about the world. The statistical 
unreliability thesis is compatible with the domain-general account. According to the 
current framework the greater unreliability of phenomenal judgements (if they are 
indeed less reliable) is typically due to properties of the target of the judgement such 
as complexity and dynamicity, or other factors such as a lack of expertise in making 
phenomenal judgements, rather than a fault in specific processes which produce the 
judgement. This can lead to statistical differences in the reliability of phenomenal 
judgements, but this uniqueness does not imply that the errors stem from separate 
domain-specific processes. 
Perhaps a type of scepticism can be based upon statistical unreliability. In this 
section I consider some motivations for holding the statistical unreliability thesis. I 
argue that while there are reasons for holding that some phenomenal judgements are 
less reliable than perceptual judgements, there are a number of reasons suggesting that 
Schwitzgebel overstates the size of the difference. I then present an argument for 
blocking a move from statistical unreliability to introspective scepticism. 
In my view, Schwitzgebel’s (2011, p. 136) claim that experience is almost 
always ‘gelatinous, disjointed, swift, shy, changeable’ is incorrect, especially when it 
comes to perceptual experience. For example, my visual experience of desks, the sky, 
and trees are very stable. According to Schwitzgebel (2011) ‘The tomato is stable. My 
visual experience as I look at the tomato shifts with each saccade, each blink, each 
observation of a blemish, each alteration of attention, with the adaptation of my eyes 
to lighting and color’. (p. 136). On the contrary, it seems to me that a tomato usually 
does look stable. I visually experience it as stable, and this is the typical experience. I 
do not infer that it is stable. When I attend more closely to the minute details of how 
my visual experience is given taking into account eye movements, blinks and lighting, 
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have I not altered my ordinary experience? In any case, both object constant and 
inconstant features are part of experience. Schwitzgebel could respond that the tomato 
also looks stable, but hold that most of perceptual experience is nevertheless unstable. 
My sense by contrast is that it is ordinarily stable. Is most of perceptual experience 
unstable before I attend to these micro-features, or did I make it unstable by trying to 
attend to how things look with eye blinks, and colour inconstancy (while ignoring 
colour constancy etc.)? Did I create the instability by focusing my attention? 
Experiments on naïve subjects would be required to decide between the views. One 
reason in favour of ordinary perceptual experience being stable is that if it was not 
then it would be difficult to filter the constant features out of the chaos. Yet we do not 
have this difficulty. Even newborns have been found to exhibit size constancy (Slater, 
Mattock & Brown, 1990) and shape constancy (Slater & Morrison, 1985), and colour 
constancy is evident at 20 weeks (Dannemiller, 1989). This suggests that ordinary 
perceptual experience from early on is mostly stable – rather than a ‘blooming 
buzzing confusion’ (as famously quipped by William James (1890, vol 1, p. 488)). 
These are the aspects of experience that we use to navigate the world. At least 
judgements about the stable aspects of experience will presumably be as reliable as 
the corresponding perceptual judgements. Overall then I think that Schwitzgebel 
overstates the dynamicity and elusiveness of perceptual experience by focusing on its 
inconstant features and micro-phenomenology.   
The dynamicity of thoughts, emotions and mental imagery is a central point 
that Schwitzgebel makes in favour of comparative statistical unreliability. However, 
he also tends to compare introspection to visual perception, a particularly powerful 
sense, hence over inflating the apparent difference. How do introspective judgements 
compare to other sensory modalities such as the sense of smell? I am often uncertain 
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as to the identity and location of things from their smell alone. What Schwitzgebel has 
not shown is that phenomenal judgements are in general less reliable than perceptual 
judgements based upon non-visual modalities (Kriegel, 2011). 
One consideration in favour of the comparative unreliability thesis is the 
possibility that we are experts when it comes to making judgements about the world 
as social factors and biological survival depend upon this.25 Since we have far more 
practice at getting these judgements right perhaps we are more likely to attend more 
effectively and to acquire more fine-grained concepts like expert wine tasters 
(Ballester, et al., 2008; Solomon, 1990) than for untrained judgements about 
experience.  
Perhaps we can also chunk items of the world more efficiently and thus can 
make more accurate judgements about complex situations such as being in traffic in 
comparison to the patterns when one’s eyes are closed just as chess experts are better 
at assessing and memorising positions on a chess board than novices (Chase & Simon, 
1973). Also there may be few negative consequences if we get details of our 
emotional phenomenology, visual acuity, visual imagery and eyes closed 
phenomenology incorrect, and so perhaps we tend to be novices particularly when it 
comes to these experiences. Again while we may be experts when it comes to making 
visual judgements about the world, most of us are not so good at making non-visual 
perceptual judgements. What’s causing that bad smell? What bird is making that call? 
What jagged thing did I step on? What instruments are playing in the symphony? 
Does the pasta sauce have basil or oregano in it, or both? 
Furthermore judgements about sensory experience such as ‘the rose looks red’ 
are intimately related to perceptual judgements such as ‘the rose is red’. In making 
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both types of judgement, I attend outwards to the rose and its perceptible properties. I 
do not shift my attention inwards to decide how the rose looks. Schwitzgebel (2012, 
p. 34-35) makes a similar point when he discusses how we easily slip between 
judgements about our perceptual experience and properties of the world and takes it 
as evidence for overlapping processes in making judgements. However he does not 
mention the implication of this - that this is a reason for thinking that a large number 
of phenomenal judgements and perceptual judgements (in the veridical case) are 
hence equivalent in reliability. Furthermore, expertise in one would then be expected 
to entail an equivalent level of expertise in the other. Wine tasting is a salient 
example. Overall, then the novice argument is a point in favour of statistical 
unreliability for some though not all phenomenal judgements. It also works against 
many perceptual judgements. The flipside of the argument from lack of expertise is 
that it should then be possible (at least in principle) to train subjects to overcome these 
errors. 
Finally, in this chapter I argued that the errors and limitations in making 
phenomenal judgements stem from domain-general processes. This has the 
consequence that perceptual judgements suffer from the same types of errors and 
limitations as phenomenal judgements. This suggests that Schwitzgebel may be 
underestimating the number of errors and limitations in making perceptual 
judgements. I also disputed whether we are unreliable at recognising the size of the 
region of clarity in the visual field and the vividness of mental imagery. 
 Suppose that it was the case that the statistical unreliability of phenomenal 
judgements was very high (although this seems unlikely for reasons already given). 
One might hold that this justifies a form of scepticism in which one should mistrust 
all of these judgements. Thus it may be that a strong form of pessimism is still viable 
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based upon their statistical unreliability. I think that the current account blocks the 
threat of scepticism based upon statistical unreliability by providing criteria for 
distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements.  
The proposal is that identifying the dimensions involved in making 
phenomenal errors vindicates the apparently trustworthy cases of phenomenal 
judgements such as foveal colour judgements, knowing that I am in intense pain etc., 
by showing why they are so often correct. These highly trustworthy, virtually 
undoubtable judgements are characterised by the stability and high intensity of the 
experience, and the high degree of attentiveness at the time of the judgement, as well 
as the possession of appropriate concepts.  
This enables us to locate the reliability of a particular phenomenal judgement 
in Reliability Space (Figure 2.1). I will provide an example using wine tasting 
judgements (for the sake of simplicity I do not include all of the relevant factors in the 
figure).
26
 For example, the judgements of a wine taster who is inattentive and with a 
low degree of conceptual adequacy would be located at A (e.g., an inattentive novice 
taster); inattentive but high conceptual adequacy at B (e.g., an inattentive expert 
taster); attentive but low conceptual adequacy at C (e.g., an attentive novice taster); 
and attentive and high conceptual adequacy at D (e.g., an attentive expert taster).
27
 As 
there are principled criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable 
phenomenal judgements, there is no reason to doubt judgements that reside in a 
superior position in reliability space, thus undermining the potential slide into 
introspective scepticism.  
                                                 
26
 Errors due to the complexity or dynamicity of the experience can be incorporated into this simplified 
reliability space as these tend to cause a failure of the appropriate concepts to either be activated or 
maintained in working memory. A more explanatorily adequate figure would also include these factors. 
27
 In a study by Solomon (1990) it was found that wine experts are better at picking the odd wine out of 
three glasses of wine than novices, which suggests that it is the possession of concepts, rather than 
terminology that differentiates experts from novices (see also Ballester, et al., 2008). 
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A response to this account by the pessimist is to move the pessimism to a 
higher level and ask: how do you know that you are in a situation where you are being 
appropriately attentive and have adequate concepts, etc.? However, this question also 
applies to perception, reasoning, and mathematics so one cannot be a higher-order 
pessimist about phenomenal judgements without also generalizing this pessimism to 
these other domains. This argument works independently of the truth of the domain-
general thesis. Suppose evidence arose that there are multiple domain-specific 
attentional mechanisms. Nevertheless, by identifying a type of error as attentional, this 
provides criteria for deciding if a phenomenal judgement is likely to be erroneous. 
 
   
Figure 2.1. Reliability Space for Phenomenal Judgements on the Dimensions of 
Attentiveness and Conceptual Adequacy. (A) Low attentiveness and low conceptual 
adequacy, (B) low attentiveness and high conceptual adequacy, (C) high attentiveness 
and low conceptual adequacy, (D) high attentiveness and high conceptual adequacy. 
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2.9. The Case for the Domain-General Thesis 
 
The primary aim of the chapter was to argue against the process unreliability 
thesis which holds that phenomenal judgements are unreliable due to faulty domain-
specific processes. The strategy was to argue that problem cases for phenomenal 
judgements can either be discounted as non-errors or accounted for by domain-
general factors such as attention, working memory and conceptualization. Thus it is 
not that mechanisms involved in making phenomenal judgements are unreliable per 
se, but any judgement in which there are attentional and conceptual errors or working 
memory limits are exceeded, including phenomenal, perceptual, mathematical and 
rational judgements. If true then this account undermines the process unreliability 
thesis. 
Furthermore, this would significantly limit the scope of pessimism about 
phenomenal judgements because perceptual judgements would also suffer from the 
same errors and limitations as phenomenal judgements.  One outcome of the current 
account if true is that theorists who claim that phenomenal judgements are generally 
unreliable must mean that they are unreliable in terms of overall numbers, not that the 
underlying processes are unreliable. If they mean that the underlying processes 
themselves are generally unreliable, then the claim would over generalise, such that 
perceptual and intellectual judgements would also be generally unreliable. This is 
presumably an outcome that no one wants. 
Should we accept the domain-general account of errors and limitations? As it 
is an empirical hypothesis it is always open to defeating evidence, so I cannot claim to 
have proved the hypothesis here. I do however think that it is sufficiently probable 
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enough to warrant assenting to this thesis over a domain-specific account. The reasons 
in favour of the present thesis are:  
(1) Attentional distraction between different modalities, suggesting that there 
is a single focus of attention. If there was a separate introspective attention then I 
should be able to attend to my thoughts and the world simultaneously without 
distraction.  
(2)  A working  memory capacity-limit of approximately four chunks for many 
different domains (Cowan, 2001) (including stereotypically introspective cases), as 
well as direct empirical evidence for a single capacity across sensory modalities 
(Saults and Cowan, 2007).  
(3) Phenomenal judgements and perceptual judgements are subject to the same 
types of conceptual errors.  
(4) That most errors and limitations for neurally typical individuals stem from 
a domain-general system is compatible with cognitive dissociations such as 
Alexithymia.  
(5) The domain-general framework is more parsimonious than positing 
multiple domain-specific systems that are responsible for the same types of errors and 
limitations. Why posit special types of attention, working memory capacity and 
conceptualization when a single system could perform the same functions? This 
arguably shifts the burden of proof onto the proponent of the process unreliability 
thesis.  
At the very least this chapter blocks an argument for the process unreliability 
thesis. However, I claim that we can draw a stronger conclusion than this.  
The above reasons do not prove the hypothesis, but I think that they provide sufficient 
support, in conjunction with being the simpler hypothesis, for provisionally accepting 
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the domain-general thesis over the process unreliability thesis barring evidence 
arising to the contrary. 
The present account also provides systematic criteria for distinguishing 
reliable from unreliable phenomenal judgements, which blocks the argument for 
general introspective scepticism based upon statistical unreliability. By limiting the 
scope of pessimism, this chapter also contributes to the wider project of defending the 
possibility of reliable first-person methods for investigating conscious experience. 
What such first-person methods might consist in is the topic for the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
3. First-Person Experiments 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades there has been a renewal of interest in using first-person 
methods for investigating consciousness (Ericsson, 2003; Ericsson and Simon, 1993; 
Hurlburt 1990; Hurlburt and Heavey 2004; Jack & Roepstorff, 2003; Jack & Shallice, 
2001; Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Overgaard, Gallagher, & Ramsøy, 2008; Overgaard, 
Rote, Mouridse & Ramsøy, 2006; Ramsoy & Overgaard, 2004; Varela, 1996; Varela 
& Shear, 1999; Vermersch, 1999). The general reliability of these methods is 
controversial. According to a number of philosophers and psychologists first-person 
methods are irredeemably fraught with sources of error (Dennett, 1991, 2001; 
Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007; Lyons, 1986; Irvine, 2012; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Schwitzgebel, 2011). In a particularly strong statement of this sceptical attitude, 
Daniel Dennett (2001a) states: ‘First-person science of consciousness is a discipline 
with no methods, no data, no results, no future, no promise. It will remain a fantasy’. 
Elizabeth Irvine also criticises a number of contemporary first-person methods and 
concludes that ‘the persistent and ineradicable presence of bias in subjective 
measures… affects… all introspective methods’ (Irvine, 2012, p. 642).  
Pessimism about first-person methods involves questioning the reliability of the 
link between phenomenal judgements and experiences. A first-person report may fail 
to indicate an experience because the subject may be confabulating, have biases, be 
influenced by the experimenter’s biases, and the attempt to make a judgment about an 
experience may interfere with the experience. These potential sources of error should 
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be taken seriously, however the conclusion that all first-person methods are unreliable 
does not follow. Advances in controlling for errors in making verbal reports are 
particularly found in Ericsson and Simon’s method of Protocol Analysis (Ericsson, 
2003; Ericsson and Simon, 1993) and Hulburt and colleague’s Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (Hurlburt 1990, 1993; Hurlburt and Heavey 2004: though see Schwitzgebel 
in Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007) for criticism).
28
 Furthermore, the conclusion of 
general unreliability can only be maintained by discounting psychophysics as 
involving introspection
29
 and ignoring Gestalt psychology and illusion research 
altogether, both of which are generally accepted as employing reliable methods. 
No doubt there are many sources of first-person errors, however, third-person 
methods are also subject to many sources of error, which often require sophisticated 
techniques to control. Taking further inspiration from science, we find that 
experiments are a particularly effective method for isolating variables of interest, and 
for controlling for sources of error. Hence a potentially reliable first-person method 
would be to use a first-person equivalent of standard scientific experiments in 
investigating questions about experience – first-person experiments. Such methods 
have been proposed by Ginsburg (2005). There have been many discussions of first-
person methods used in conjunction with third-person methods (e.g., Lutz & 
Thompson, 2003; Varela, 1996) but few discussions on appropriate methods for 
intraperspective experiments.  
In this chapter I seek to characterise what a first-person experiment is, and to 
distinguish them from third-person experiments. I also argue that many such 
experiments do not fall prey to common objections to first-person methods. I begin 
with the historical origin of first-person experiments. 
                                                 
28
 See Goldman (2004) and Hatfield (2005) for general defences of first-person methods. 
29
 See Horst (2005) for arguments against psychophysics as being merely third-person methods. 
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3.2. Historical Background 
 
Historically one of the reasons for the failure of introspective psychology was 
reputably its inability to resolve the dispute over imageless thought (Boring, 1953; 
Lyons, 1986). Members of the Würzburg School claimed to find introspective 
evidence of imageless thought, while Titchener and his followers claimed the 
opposite. Neither could the schools agree on the number of sensory elements nor upon 
their basic attributes.
 30
 In his famous behaviourist manifesto, John Watson (1913) 
criticised introspective psychology for its inability to resolve such questions: 
 
I firmly believe that two hundred years from now, unless the introspective 
method is discarded, psychology will still be divided on the question as to 
whether auditory sensations have the quality of 'extension’, whether intensity is 
an attribute which can be applied to color, whether there is a difference in 
'texture' between image and sensation and upon many hundreds of others of like 
character (Watson, 1913, p. 164). 
 
According to the received historical account such examples of the unreliability of 
introspection account for why they were abandoned and why only third-person 
methods should be used now.  
                                                 
30
 A quibble over history: A popular illustration of the disagreement between Introspective schools has 
been to cite Boring (1942), as reporting that Külpe’s laboratory found less than 12,000 discriminable 
sensations, while Titchener’s laboratory discovered more than 44,435 (e.g., Güzeldere, 1995, p. 39; 
Nahmias, 2002, p. 6; Velmans, 2000a, p. 48-49). This is an apparently very large disagreement. 
However these numbers exaggerate the difference because the 44,435 was the total number from 
Titchener’s laboratory, while the 11,916 from Külpe’s laboratory is the sum of the numbers provided 
by Boring. Boring does not actually provide the number of smells identified by Külpe – he merely says 
that he discovered ‘numerous smells’ (Boring, 1942, p. 10). This unspecified number is in addition to 
the sum of 11,916, so there is no way of calculating the actual total of sensations from Külpe from the 
numbers provided by Boring. The only numbers that are directly comparable are tastes (each laboratory 
identifying 4), and tones which was 11,063 for Külpe and 11,600 for Titchener. These are hardly large 
differences. 
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There a number of problems with the received view. Firstly, Danziger (1980) 
points to historical factors such as changes in research interests as more important 
than internal difficulties to introspective methods. Much of introspective psychology 
involved the attempt to identify sensory elements which only extensively trained 
subjects could uncover. For instance, the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Kohler 
(1947) criticised introspectionist methods not due to their unreliability but due to their 
artificiality in attempting to exclude sensory context and meaning from experience. 
An example of an introspective method was to view two objects one at a time through 
a hole in a card so as to remove the influence of background. In this way an obliquely 
viewed plate would seem elliptical rather than circular. Similar methods were used to 
eradicate size and brightness constancy from experience and to thus arrive at the ‘pure 
sensations’. Kohler remarks, ‘when I apply the Introspectionist’s methods I often find 
the same experiences as he does. But I am far from attributing to such facts a rare 
value as though they were more ‘true’ than the facts of everyday experience’ (Kohler, 
1947, p. 52). Interest shifted away from the introspectionist’s narrow research goals to 
more applied psychology such as learning, memory and intelligence.  
A second problem with the received account is that the use of introspection 
never actually ceased. Boring (1953) points out that although introspective 
psychology fell out of favour, first-person methods continued under different names 
in the form of verbal reports, particularly in Gestalt psychology and psychophysics. 
First-person methods were never in fact abandoned, even during the heyday of 
behaviourism. They have continued unabated in some form to this day. In particular, 
first-person reports play an essential role in scientific studies of consciousness (Jack 
& Shallice, 2001). 
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Phenomenology is an alternative first-person approach also with roots in early 
German experimental psychology. Beginning with Brentano, phenomenology split off 
into two main branches. Husserl developed philosophical phenomenology with 
followers such as Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Sartre. In the second branch, Carl 
Stumpf initiated an experimental approach to phenomenology – ‘experimental 
phenomenology’ (Vicario, 1993). Stumpf’s students, Werheimer, Koffka and Kohler 
pioneered Gestalt psychology, in particular they used first-person experiments in the 
identification of laws of sensory grouping (Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 1947; Wertheimer, 
1912). Unlike the introspective psychologists, the Gestalt psychologists emphasised 
the investigation of ordinary experience without the extensive training of subjects. 
A first-person experimental approach is also found in the investigation of illusions 
(Kanizsa, 1976; Müller-Lyer, 1889). Hatfield (2005, p. 276-277) emphasizes the 
important role that ‘demonstration drawings’ play in these investigations and how 
they continue to be used in perception textbooks for demonstrating phenomenological 
effects. Vicario remarks that ‘Gaetano Kanizsa used to say… that he performed his 
own experiments on the pages of his books’ (Vicario, 1993, p. 202). Figures that 
result in multi-stable perception such as the Necker cube are also examples of the use 
of demonstration drawings (see also, Ihde, 2012). Many examples can be found in 
Robinson (2013), Rock (1975) and Palmer (1999). A handbook dedicated to 
experimental phenomenology has recently appeared (Albertazzi, 2013). The first-
person experiments I discuss here are also in the tradition of experimental 
phenomenology.  
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3.3. First-Person Data and Third-Person Data 
 
Before discussing first-person experiments we need to be clear on the 
difference between a first-person method and a third-person method. A first-person 
method differs from a third-person method in that the former produces first-person 
data and the latter produces third-person data.
31
 First-person data represent 
phenomenal experiences, such as the way things seem, feel, appears etc. to a subject. 
Examples are the verbal judgements ‘I feel a throbbing pain’, ‘the lines look unequal 
in size to me’, ‘the mental image of the house is vivid’. A subject can also indicate the 
experience behaviourally such as by pressing a button to select whether two lines look 
the same size or not, and selecting a number on a scale to represent the intensity of a 
pain. These are all examples of subjects making judgements about their experience. 
For the purposes of this thesis, only methods which involve a subject making a 
phenomenal judgement will be referred to as first-person methods. First-person data 
are sentences, phrases, symbols or numbers which record phenomenal judgements.
32
 
The explanandum of first-person data is what the data represents, namely phenomenal 
experiences.  
Third-person data by contrast represents properties and events in the world - 
the way things are. Third-person data represents phenomena such as gestures, reaction 
time, eye movements and fixations, heart rate, skin conductance and brain activity. 
                                                 
31
 The terms first-person and third-person are somewhat unfortunate as all third-person perspectives 
upon me are just others’ first-person perspectives upon me. Even the behaviourist observes the rat’s 
behaviour by consciously experiencing it. The cognitive psychologist investigates the data from a 
reaction time study by visually experiencing the numbers on a computer screen. There is no question of 
‘objective’ methods eliminating ‘subjectivity’ from science (for a discussion see Velmans, 2000a, 
chapter 6). Clearer terminology would be between ‘phenomenal data’ – data about experiences, and 
‘objectival data’ – data about objects, properties and events in the world. As first-person and third-
person are the standard terms I will continue to use them, though this potential source of confusion 
should be kept in mind. 
32
 Levine (1994) and Chalmers (2004) use a different definition of first-person data in which the 
phenomenal experiences themselves are the data. Here I follow Piccinini’s (2009) usage. 
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Third-person methods are methods that collect third-person data. A mixed method 
collects both types of data. For example, a study that asks subjects to rate the intensity 
of their pain (first-person data) and also records skin conductance (third-person data) 
is using a mixture of first-person and third-person methods. 
It may be objected that skin conductance also indicates (and hence represents) 
the presence of pain and therefore the distinction between first-person and third-
person data collapses. While skin conductance, heart rate and pulse rate can all be 
used as indicators of pain, the function of these physiological responses is not to 
symbolise pain – rather there is a merely an association between them. This is like the 
association between tree rings and its age. This is a ‘natural sign’ of the tree’s age 
(Dretske, 1988, p. 54-59).
33
 First-person judgements on the other hand are embedded 
in system of convention. The function of first-person report such as ‘the pain in my 
foot is excruciating!’ is to symbolise the pain either to myself or to others. It is a 
symbolic representation in which the speech act is about the pain. It is also essential to 
a symbolic representation that it can misrepresent. A map can misrepresent the 
distance between two cities. I can report that my left foot hurts, when it is actually my 
right foot that hurts. Smoke on the other hand does not misrepresent the presence of 
fire if there is no fire, it just fails to be associated with it. Here I will restrict the use of 
‘first-person data’ to data that is about phenomenal experiences in virtue of recording 
(or being) a subject’s phenomenal judgements. Assigning numbers to a subject’s 
phenomenal judgements or a list of their first-person reports are both types of first-
person data. Third-person data, on the other hand, represent the physiological activity 
of an organism, which may also be used as a (non-symbolic) sign of the experiential 
state of that organism.       
                                                 
33
 Ideas in this paragraph are loosely drawn from the third chapter of Dretske (1988) on 
Representational Systems.  
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For Daniel Dennett (1991, 2003, 2007) first-person data is always in the 
medium of behaviour (speech acts, gestures, cries, groans) and technologies such as 
computer read outs. However first-person data also exists in non-behavioural and non-
technological mediums. Subjects often make judgements about their experience by 
consciously thinking about it. These judgements are also first-person data. A subject 
that memorises numbers which represent the intensity of their pain experience and 
uses these numbers to calculate their average pain over some period is also 
manipulating first-person data. First-person data comes in many different mediums. It 
is not limited exclusively to behavioural or technological mediums.
34
 
Pressing a button to indicate the intensity of a pain is behavioural, however, 
assuming that the subject is using their behaviour to communicate properties of their 
experience, the behaviour represents an experience - it is a first-person behaviour 
(Piccinini, 2009), and hence is a source of first-person data. However, some 
philosophers treat all data that is collected by behavioural means as third-person 
methods (e.g., Dennett, 1991, 2003, 2007). If so then there would be no substantial 
debate between those that support first-person methods and those that criticise them. 
By distinguishing between first-person and third-person data the debate is not merely 
terminological. There is then a substantial question as to whether or not first-person 
data reliably represent subject’s phenomenal experiences. 
 
                                                 
34
 Some would object to calling this scientific data as it seems to be private. I will not discuss the 
private-public debate in detail here. My response is that this data is at least potentially communicable 
and so in this sense it also counts as public. I agree with Piccinini (2003, 2009) that first-person 
methods should be public in the sense that they are intersubjectively repeatable. Otherwise, as he points 
out, the observation of auras would count as a scientific method. However, Picinini uses ‘third-person 
methods’ and ‘public methods’ interchangeably which obscures the fact that all third-person 
observations are made from a first-person perspective. There are no third-person observations, just 
first-person observations, and all first-person observations are private (Velmans, 1999, 2000a). I 
observe the star by experiencing it, and my experience is private. Neither do I have access to your 
experience of the star. Nevertheless each experience has a common cause (the star) and each of us can 
verify the other’s experience when suitably positioned. In this sense it is public – that is, 
intersubjectively accessible. 
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3.4. Characterising First-Person Experiments 
 
How can we characterise a first-person experiment? This question can be 
divided into two further questions: (1) What is a scientific experiment? and (2) What 
is a specifically first-person experiment?  
A standard scientific experiment is often characterised as differing from 
observation in that it involves an intervention on a system. In particular, an 
experiment involves an intervention the system in order to observe the effect on 
properties of the system (Bogan, 2010; Hacking, 1983; Parker, 2009; Tiles, 1993; 
Woodward, 2003).
35
 As Wendy Parker states it ‘an experiment can be characterized as 
an investigative activity that involves intervening on a system in order to see how 
properties of interest of the system change, if at all, in light of that intervention’ 
(Parker, 2009, p. 487). The advantage of an experiment is that it can produce a 
predicted change/non-change in a dependent variable hence testing a hypothesis about 
that system. By putting the system into a novel state an experiment can isolate a 
property of interest and also be used to control for confounding background factors.  
As an example, suppose I want to test the electrical conductivity of water that 
has sodium chloride dissolved in it. By setting up a circuit through a beaker of water 
and connecting it to a galvanometer it can be shown that the salt solution conducts 
electricity. This can be compared with distilled water which will not conduct a 
current. How different levels of sodium chloride affect conductivity can be tested by 
varying the amount of salt in the solution. By holding fixed other factors such as 
amount of water, water temperature and distance of the electrodes from each other in 
                                                 
35
 See Meketa (2012) for a criticism of the experiment-observation distinction in scientific practice.  
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the water, the effect of sodium chloride concentration on electrical conductivity can 
be isolated. 
An initial characterisation of a first-person experiment then is: 
 
(1) An investigative activity in which there is an intervention on a subject’s 
experience and the subject makes a phenomenal judgement about the resulting 
phenomenal character of that experience.  
 
A clarification of this characterisation is that the intervention on the subject’s 
experience could be made by the investigator themselves such that they intervene on 
their own experience, or by an investigator who is not the subject. 
A problem with the above characterisation is that it seems to be too thin. 
Imagining a house and then making a judgement about it will fit the criteria for a first-
person experiment. The mere act of imagining changes experience in that there is now 
a visual image where before there was not, and hence involves an intervention upon 
experience. However this does not seem to involve enough constraints to count as an 
experiment. An experiment needs to include an effort to manipulate some properties 
of experience, while keeping others fixed. A thicker characterisation then is: 
 
(2) An investigative activity in which there is an intervention on a subject’s 
experience in which independent variables (phenomenal or non-phenomenal) 
are manipulated, and extraneous variables (phenomenal or non-phenomenal) 
are held fixed, and in which the subject makes a phenomenal judgement about 
the dependent variable (target phenomenal character of the investigation).   
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I discuss this characterization in reference to an example. Kirby and Kosslyn 
(1990) describe an unpublished study involving mental imagery which fits this 
criterion for a first-person experiment. They asked subjects to imagine a brick as 
clearly as possible, and then further additional bricks until any of them became 
unclear. The experiment manipulates the number of bricks (independent variable) and 
the target phenomenal character is imagery vividness (dependent variable). There was 
an average limit of 6.3 bricks with a range of 4-9, suggesting that there is a capacity 
limit to the details that can be maintained in a visual image at any one time.
36
 
The dependent variable is assumed to depend upon the independent variable 
such that changing the independent variable will change the dependent variable. 
Changing the number of imagined bricks manipulates the complexity of the visual 
image. If there is a capacity limit to the details that can be clearly maintained in a 
visual image then manipulating the complexity of those details should affect the 
overall vividness of the mental image. The house example by contrast does not 
involve the manipulation of an independent variable. 
Non-phenomenal factors may include cognitive factors such as effort and 
degree of attentiveness. For example, the amount of effort the subject puts into the 
imagery task. Other extraneous variables such as bodily experience are held fixed in 
the experiment, or at least allowed to fluctuate randomly. For the purposes of the 
experiment it may be assumed that bodily experience has a negligible effect on the 
imagery vividness or at least one that averages out over the course of the experiment. 
If there is a theoretical reason for expecting an interaction between extraneous 
variables and the independent and dependent variables then it may have to be actively 
held fixed or actively manipulated (that is, it becomes an independent variable). Other 
                                                 
36
 Note that I am not claiming that this is a reliable experiment. I am just using it for illustrative 
purposes. 
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extraneous variables such as lighting and instructions are held fixed, whilst others are 
controlled for (e.g., practice effects can be controlled for by counter-balancing). 
The first-person experiment described above takes places within a single 
subject’s experience and the subject makes the critical judgement about the target 
experience. These intraperspective experiments can be distinguished from 
experiments in which the subject plays a more passive role. For example subjects may 
rate the vividness of their mental images in high working memory load and low 
working memory conditions. The experimenter will then typically test the hypothesis 
about how the vividness of mental imagery interacts with working memory load by 
statistical methods. Here the critical comparison which controls for extraneous 
variables is done by the experimenter, outside of the subject’s experience. In the 
experiment described above, on the other hand, the subject themselves made the 
critical decision as to how many bricks they can vividly imagine. These are the types 
of experiments that I will focus on here. Although both are experiments involve 
phenomenal judgements, I will reserve the term ‘first-person experiments’ for the 
latter type of first-person methods.    
 
3.5. First-Person and Third-Person Experiments 
 
Many experiments involve an intervention on a subject’s experience. A 
subject’s experience is systematically manipulated in most psychological experiments 
yet most investigations in psychology do not explicitly use first-person methods, such 
as experiments on concepts, memory, attention, priming, perceptual processing. The 
reason for this is that most of these studies do not involve subjects making a 
judgement about experience. For example, perceptual judgements such as when a 
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subject judges whether a red X is present or absent in a display involve judgements 
about the presented stimuli. On the other hand, if we were to ask whether a red X 
seems to be present or absent then this would be a first-person method. Thus it is the 
manipulation of independent variables in conjunction with the subject making 
phenomenal judgements about the resulting experiences that makes a method a first-
person experiment. This allows that not all experiments in psychology count as first-
person experiments. 
The experiment with the galvanometer also relies upon an observer 
experiencing it, but it is not a first-person experiment. This is because my judgement 
is not about what it is like to see the galvanometer, but about the conductivity of the 
water. I make judgements about properties of the world based upon my experience of 
it in conjunction with background beliefs and theory. Call these judgements 
‘objectival judgements’. These are distinguished from an experiment in which I make 
a ‘phenomenal judgement’, that is a judgement about the phenomenal character of my 
present experience such as how things look, seem, and feel. For example, in looking 
at a wall through red coloured spectacles, I may judge that the wall looks pink 
(phenomenal judgement), or judge that the wall is white (objectival judgement). In the 
latter case, my belief that I am looking through red spectacles is used infer beyond 
how things look. In other cases, in standard lighting and viewing conditions, I may 
judge that the wall both looks white (phenomenal judgement) and is white (perceptual 
judgement). In a perceptual judgment, I make a judgement about the world but I do 
not infer beyond currently perceptible properties. 
As I previously mentioned, only methods which involve subjects making a 
phenomenal judgement about their experience will be treated as first-person methods. 
For example, upon being presented with the Müller-Lyer illusion subjects are asked if 
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the lines look the same size or different in size. Subjects will usually respond 
‘different’. If subjects are asked whether the lines are actually the same size or not 
they may well respond that they are the same size. As another example, questions 
about how large a distant disc is elicit different responses than questions about how 
large the disc looks. Granrud (2009) found that in older children and adults, the 
former question produced underconstancy whereas the latter question produced 
constancy. First-person experiments hence have a clearly distinguishable subject 
matter from third-person experiments. In particular, the target of the judgement differs 
between third-person and first-person experiments. 
 
3.6. Examples of First-Person Experiments 
 
Experiment 3.1: Attention and Perceived Brightness 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The Tse Illusion. In A, focusing on a square and attending to a disc 
decreases the brightness of the attended disc. The effect is absent in B. Figure from 
Tse (2005, p. 1096). 
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On the above characterisation there is little doubt that there can be, and in fact 
are, numerous first-person experiments. An example is the Tse Illusion (Tse, 2005). 
 
Look at A and fixate on one of small squares. Now shift attention to one of the discs. 
The perceived brightness of the attended disc decreases. It seems darker. This 
demonstrates that attention can change perceived brightness. Repeat this for B and 
notice that the effect is absent. 
 
The effect seems to stem from the visual system interpreting the discs as 
transparent. This explanation is supported by B where the effect is absent. Here the 
discs are overlaid on a black background, which removes an important cue indicating 
that the discs are transparent. 
This is a first-person experiment because it involves subjects making a 
judgement about how bright the discs look (dependent variable), rather than how 
bright they actually are. It also involves holding fixed variables such as colour, shape 
and eye focus, while manipulating attention to different discs (independent variable). 
The decrease in brightness to an attended disc in A involves the experience of a 
phenomenal difference between the attended and non-attended discs. In B on the other 
hand, there is no phenomenal difference in brightness between attended and non-
attended discs. The presence of the effect in A but not in B shows a further 
phenomenal difference. In both cases, subject’s judge whether there is a phenomenal 
contrast between the targets. These experiments hence systematically manipulate 
attentional focus and background colour, while holding fixed other factors (see Tse 
(2005) for a manipulation of further factors). 
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Experiment 3.2: Subjective Contours 
 
    
   
Figure 3.2. Subjective Contours. A phenomenal contrast between A and B 
demonstrates that changes in spatial organisation can lead to emergent shape 
phenomenology, in particular a triangle in B but not in A. Subjective contours also 
occur with a black background in C and D, and non-straight contours in D. 
 
Another example of first-person experiments comes from the investigation of 
‘subjective contours’ by Kanizsa (1976). Using the depicted images in Figure 3.2, one 
can test the hypothesis that changes in spatial organisation can lead to emergent 
phenomenal character. The images in A and B show two groups of black pie-shapes. 
The only difference between the A group and B group is the spatial orientation of the 
shapes (the independent variable). The result of the experiment is that there is an 
 
  
C D 
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additional type of phenomenal character in experiencing B which is not present in 
experiencing A, that of seeing a triangle (the dependent variable). I see lines 
connecting the shapes where there are none. This experiment supports the hypothesis 
that changes in spatial organisation can lead to emergent or gestalt phenomenology. 
Further questions arise such as whether such phenomenal shapes occur with 
different coloured backgrounds and pie-shapes, which can be explored by 
manipulating these variables. Thus for instance, it is found that subjective contours 
also occur when the background is black as in C, and that the apparent lines do not 
need to be straight as in D. By manipulating variables one can systematically 
investigate the conditions under which the phenomenon occurs (see Kanizsa, 1976 for 
further conditions in which subjective contours manifest). 
 
Experiment 3.3: The Visual Periphery 
 
Hold out a single finger and focus your eyes on it. Now hold a hand up in your 
peripheral vision so that it is at the same depth as your finger. Now without moving 
your eyes attend to your hand. How many fingers can you distinguish? I find that it 
looks pink and blurry. I seem to have somewhere between four and five fingers, and 
there is no clear boundary where one finger ends and the next begins.  Now look 
directly at your hand and see by contrast that the two appearances of your hand are 
radically different. The same applies to all objects seen peripherally and in the centre 
of your vision. In the centre objects seem distinct and in the periphery they seemingly 
blur together.  
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This provides an example of using a method of phenomenal contrast to notice 
my visual experience, and the use of apparatus (my hands) to assist in doing so (for 
other versions of the experiment see also Dennett, 1991, p. 53-54; Hill, 2011, p. 27; 
Schwitzgebel, 2011, p. 125-127). 
 
3.7. Phenomenal contrast 
 
Many first-person experiments (but not all) use a method of phenomenal 
contrast (Bayne, 2009; Bayne, & Montague, 2011; Kriegel, 2007; Masrour, 2011; 
Siegel 2006, 2007; Robinson, 2005). Rather than asking whether a plate viewed 
obliquely looks elliptical, one asks whether it looks elliptical in contrast to a plate 
viewed straight on. That is, one looks for a phenomenal difference, thus allowing for a 
more refined phenomenal judgement. The critical test for whether phenomenal 
character differs between two scenarios is whether there is a phenomenal difference 
(Siewert, 1998, p. 219). Where there is no phenomenal difference between two 
experiences, then phenomenal character is identical.
37
 
First-person experiments are intraperspective methods which often involve a 
subject making a phenomenal contrast between two target phenomena. These 
intraperspective phenomenal contrasts should be distinguished from theoretical 
phenomenal contrasts. As an example of the latter, Bayne (2009) considers the 
phenomenal difference in what it must be like to have visual agnosia in which objects 
are not recognized and what it is like to have normal visual recognition of objects. It 
is a thought experiment rather than a first-person experiment. By thinking about two 
cases I come to believe that there must be a difference between the two types of 
                                                 
37
 I do not say detectable phenomenal difference here because there are many situations such as 
‘change blindness’ in which we would want to say that there is a phenomenal difference, however, the 
subject fails to recognise it. 
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experience (for other examples of theoretical phenomenal contrasts see Kriegel (2007) 
and Siegel (2006)).  
On the other hand, an intraperspective contrast involves experiencing the 
phenomenal difference for oneself, either simultaneously or by contrasting a current 
experience with a recalled experience. For example, in experiment 3.1 the 
phenomenal contrast in apparent brightness is made between attended discs and 
unattended discs. The attended disc looks darker than the unattended disc. The 
phenomenal contrast is required for isolating the phenomena. Without the contrast it 
would have been difficult to recognise that any change in apparent brightness had 
occurred at all. The Kanizsa triangle, on the other hand, provides an example where 
phenomenal contrast is not essential to the experiment. One does not need to use 
phenomenal contrast to see the subjective contours in experiment 3.2. However, 
making a contrast can tell us something, in particular that the figures are not 
deceptions. Perhaps I have drawn in very faint lines between the pie-shapes. By 
making the contrast it can be demonstrated that it is the change in spatial organisation 
that leads to the phenomenology in B, C and D but not in A, and no tricks have been 
played. Another way of performing the contrast is to occlude two of the pie-shapes. 
When I do so the apparent connecting lines disappear.   
 
3.8. Objections to First-Person Methods 
 
 In this section I discuss how first-person experiments control for common 
errors in making phenomenal judgements: (1) The Unreliability of Naïve 
Introspection, (2) Interference From Extraneous Variables (3) Variability in 
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responses. I also respond to the criticism that (4) first-person methods are not different 
from behavioural methods. 
 
3.8.1. The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection 
 
Schwitzgebel (2011) presents a large number of problem cases to motivate the 
conclusion that naïve introspection is unreliable. One of the main aims of using a 
first-person experiment is to avoid or at least reduce errors in making phenomenal 
judgements. In chapter 2, by categorising the errors in Schwitzgebel’s cases, I 
identified two main errors in phenomenal judgements: attentional and conceptual. We 
make errors either because we fail to attend to the target experience or because there 
is a failure in possessing, forming or employing the correct phenomenal concept about 
the target (or both). It is a goal of first-person methods to control for these sources of 
error. In particular, the methods are used to orient attention to the experience, as well 
as providing a salient sample of an experience, so that a phenomenal concept can be 
activated or formed. 
 While naïve introspection can frequently go wrong, first-person experiments 
use methods for overcoming these common errors. Experiment 3.1 assists subjects in 
controlling their attention by asking them to keep their eyes fixated on one of the 
squares and then shifting their attention to one of the discs at a time. Similarly in 
experiment 3.3, keeping your eyes focused on a fixed point avoids the error of moving 
your eyes. This may be one of the main reasons that subjects typically do not notice 
extent of the low resolution of the visual periphery. 
All three experiments provide a phenomenal sample of the target phenomena 
of interest. I experience the darkening of a disc when I attend to it, while all other 
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factors are held constant. This succeeds in isolating the effect of attention changing 
subjective brightness. Although I probably had no concept of a subjective contour 
before looking at a diagram such as in figure 3.2, doing so provides just such a sample 
phenomenal character. By providing a sample of the property of interest the 
appropriate phenomenal concept can be activated or formed, hence the probability of 
making a conceptual error becomes very low. 
Wine tasting provides another example of the method of providing 
phenomenal samples. The wine taster needs to possess or form the appropriate 
concepts before they can make reliable judgements about wine aromas. The problem 
of how to train subjects to acquire the appropriate concepts is solved by providing 
subjects with phenomenal samples. For instance, give a group of tasters examples of 
wines with coffee, burnt match, and honey aromas and keep giving them examples 
until they can reliably identify them. This method allows people to overcome their 
personally acquired ideas of aroma (e.g., ‘it really tastes like my granny’s baked 
cookies’ – perhaps it does!) and adopt a standardised system of categories (e.g., 
Noble, et al. 1987). Whether or not an individual has their own category that may be 
more accurate than the current category is beside the point. The point is that we 
enable communication about dimensions of the experience. First-person experiments 
are an effective means of enhancing a subject’s ability to isolate the target of interest 
and hence in forming or activating the appropriate concept to make a correct 
judgement about it. 
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3.8.2 Interference from Extraneous Variables 
 
Another objection to first-person methods is that the act of introspection 
interferes with its target. One plausible mechanism by which distortion may occur is 
by attention. Suppose that attending to a pain always increases its felt intensity. If I 
am to introspect what it is like to feel a pain it seems then that I must change it. A 
general response to this objection is to question its coherence. To assume that 
introspection distorts the target experience is to presuppose that there is such a thing 
as an undistorted experience. But how does one know that this undistorted experience 
exists? To do so I must sometimes know my conscious states without distorting them, 
so not all introspection distorts experience. If we do not know that there are any 
undistorted experiences then the objection does not even get off the ground. To know 
that attention changes the pain I must have already been aware of the pain either 
without attending to it or by partly attending to it (see Zahavi, 2005, p. 74-78). It 
seems then that I can judge what effect increased attention has on a target experience.  
The effect of attending to something can also be directly investigated. 
Experiment 1A shows how attending to a disc in certain conditions changes the 
subjective brightness of the disc. However, the subjects only know this by contrasting 
the subjective brightness of the disc in the focus of attention with the discs outside of 
the focus of attention. Thus it seems that subjects can either make a judgement about 
these other discs without attending to them (and hence without interference) or they 
were partly attending to them. In either case, the effect of attention upon experience 
becomes a dependent variable in the experiment. In 1B there is no apparent change in 
subjective brightness with changes of attention. Also in experiment 2 the subjective 
77 
 
 
 
contours seem to be present whether I directly attend to them in or not. This suggests 
that attention does not always significantly change the target property. 
A second way in which interference may occur is from my concepts changing 
experience. Cognitive penetration is an example of such a change. For instance, I may 
experience a red coloured heart as redder than it is due its association with the colour 
red (MacPherson, 2012).
38
 This will cause errors in making a perceptual judgement 
about the actual colour of the heart. However it is not an error in my phenomenal 
judgements as the question is ‘how red does the heart look?’ That my concepts were 
causally involved in how red the heart seems is beside the point. Suppose instead that 
my occurrent belief, or the judgement itself, actually changes the experience. Suppose 
I look at a pattern of black blotches and see no organisation. I am told that the picture 
shows a giraffe and suddenly I can see this animal where formerly there was none. 
My belief has changed my experience. Of course, the change between the two 
experiences is highly salient (I am aware of the phenomenal contrast) so there is no 
problematic interference going on here. Moreover, there is little evidence that changes 
in experience from occurrent conscious beliefs are a generally occurring phenomenon. 
 Another possibility is that my expectations affect the judgement itself. Thus I 
may judge that the heart looks redder than it appears because of my expectation that 
hearts are coloured deep red. This is a problem of response biases rather than 
interference with the experience. These are extraneous variables that can affect the 
judgement and hence are confounds to be minimised or controlled for. The effect of 
expectation can be directly investigated by including it as an independent variable in 
the experiment. For example, subjects can be shown objects that are the same shade of 
red that are either associated or not associated with red to gauge the effect of the bias. 
                                                 
38
 For a criticism of this evidence for cognitive penetration see Gross et al. (2014). Firestone and Scholl 
(2015) argue strongly that the purportedly overwhelming evidence for cognitive penetration is in fact 
weak. 
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 It is worth considering why biases typically occur. As Irvine (2012) points out 
these biases are negative when the bias tends towards a false judgement about 
experience and positive when they tend towards a true judgement about experience. 
One case where biases seem to be particularly evident is in the question of rich versus 
sparse experience. Do you constantly have tactile experience of your left foot 
(Schwitzgebel, 2011, chapter 6)? This question is difficult to answer without shifting 
your attention to your foot (‘the refrigerator light illusion’). To avoid this problem, 
Schwitzgebel (2011) asked subjects to retrospect. Although an advance over naïve 
introspection, Irvine and Schwitzgebel are both pessimistic about this methodology. 
As well as errors in recalling the experience, it is difficult to know if subjects really 
had (or did not have) the experience they report as they may be influenced by their 
expectations about whether or not experience is rich or sparse, as well as the 
experimenter’s expectations. Schwitzgebel does point out that some of these biases 
can be assessed by asking subject’s what their expectations were to see if it predicts 
their responses and by replicating the experiment with an experimenter with different 
expectations. There may however be no reliable way of testing whether experience is 
rich or sparse outside of attention given the plausible view that reliable phenomenal 
judgements require attention to a target before a judgement can be formed about it. 
This is also a problem for retrospection. If unattended (or partly attended) experiences 
do not (or perhaps infrequently) activate a concept in short-term memory or perhaps 
only very briefly, then we should not expect subjects to recall them. Neither should 
we expect subjects to know from introspection whether or not an experience was 
unattended or partly attended. 
Other cases where biases are particularly problematic are with low intensity 
experiences. Do subjects reliably report the presence of a low volume sound? Irvine 
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points out that signal detection theory treats such reports as inherently unreliable. Of 
course, this is again not surprising. Experiences that are low intensity are extremely 
difficult to report upon. False negatives and false positives abound. Stimuli that are 
close to threshold or extremely brief should not be expected to be reported reliably. 
These problems are overcome in psychophysics by collecting data from a large 
number of trials, and using sophisticated methodologies and statistical analyses to 
discover the threshold for experiencing a stimulus and ‘just noticeable differences’ in 
discrimination tasks.
39
  
From the low reliability of judgements about unattended experiences, close to 
threshold experiences, and extremely brief experiences it does not follow that all 
experiences are unreliably reported. Given the meagre information to go on in these 
cases, subjects augment their judgement with other sources of information such as 
their expectations and the experimenter’s expectations. It is not entailed that these 
bias-driven errors generalise to judgements about experiences that are fully attended, 
well above threshold and long lasting. The experiments presented here provide 
examples of such judgements. 
Irvine (2012) argues that context affects the phenomenal judgements that we 
make. This should be readily admitted. In this sense all judgements are biased – not 
just phenomenal judgements. Just asking someone a question about their experience is 
to have a causal influence on the judgement and how it is made. This is a rather trivial 
sense in which context effects phenomenal judgements. Biases are problematic when 
we cannot distinguish whether the phenomenal judgements are accurate or are being 
completely driven by biases. This is certainly a significant problem when it comes to 
                                                 
39
 It is also unclear whether subjects can be reliably trained to identify micro-phenomenology such as 
the sensory elements investigated by the Introspective Psychologists. It is plausible that many of the 
‘discovered’ sensory elements were artifacts of that very training. Though again, it does not follow 
from this that subjects cannot reliably identify broad properties and structures of consciousness. 
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unattended experience. What has not been shown by Irvine, however, is that this 
problematic influence of biases affects all phenomenal judgements. The important 
question is whether phenomenal judgements in general are driven more by context 
and expectation than other judgements such as mathematical and perceptual 
judgements. In chapter 2, I argued that phenomenal judgements and perceptual 
judgements are equally reliable when you hold fixed the complexity and dynamicity 
of the target. To the extent that biases affect a phenomenal judgement about the 
number of spots on a visual image of a speckled hen, these will (presumably) equally 
affect perceptual judgements about the number of spots on a perceptually experienced 
speckled hen. 
The experiments presented here do not seem to involve any significant 
interference or response biases. The subjective brightness differences (experiment 
3.1), the subjective contours (experiment 3.2) and the low detail of the visual 
periphery (experiment 3.3) are experienced whether I believe in them or not. Consider 
also the Müller-Lyer illusion in which the lines appear unequal despite my belief that 
they are actually equal. Neither do the experiments involve unattended, fleeting or 
low intensity experiences, so the effect of biases can be expected to be minimal (or at 
least no worse than standard experiments in psychology).  
 
3.8.3 Variability in Phenomenal Judgements 
 
A common criticism of first-person methods is that they often produce variable 
responses (Schwitzgebel, 2011). Such disputes between subjects question the 
reliability of these methods. A notorious example is the dispute over whether the 
experience of thoughts includes a non-sensory phenomenology – cognitive 
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phenomenology. In fact, the standard means for testing this qualifies as a first-person 
experiment. An example is reading a sentence in a nonsense language with a sentence 
in one’s own language: 
 
 
A. The Gufon of nolkestion yotoles that midats rebarg krowl cisteroh vigefion. 
 
B.  The theory of evolution proposes that species emerge through natural 
selection.  
 
The important idea is that one can approximately hold fixed syntax, and the 
visual and auditory properties of the words so as to bring out the phenomenology of 
meaning (whatever this may be) (Strawson, 1994; Pitt, 2004, p. 28-29). Despite using 
phenomenal contrast to isolate the phenomena philosophers still disagree as to 
whether or not there is distinct non-sensory phenomenology of meaning. Liberals 
maintain that there is (Horgan & Tienson, 2002; Pitt, 2004; Siewert, 1998; Strawson, 
1994), while conservatives deny this (Carruthers, 2005; Lormand, 1996; Nelkin, 
1989; Robinson, 2005; Tye, 1995).
40
 While the method of phenomenal contrast 
provides more refined data than naïve phenomenal judgements there is still room for 
disagreement. Assuming that the method supplies the same results across subjects, 
there is still the possibility of disagreement over how to categorise the phenomenal 
outcome. According to Susanna Siegel:  
 
                                                 
40
 See also Bayne & Montague (2011). 
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The method of phenomenal contrast is a way to limit the use of introspection 
in theorizing about visual experience. All that introspection is relied upon to 
do is to detect the phenomenal contrast. The method need not take a stand on 
the category of the phenomenally contrasting states, such as whether they are 
sensory, cognitive or some other kind (Siegel, 2007, p. 139). 
 
Thus continued disagreement does not invalidate the use of the method. In 
particular, I suspect that philosophers are actually having a verbal dispute, that is, 
using different terms to describe the same experience. It is likely that a theoretical 
dispute partly explains the disagreement over cognitive phenomenology (Bayne & 
Spener, 2010; Smithies, 2013b). A resolution may come not via phenomenological 
methods, but via philosophical debate.  A closely related example was the dispute 
amongst Introspective Psychologists over imageless thought. This is often used as 
evidence that first-person methods are unreliable. Monson (1993) however argues that 
the raw data obtained from subjects within the different labs was actually very similar, 
it was just that each school coded the raw data differently depending upon their 
theoretical commitments. The introspectors were not unreliable, rather it was the 
experimenters themselves who produced the theoretical dispute. 
Hence we need to distinguish between the reliability of an experiment in 
producing data, and disagreements in interpretation. Even when experiments are well 
designed they often underdetermine the scope of hypotheses that they support. 
Different interpretations of the data are always possible. The challenge then becomes 
designing experiments that distinguish between the competing interpretations, or 
using reasoning to decide between the interpretations. In such cases, as long as the 
experiment is free from confounds (etc.) and the data is robust between and within 
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subjects, then a method should be considered reliable (otherwise reliable scientific 
methods are impossible). That is, a dispute by itself does not show that an experiment, 
nor indeed that ‘introspection’, is unreliable. The method may reliably produce the 
same types of data, it’s just that the data is compatible with varying interpretations.  
As another example of the effect of interpretation, someone might object to 
experiment 3.3 on the grounds that it is not clear what subjects mean by saying that 
objects in the visual periphery ‘look blurry’. Here they could use descriptions such as 
fuzzy, unclear, low detail etc. It may not be clear how to define these terms but this 
was not the goal of the experiment. The only goal of the experiment was to produce a 
reliable phenomenal difference. How to conceptualise this difference is a 
philosophical problem not an introspective problem.  
Many first-person experiments will of course produce unreliable results, 
however, it does not follow from this that all first-person experiments are unreliable. 
Others produce reliable data but simply fail to resolve the original question. There are 
also long standing disputes in psychology which appear to be unresolvable (e.g., early 
selection versus late selection theories of attention). If the existence of disputes shows 
that first-person methods are in general unreliable then the same applies to 
psychology as a discipline. 
Phenomenal contrast has also been criticised on the grounds that it often does 
not always resolve the dispute it was meant to resolve (Bayne, & Montague, 2011; 
Koksvik, 2015; Nanay, 2012). I agree that phenomenal contrast does not always help 
in questions of high-level perception and meaning, however for low level perception 
the results are often clear cut. The results of the experiments presented here do exhibit 
high intersubjective agreement. For example, in viewing the Tse Illusion all 16 
subjects reported that the discs in A looked darker when they were attended. All 16 
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subjects also reported no darkening of the discs in B when they were attended. That 
subjects experience subjective contours when viewing figures such as 2 and 3 has also 
been replicated on numerous occasions. Upon conducting a test like experiment 3, 
everyone will agree that peripheral vision is low in detail, perhaps to a far greater 
extent than they had previously realised. 
 
3.8.4 Not different from behavioural methods 
 
I argued that the present experiments are not hostage to many of the biases that 
afflicts methods investigating unattended and close to threshold phenomena. Irvine 
poses a dilemma for the proponents of first-person methods. She argues that these 
methods are either unreliable or if they are reliable they do not differ from existing 
behavioural methods. She criticises a version of the third experiment reported by 
Schwitzgebel on this basis:  
 
It could be argued that asking if an object appears clear to me is just to ask 
how precisely I can discriminate it, and how confident I am in my judgments 
about it. That is, objects may appear clear if I can confidently detect exactly 
where their edges are, if I can identify the patterns on its surface, and so on. If 
this is the case, is not immediately clear if trained introspective reports can add 
to the body of already existing behavioural evidence about the boundaries of 
conscious experience (Irvine, 2012, p. 633). 
 
There a number of problems for this analysis of the task. The first reason is 
that how things seem does not reduce to discriminative abilities in that the two can 
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come apart. Things seem unclear in the visual periphery whether or not I am making a 
judgement about it. This supports the interpretation that how things seem is 
independent of the discriminative capacity. Smithies (2014) argues that for typical 
subjects how things perceptually seem to them provides justification for their 
perceptual judgements. On the face of it, the difficulty in discriminating shapes in the 
periphery of vision is because they look blurry. That is typical visual discriminations 
depend upon the visual experience. Such phenomenal discriminations can be 
contrasted with non-phenomenal discriminations as evident in blindsight (Weiskrantz, 
1986). Subjects with blindsight lack visual experience in a region of their visual field 
after sustaining a lesion to the visual cortex. Despite this, when prompted, they can 
reliably make some basic visual discriminations such as guessing whether an X or O 
has been presented in the blind field (‘blindsight’). The blindsighter hence makes this 
discrimination even though they deny that they are visually conscious of that which 
they are discriminating. For the non-blindsighter there is a way that things visually 
seem to them which provides a basis for making their decision, which is lacking for 
the blindsighter. Arguably then I have difficulty discriminating the edges of objects in 
peripheral vision because they appear unclear, they do not seem unclear because I 
cannot discriminate their edges. Hence Irvine’s above statement plausibly gets the 
explanation backwards. 
Secondly, the horn of the dilemma that first-person methods are not 
significantly different from ‘objective’ measures does not seem particularly serious. It 
is not a hard pill to swallow. In fact, the criticism veils the positive outcome for a 
supporter of first-person methods. Suppose that we ask subject 1 to complete an 
experiment in which they judge whether or not a red X is present, and we ask subject 
2 whether or not a red X seems to be present. The former is often labelled an 
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‘objective’ method, while the latter is labelled a ‘subjective’ method. The results will 
be likely to be very similar in terms of accuracy. This is a positive result for the 
supporter of first-person methods as it falsifies the generalisation that all phenomenal 
judgements are hopelessly biased, open to interference etc. It does not show that there 
are no biases in play, but whatever biases are occurring are effecting both decisions 
equally. Hence, there are at least some cases where first-person methods and 
‘objective’ methods are equally reliable. 
Lastly, the criticism that first-person methods do not add anything new does 
not apply to experiments 3.1 and 3.2. That the subject makes a phenomenal judgement 
is critical. If they were to judge how the stimuli actually are they may well judge that 
the discs are equal in luminance and that there is no triangle present. This would be to 
miss the phenomena of interest entirely. The phenomena in which we are interested in 
just is how things seem, not how they are. The first-person report adds something 
which the outside observer only has access to by the subject’s first-person report or by 
the observer experiencing the subjective brightness and subjective contours for 
themselves. Neither can these judgements be reduced to the discrimination of 
properties of the stimuli because the stimuli do not have these properties (Horst, 
2005). The first-person data adds something that a mere third-person method could 
not.  
This being said third-person methods also provide information that a first-
person method does not. For instance, the response time in judging how things look 
gives an insight into the duration of the underlying cognitive processes in making 
those judgements. A difference in response time between conditions provides 
evidence that different processes are involved in making that response. First-person 
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and third-person methods provide complimentary data. It is not a matter of choosing 
between them. Both provide vital data in the investigation of conscious experience. 
 
3.9. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have characterised first-person experiments and how they 
differ from third-person experiments. I have also discussed how they avoid the main 
criticisms regularly made of first-person methods. Of course, not all first-person 
experiments are successful, but this is also true of third-person experiments. The 
important fact is that many first-person experiments are reliable. This is a needed 
balance to the scepticism of first-person methods professed by many philosophers and 
psychologists (Dennett, 1991, 2001; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007; Lyons, 1986; 
Irvine, 2012; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Schwitzgebel, 2011). A critical stance is 
laudable, and scepticism is well deserved for many first-person methods, but neither 
should we ignore the reliable first-person methods that do exist. 
The first-person experiments presented here allow for the testing of 
hypotheses about experience, and produce reliable results over many occasions both 
within subjects and across subjects. In fact, numerous first-person experiments such 
as these have been in use since the late 19
th
 century and continue to be used to 
investigate perceptual illusions and many other phenomena (Albertazzi, 2013). 
Praises of these methods may not always be sung by philosophers, but they continue 
to flourish as respectable scientific methods nevertheless. 
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Part II 
Applications 
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Chapter 4 
4. Variance and Constancy in Size Experience 
 
‘I see no more than you, but I have trained myself to notice what I see’. – Sherlock 
Holmes
41
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
A distant tree looks smaller than a closer tree in some sense despite being the 
same objective size. The stars look smaller than the moon, even though according to 
scientists the stars are actually much vaster in size than the moon. These are examples 
of how the experience of size differs from the sizes that common sense and science 
says they actually have. Such variance in perceptual experience has traditionally been 
used by Early modern philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume and 
20th century philosophers like Moore, Broad, Price and Russell to support accounts of 
size experience in which we are directly aware of mind-dependent properties 
(subjectivism). This was usually at the expense of ignoring perceptual constancy 
altogether. This was a criticism that Ayer (1988, p. 81) levelled at Russell’s 
description of perceptual experience.  
More recently perceptual constancy has been used to support the view that we 
are directly aware of mind-independent properties (objectivism) (Smith, 2002; Tye, 
2000). For example, Tye (2000, chapter 7) uses the phenomenon of colour constancy 
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 From The Adventure of the Blanched Soldier, Arthur Conan Doyle (1926, p. 1072). 
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to argue that colours are objective properties. Examples of size constancy that 
subjectivists need to account for include for example light posts looking the same size 
in some sense as they recede into the distance, and cars looking to remain the same 
size as they approach. A full account of visual experience should not ignore either 
perceptual variance or constancy, and theories can be assessed by whether they 
provide a more adequate account for both phenomena than competing theories. I will 
be arguing that perceptual objectivism cannot account for variance in size experience, 
hence providing support for perceptual subjectivism.  
 
4.1.1 Terminology 
 
In this section I will clarify the terminology being used in the chapter. A 
popular view in the philosophy of mind is ‘perceptual objectivism’. This is the thesis 
that, in perceptual experience, I am directly aware of either properties instantiated in 
the external world or uninstantiated properties. These properties exist outside of 
minds (mind-independent). This view comes in representationalist versions (Dretske, 
1995; Harman, 1990; Lycan, 1996, 2001; Siegel, 2006b, 2010; Tye, 1995, 2000) in 
which experience represents these properties, and naïve realist varieties (Campbell, 
2002; Campbell & Cassim, 2014, chapter 1-4; Johnston, 2004; Kennedy, 2009; 
Martin, 2002; Smith, 2002) in which there is a direct perceptual relation to the 
properties of mind-independent objects (in veridical perceptual experience). 
Representationalists can also hold that the representational content is the surfaces of 
physical objects in the case of veridical experience, hence allowing for a direct 
perceptual relation. 
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Pappas (1989) uses the term ‘perceptual direct realism’ to label these views. 
The perception is direct (or immediate) in that it is not mediated by the perception of 
other properties or objects such as mental properties. In understanding this claim I 
follow Jackson (1977, p. 15-20) who analyses perceptual directness in terms of an in 
virtue of relation. I see the plane overhead in virtue of seeing a part of the plane - its 
underside (ibid., p. 19). I see the plane’s underside directly and the plane indirectly. 
According to perceptual objectivism mind-independent properties are present in 
awareness in such an immediate fashion. 
Perceptual subjectivism is the thesis that in perceptual experience I am directly 
aware of mental properties. These are properties of minds (mind-dependent). This 
definition is neutral as to whether minds and their properties are physical or non-
physical. For example, a mind could be a substance or a person’s current total brain 
states. A common definition of colour subjectivism is that colours are neural 
processes (Byrne & Hilbert, 2003; Hardin, 1988; Revonsuo, 2001; Ross, 2001). A 
perceptual subjectivist may be an indirect realist in which case the perception of the 
objective properties of the world is mediated by the awareness of subjective properties 
(e.g., qualia) or objects (e.g., sense data). They may also be an irrealist about some or 
all objective properties. Berkeley as an idealist was an irrealist about all perceptible 
properties.
42
 Locke on the other hand proposed a primary-secondary distinction in 
which size, shape and extension belonged to the mind-independent object (realism), 
and colours, taste and smell belonged only to the mind (irrealism). Nevertheless he 
also thought that we were only ever directly aware of a two-dimensional array of 
impressions (Jacovides, 2016). Hence we are aware of an ellipse when viewing a 
                                                 
42
 Although realism and irrealism is standard terminology it is unfortunate in that no one is denying that 
colours exist, they are just disagree over whether they are mind-independent or not. Berkeley for 
example would have denied that he was an irrealist about colour, shape, size etc. In fact, these 
properties all belong to objects. He just holds that these objects and properties are not mind-
independent. 
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tilted coin despite the coin actually being circular. We are only directly aware of 
impressions in the mind, not the mind-independent objects themselves. Hence he was 
a subjectivist about all perceptible properties. Objectivism on the other hand involves 
both direct awareness of mind-independent properties and realism about those 
properties.
43
 
Helmholtz (1860, p. 283) recalled an occasion as a child walking with his 
mother, in which he saw two people in the window of a chapel and because he 
thought that they were dolls, he asked his mother to reach up and retrieve them for 
him. Young Helmholtz was exhibiting a failure in size constancy. Drawing upon 
Hatfield (2012), two types of size constancy can be distinguished: phenomenal size 
constancy and response constancy. ‘Phenomenal size constancy’ is usually defined by 
psychologists as things looking to remain constant in size despite variable image sizes 
on the retina as the distance between the eye and the object changes. Alternatively, a 
more phenomenologically motivated definition of phenomenal size constancy is 
things looking to remain the same size despite variability in the area they take up in 
the visual field as the distance between perceiver and object changes.
44
 This form of 
size constancy can be distinguished from ‘response constancy’ which includes 
abilities such as making reliable judgements of objective size, and exhibiting 
                                                 
43
 I make the distinction between perceptual objectivism and perceptual subjectivism rather than 
between perceptual direct realism and perceptual indirect realism as the question here is whether 
objective properties show up in perceptual experience or not, rather than whether realism about 
objective macro-properties is true or false. Perceptual objectivists are almost always phenomenal 
externalists about perceptual experience. Phenomenal externalism is the thesis that phenomenal 
qualities are properties of a mind-independent world – in particular located outside the head or body.  
This is contrasted with phenomenal internalism which is the thesis that phenomenal qualities are 
located in the brain or body. However, perceptual subjectivism can be distinguished from internalism, 
in that it is neutral as to whether phenomenal qualities are located in the head or not. Rather they may 
be in the mind, which may or may not be located in the head. For example, Descartes was a perceptual 
subjectivist who held that the mind was an unextended substance with no spatial location and so did not 
think of the mind as literally located inside the head. Where phenomenal qualities are located is 
orthogonal to the question of whether the properties presented in experience are mind-independent or 
not (Farkas, 2003). 
44
 In fact, constancy also covers cases where objects at different distances project the same size on the 
retina/take up the same proportion of the visual field, but nevertheless look different sizes. I set aside 
these cases here. 
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behavioural and emotional responses which reflect knowledge of objective size. This 
may be based upon phenomenal size constancy or a result of perceptual and cognitive 
factors which correct for variability in size experience. It is unclear whether young 
Helmholz’s judgement was based upon phenomenal size variance or whether he was 
merely making an erroneous response to an experience which included size 
constancy. From here on, unless otherwise indicated, by ‘constancy’ I will be 
referring to phenomenal constancy. I will use ‘phenomenal variance’ (‘or ‘variance’ 
for short), to mean the inverse of phenomenal constancy. I will use the terms 
‘phenomenal size’ and ‘size experience’ interchangeably. These terms as I use them 
are both neutral between objectivism and subjectivism about size experience. 
Upon what aspect of experience if any was young Helmholz basing his 
judgement? A plausible explanation is that because distant people take up a small 
proportion of the visual field (‘visual area’ for short) he mistook the people for dolls 
(Rock, 1975, p. 36-39; see also Harding, 1998, p. 428). As a provisional 
characterisation I use ‘visual field’ to refer to the totality of currently visible objects, 
properties and relations.
45
 I will restrict the discussion here to seen properties rather 
than imagined properties. This ‘field’ can be recognised by fixating at a point in front 
of you and putting a hand out to one side until it seems to blur and then disappear. 
This is the edge of the field of vision. Its shape can be traced out by running your 
hands around this edge. It is longer on the horizontal axis (left to right) than the 
vertical axis (up and down). In particular, it is an oval shaped field. This is a 
phenomenological characterisation of the term ‘visual field’ and is intended to be 
neutral as to whether the field itself or its objects, properties and relations are 
subjective or objective. I will specify when I am not using the term neutrally. ‘Visual 
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 Armstrong (1968, p. 236-237) uses a similar definition.  
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area’ is the proportion that things look to take up on the horizontal and vertical axes of 
the visual field. I say ‘look to take up’ because in some cases visual area is not tracked 
by the objective size of things nor what is projected on the retina. In the Müller-Lyer 
illusion it really does look like one line takes up more visual area on the horizontal 
axis than the other. Again ‘visual field’ and ‘visual area’ are phenomenologically 
characterised, they are not derived from theoretically inspired considerations such as 
the common view that the visual field just is what is projected on the retina. The eyes 
do not appear in vision so they are not eligible for the phenomenological 
characterisation. Another important point, as I discuss in the next section, is that the 
visual field is not merely a two dimensional plane. It has a dimension of depth. This is 
another point against the visual field being merely the image projected on the retina. 
It is common for philosophers to make a distinction between two senses of 
‘looks’ - phenomenal and epistemic (Chisholm, 1957; Jackson, 1977; Hill & Bennett, 
2008).
46
 The phenomenal sense is referring to what properties and objects presently 
show up in visual experience independently of what I believe about them. I presently 
seem to see a computer screen and black text on a white background, a desk, and a 
window beyond it. I do not presently seem to see Bondi Beach, a tiger, or Jupiter. 
This epistemic sense of looks refers to the occurrent beliefs about the world I form 
based upon visual experience. Since there visually seems to be a computer in front of 
me I form the belief that ‘there is a computer in front of me’. However, the epistemic 
sense does not require that the objects and properties I form beliefs about are visually 
presented to me. For example, ‘it looks as if we’ve been broken into’, ‘it looks as if 
it’s going to rain’. Given that the window is broken, and front door open I may judge 
that ‘it looks as if we’ve been broken into’. In response to the visual evidence I form a 
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 Chisholm (1957) and Jackson (1977) also distinguish a sense of ‘looks like’ but this won’t be 
relevant for our purposes here. 
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belief about what happened. I take it that the epistemic sense could also include 
automatic factors. Thus if the train tracks appear to converge, the visual system may 
automatically dispose me to judge that they are actually parallel (Hunter, Biver Fuqua 
& 2007, cited by Cohen 2013). In this chapter, I will only be interested in the 
phenomenal sense of ‘looks’.  
Finally, one of the goals of a phenomenological method is to describe 
experience using terminology that is as theory neutral as possible. This is done in an 
attempt to avoid contaminating the first-person data with material that is foreign to it. 
It is common for philosophers to describe experience as ‘representing’ such as 
‘experience represents the rose as red’ as if this is a neutral way of describing the 
experience.
47
 In the context of a phenomenological method, this is an example of a 
questionable use of terminology as it is unclear (at least to me) whether it is meant to 
provide a pre-theoretical description of experience, or whether it is a statement of a 
theory about the experience. Whether it is theory neutral or not will depend upon what 
sense ‘represents’ or ‘intentional’ is being used (Siegel, 2010, chapter 2). A weak 
sense of intentionality is just that the redness looks to qualify the rose. This is a 
theoretically neutral sense of intentional. This is to be distinguished from strong 
intentionality in which experience is a relation to intentional content. A popular 
version of strong intentionality identifies the phenomenal character of an experience 
with intentional content (that which is represented) (Dretske, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Tye, 
2000). Weak intentionality, on the other hand, is neutral on this question. For 
example, subjective properties (e.g., colour qualia) may be intentional by being 
projected onto things of experience, thereby qualifying them. Hence they can be both 
weakly intentional at the same at time as being subjective (Stoljar, 2004). Even sense 
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 As an example see the Peacocke quote below. 
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data views can be labelled as weakly intentional in that colour properties qualify 
mental objects.  
To remain as theory neutral as possible, and to avoid confusion over the 
different uses of ‘represents’, rather than saying ‘experience represents the rose as 
red’ I will say ‘the rose looks red’. I take ‘looks’ in the phenomenal sense to be a 
relatively neutral term for designating what shows up in experience (Siegel, 2007).
48
 
Furthermore, even though the descriptions of experience provided by a 
phenomenological method attempt to be neutral as to metaphysics, these descriptions 
will have consequences for philosophical theories of perception.  
 
4.1.2 The Current Account Contrasted With Some Other Accounts 
  
As seen in Table 4.1, accounts of size experience differ depending upon 
whether they are objectivist or subjectivist, whether they include either constancy or 
variance (or both) in experience and whether the size property looks to qualify things 
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 Yet another sense of ‘represents’ is that experience is accessible for accuracy (Siegel, 2010; Siewert, 
1998, chapter 7). It is true or false about the world. This may well be so, but it is not clear that this use 
of ‘represents’ counts as theory neutral. In particular, we are then assuming that other theories such as 
phenomenalism are false in which things are constituted by properties of experience. As Armstrong 
points out in his introduction to Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings, for Berkeley there is no question of 
what is immediately experienced ‘corresponding or failing to correspond’ to an external world 
(Armstrong, 1969, p. 23). Berkeley says in regards to someone experiencing an oar looking bent in the 
water ‘He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives but in the inferences he makes 
from his present perceptions… What he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far 
he is in the right. But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive 
the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that manner 
he is mistaken’ (In the third of The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous: Berkeley, 1713, p. 
200). Travis (2004) makes a similar point: ‘In perception things are not presented, or represented, to us 
as being thus and so. They are just presented to us, full stop. It is in making out, or trying to, what it is 
that we confront that we take things, rightly or wrongly, to be thus and so’ (Travis, 2004, p. 65). The 
truth accessible use of ‘represents’ imposes a theory on the experience. Note that I am not denying that 
there may be an argument that successfully establishes that experience represents in the weak sense of 
being truth accessible, but the fact that this needs an argument is a further reason for thinking that it is 
not theory neutral. To use represents in this way is not to describe experience, but is rather an exercise 
in metaphysics. On the other hand to describe my experience by saying ‘the rose looks red’ presumably 
does not require any argument and minimal theory. Perhaps there are no truly theory neutral 
descriptions such that even saying ‘the rose looks red’ depends upon some background theory. I will 
not argue against this thesis here, but merely claim that ‘looks’ is neutral between more theories than 
terms such as ‘represents’ so using this term fits better with the aim of being as neutral as possible. 
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or not. The view for which I will be arguing, represented by the ticks in Table 4.1, is 
that the visual size properties which constitute both phenomenal size variance and 
constancy are mind-dependent properties. In particular, the size properties of which I 
am directly aware are not the actual properties of macroscopic objects or the relations 
between an observer and objects nor uninstantiated properties. Rather, these are 
subjective properties.  
The subjectivist view I am defending is inspired by an account of visual 
spatial experience developed by Gary Hatfield (2009, 2012). Philosophers do not 
seem to have engaged with Hatfield’s account of size experience, and the empirical 
evidence he uses to support it (though see Hill & Bennett, 2008).
49 Hatfield’s view is 
that the geometry of visual space
50
 contracts with distance. The best way to test this is 
to look down a long corridor (path or road) and look to see what happens to parallel 
lines with distance. If visual space is constant with distance then the lines of the 
corridor should look to remain an equidistant width at all points. If contraction occurs 
then the lines should visually converge. My experience shows the latter. Conforming 
with this geometry, distant people also take up a smaller visual area thereby staying 
within the confines of the corridor. I also agree with Hatfield’s phenomenological 
observation that the visual field is not a two dimensional array. Depth is immediately 
present in experience. Railway tracks do not converge on a ‘flat vertical plane in front 
of me’ (Hatfield, 2012, p. 40) like in a perspective picture, but neither do they look 
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 Hatfield (2009) labels his position as ‘representation-mediated critical direct realism’ (p. 264) in 
which ‘we see the surfaces of objects by having a subject-dependent phenomenal experience that 
mediates our perception of the object’ (ibid., p. 349). He does not posit sense-data, and also rejects the 
representative realism of Russell in which ‘we see our sense-data or representations’ (ibid., p. 349). 
Rather he holds that ‘we see the properties of objects by having phenomenal experiences of certain 
sorts. These representations, these phenomenal experiences, are not that which we see, but that by 
which we see’ (ibid., p. 350). Here I draw upon arguments from Hatfield, but also further empirical 
results, phenomenological demonstrations (Experiments 4.1-4.3), and arguments (section 4.3).  
50
 ‘Visual space’ refers to the spatial structures visually experienced by a subject. This 
phenomenological notion is to be distinguished from the ‘physical space’ as investigated by physicists. 
Visual space as so defined may or may not be identical to a portion of subject-independent physical 
space. 
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parallel. Rather ‘Railway tracks … converge while running away in depth’ (ibid., p. 
37). Visual space is three dimensional, but at the same time it contracts with distance. 
Hatfield also draws upon the relational theory of size constancy of Rock and 
Ebenholtz (1959). Here I also extend the relational theory to account for further trees 
looking the same size as closer trees (section 4.4). 
 
                                  Objective                   Subjective 
 
 
       Tye 
       Noë 
 
                        
     Russell 
     Hatfield 
    Peacocke 
  ✓ 
 
    Tye 
    Noë  
    Peacocke 
 
 
 
 
 
     Hatfield 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1. Theoretical Positions on the Types of Size Properties that Show up in 
Visual Experience: Objective vs Subjective, Variable Properties vs Constant 
Properties, Actual vs Non-Actual properties. The ticks represent the view for which I 
provide a defence. 
  
The current view is also similar to the sensationalism of Christopher Peacocke 
(1983). One difference is that Peacocke has a mixed subjective and objective account 
of the experience, while the present view is a subjectivist about both size variance and 
size constancy. He describes the visual experience of viewing an avenue of trees: 
 
Taking your experience at face value you would judge that the trees are 
roughly the same physical size… Yet there is also some sense in which the 
nearer tree occupies more of your visual field than the more distant tree. This 
Actual 
Properties 
Non-Actual 
Properties 
Constant 
Properties  
   Variable 
Properties 
 
✓ 
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is as much a feature of your experience itself as its representing the trees as 
being the same height (Peacocke, 1983, p. 12) 
 
According to Peacocke (1983) the trees look the same size, so objective 
properties show up in visual experience. However, there is also a sensation of size 
which accounts for the sense of different sizes between the trees. The property of 
largeness of the closer tree belongs to the visual field. It is a non-representational 
property that is intrinsic to experience. In particular, he denies that size variance is 
strongly intentional in the sense of being a relation to intentional content. He argues 
that size variance is non-representational because veridical experience cannot 
represent a tree as being both larger than another tree and the same size (Peacocke, 
1983, p 12).
51
 However, I will assume that he would allow that size variance is 
weakly intentional in the sense that it apparently qualifies the tree. Weak 
intentionality can conflict with strong intentionality without contradiction. The small 
size of a distant tree seems to qualify the tree, not merely the visual field (the tree 
looks small in some sense). This being said, size properties can be intrinsic properties 
of a subjective visual field at the same time as qualifying objects. The visual field can 
be thought of as analogous to a television screen. The pixels on a television screen 
belong to the screen, yet at the same time they qualify objects displayed on the screen. 
A statement by Peacocke which suggests that he would accept weak intentionality is 
when he says: ‘The impression of a hut as having a certain physical size is grounded 
in part in the size of the region of the visual field in which it is presented’ (Peacocke, 
1983, p. 54).  
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 Tye and Noë deny that there is a conflict. See below.  
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There are a family of subjectivist positions which for the purposes of this 
chapter I will be neutral between. I will be neutral here as to whether there are sense 
data (mental objects) which bear these subjective properties. Other issues on which 
the current arguments will not have a bearing is whether mind-dependent properties 
are physical or non-physical and whether or not realism or irrealism is true of 
objective size.
 
 
The current view differs from earlier subjectivists such as Hume and Russell 
who did not seem to include phenomenal constancy as part of visual experience. For 
example Hume famously wrote: 
 
The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but 
the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, 
therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind (Hume, 1777, 
p. 151–2). 
 
By contrast I hold that there is also a sense in which the table looks to stay the same 
size.  
The main competitor of a subjectivist account is the objective dual aspect 
view. Tye holds that ‘the nearer tree looks the same objective size as the tree further 
away while also looking larger from the given viewing position’ (Tye, 2000, p. 78). 
He agrees with Peacocke that the trees look to have the same size, there are 
perspective independent properties in the experience, but there is also an objective 
property of how large the nearer tree looks from here in the experience. The tree looks 
larger from my perspective because it subtends a greater angle at the eye (ibid., p. 78). 
Thus the second visual property is also objective – it’s not merely a sensational 
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property of the visual field. My objective spatial relation to the tree, or ‘perspectival 
properties’ (Noë, 2004, p. 166), are present in the visual experience. The dual 
objective aspect account of experience is purely objectivist and is a popular view 
amongst contemporary philosophers (Jagnow, 2012; Kelly, 2008; Noë, 2004; 
Schellenberg, 2008; Tye, 2000).  
A similar theory is that ‘visual extensity’ (Rock, 1975, p. 37) is the experience 
of the size of one’s retinal images. This is seen in the notion that there are ‘distal’ and 
‘proximal’ modes of perception (Palmer, 1999, p. 313-314), the former is the normal 
mode of perception in which we veridically perceive properties of the world and the 
latter is a special mode in which perceivers experience properties of their retinal 
images (Rock, 1983, p. 284 refers to these modes as ‘proximal’ and ‘world’). If these 
accounts succeed then visual area can be accommodated by the objectivist. Thus 
young Helmholtz was basing his judgement upon the perspectival properties of visual 
experience, but he had yet to learn to recognise the perspective-independent properties 
of visual experience. 
A simplified form of the argument I will be making for subjectivism is: 
 
1. In size variance experience I am directly aware of either mind-independent 
properties or mind-dependent properties. 
2. In size variance experience I am not directly aware of mind-independent 
properties. 
3. Therefore in experiencing size variance I am directly aware of mind-
dependent properties. 
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This argument can be unpacked further to make explicit the objectivist alternatives (A 
and B): 
 
1. In size variance experience I am directly aware of either: (A) instantiated 
mind-independent properties in the environment or (B) uninstantiated mind-
independent properties or (C) mind-dependent properties. 
2. In size variance experience I am not directly aware of (A) or (B). 
3. Therefore in experiencing size variance I am directly aware of (C) mind-
dependent properties. 
 
The strategy in the current chapter is to argue for the present view by ruling 
out disjuncts A and B. By rendering the objectivist alternatives implausible, the most 
plausible remaining theory is subjectivist. The limitation of this argument is that the 
options may not be exhaustive. It does not rule out the possibility that there are other 
plausible objectivist options that I have not considered. These however can be 
evaluated as they arise on a case by case basis. 
According to Tye, Noë and many others, in visual experience I am directly 
aware of actual objective size properties of the physical world (disjunct A). In section 
4.2, I argue against disjunct A. I draw upon empirical findings and phenomenological 
demonstrations to motivate the conclusion that actual objective properties are not 
typically present in visual experience, and thus do not account for variance in size 
experience. The falsity of disjunct A would negate the objective dual aspect view as it 
currently stands, and force it into the less desirable position that we are aware of 
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uninstantiated properties in size variance experience (disjunct B). That is, size 
variance experience would be treated on par with illusions. This in itself would be a 
significant blow to perceptual direct realism. In section 4.3, I argue against disjunct B 
that in size variance experience I am aware of objective uninstantiated properties. The 
falsity of these two disjuncts would rule out most plausible versions of objectivism 
and hence leaves subjectivism as the most plausible theory. 
An objection to subjectivism is that it cannot account for size constancy. In 
section 4.4, I propose that a subjectivist theory can use visual relations to account for 
size constancy. If this response succeeds this would remove another major motivation 
for preferring objectivism over subjectivism. In section 4.5, I discuss details of the 
proposed subjectivist view and respond to some objections. 
 
4.2. Perspectival Properties 
 
 In this section I argue that variance in size experience is not reducible to 
objective relations in the environment or retinal images. In particular, I provide 
evidence from empirical studies and phenomenological demonstrations. The method 
used in the latter will be phenomenal contrast (Siegel, 2007). For example, rather than 
asking whether an obliquely viewed plate looks elliptical, one asks whether looks to 
have a different shape than a plate viewed front on. That is, one looks for a 
phenomenal difference, thus allowing for a more refined phenomenal judgement. I 
will also be using apparatus such as hands, feet, and mirrors for setting up the 
contrast, a ruler for measuring how things appear, and images as demonstrations of 
different aspects of visual experience. It is due to the use of apparatus for assisting 
making judgements about experience that I refer to these exercises as first-person 
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experiments (Ginsburg, 2005). Rather than just ‘looking’, one manipulates one’s own 
experience using apparatus to produce a salient phenomenal contrast. The first 
experiment provides a means of measuring perspectival size properties. The second 
and third experiments provide evidence that variance in size experience is not the 
same as perspectival properties or retinal images. 
Michael Tye (2000, p. 78-79) and Alva Noë (2004, 164-169) propose that the 
trees in the avenue look the same size, but the closer tree looks larger from here. 
When Tye elaborates as to what the looks from here relation amounts to he rejects the 
idea of visual area in the subjective sense. Rather he thinks that visual area reduces to 
a representation of the angle subtended at the eye. Is visual area identical with 
perspectival properties? Visual angle is the standard means of measuring perspectival 
properties. Is there a first-person means of operationalising perspectival size? Alva 
Noë defines the perspectival size of a thing as ‘the size of patch that one must fill in a 
given plane perpendicular to the line of sight in order to perfectly occlude an object 
from view’ (Noë, 2004, p. 82). My own suggestion is to use a ruler. 
 
Experiment 4.1: Measuring Perspectival Size 
 
Hold out a ruler at the same distance as your hand. I find that my hand measures 17 
cm from the bottom of the palm to the top of the middle finger. Maintain the ruler at 
the same distance and align it with the appearance of your foot. I find that it measures 
5 cm (figure 4.1).  
 If this procedure accurately measures visual area, then my hand currently takes 
up more than three times the visual area of my foot.
52
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 I will be arguing that this method does not typically measure visual area. 
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                     Figure 4.1. Measuring Perspectival Size 
 
Why hold the ruler close to the hand rather than closer to the foot? Where you 
hold the ruler does not make an important difference here because whilst the units will 
change the ratio remains constant. Perhaps my foot will be measured as 10 cm, while 
my hand will then be measured as 30 cm. My foot will continue to be measured as a 
third the size of my hand, where ever I hold the ruler, unless of course I change the 
distance between my hand and my foot, or the relative position of the ruler. This 
method abstracts away from depth and thus provides a means of measuring 
perspectival size on the vertical and horizontal axes. It also presumably gives a result 
which is sensitive to differences in retinal image size and visual angle, but it is a first-
person means of measuring this.
53
 The same method can be used for measuring the 
shape that something takes up in the visual field. For example, upon measuring the 
shape of an obliquely viewed plate I found that it took up less area on the vertical axis 
than the horizontal axis which is consistent with an ellipse. A plate viewed straight on 
however was measured as the same area on both axes consistent with a circle.
54
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 Retinal size can also be calculated from visual angle, and two objects with an identical retinal image 
size also have an identical visual angle and vice versa. Hence retinal size and visual angle can be used 
interchangeably for our purposes. 
54
 An objection is that using a ruler introduces another thing into the visual experience which may 
interfere with it. To test this one can take a photo and measure the size of the images on the photo. I 
find that the ratio of the images is the same as measured by the original ruler, and it remains the same 
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While perhaps a useful approximation of how things look, it turns out that in 
many circumstances apparent size and shape does not coincide with perspectival size 
and shape as measured by a ruler. The Müller-Lyer illusion shows that phenomenal 
size variance is not always identical with perspectival size. The lines look different in 
size in the context of intersecting lines, despite the fact that they take up the same 
perspectival size. As another example, the moon looks larger when it is close to the 
horizon (the ‘moon illusion’) than when it is at its zenith. 
 
Experiment 4.2: The Corridor Illusion 
  
That size variance cannot always be explained by perspectival properties is 
illustrated in figure 4.2. I again use phenomenal contrast as a demonstration of these 
different aspects of visual experience.  
 
In A, block ii looks smaller than block i. There is a phenomenal difference in size 
between the blocks. However block ii does not look as small as block iii even though 
they are identical in visual angle. In B, block v looks larger than block iv, however 
they are in actual fact identical in visual angle.  
 
The phenomenal difference between ii and iii, and iv and v demonstrates that not all 
size variance is identical with perspectival properties. In the context of depth 
information there is a phenomenal difference between experienced size of a thing and 
its visual angle (likewise its retinal image size). By contrast, we are relatively accurate 
in judging the size difference between block i and block iii, in particular in judging 
                                                                                                                                            
both with and without the ruler, hence I conclude that there is no interference occurring in the 
experiment. 
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that block iii is one third the size of block i. In this case, when depth information is 
the same for both targets, we are sensitive to relative perspectival sizes. 
 
Figure 4.2. The Corridor Illusion. Adapted from Palmer (1999, p. 316). 
 
Experiment 4.3. How large does your head look in the mirror? 
 
Another experiment is looking at your head in the mirror and trying to judge 
how large it looks in comparison to the size of the image on the mirror. Gombrich, 
(1960, p. 5) has pointed out that people are unaware that the image is approximately 
half the objective size of their head as is seen by tracing its size on a steamed up 
mirror. Here, I extend the experiment as reported by Gombrich by adding in a 
phenomenal contrast to make the difference between apparent size, image size and 
objective size more salient, and using a ruler to keep distance fixed. Try it for 
yourself. 
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Stand 30 cm from a mirror using a ruler to measure the distance. Now trace around 
the outline of your head in the mirror with a whiteboard marker. For me the image 
traced measured only 11 cm high and 8 cm in width. This is a remarkable result going 
by experience alone. Now step to one side, and use the ruler so that you are again 
standing 30 cm from the mirror. Now compare the size your head looks with the 
outline. I find that my head looks significantly larger (perhaps a third larger) than the 
outline next to it. To be even more precise, next to this outline, you can also draw the 
objective size of your head on the mirror. Again stand 30 cm from the mirror. I find 
that the head in the mirror looks smaller than outline of its objective size, but not as 
small as the image outline. That is, the experienced size is intermediate between the 
image and its objective size.  
 
Recall that perspectival size is the area that something would take up if it was 
projected upon a plane perpendicular to the line of sight. In viewing a mirror I am 
literally viewing a plane perpendicular to the line of sight. If size variance (of my 
head looking smaller with distance) was explained by its perspectival size then it 
should look to take up the size of the image on the mirror. The fact that it does not 
again demonstrates a failure of perspectival size to explain size variance. 
Noë (2004, p. 165) briefly considers Gombrich’s experiment as showing that 
we do not usually experience perspectival properties, but then dismisses it as being 
due to the ‘puzzling character of reflections’ (ibid., p. 166). In fact, studies suggest 
that much of the time we do not experience perspectival size. Thouless (1931) 
presented subjects with two white discs of different sizes at varying distances. The 
distance of the smaller (closer) disc was varied until subjects reported when it looked 
the same size as the larger (further) disc. It was found that subjects did not adjust the 
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closer disc such that it took up the same the size as the further the disc on the retina, 
but rather to a size intermediate between the retinal size and objective size. Thus,  
 
as the distance of an object changes, its phenomenal size changes, whether the 
object be far or near. It changes, however, less rapidly than does the size of the 
retinal image. The tendency to constancy is shown by the amount of change 
being a compromise between the changing size of the peripheral stimulus and 
the unchanging ‘real’ size of the object (Thouless, 1931, p. 353). 
 
Thouless (1931) also found that same for shape. Subjects tended to choose an ellipse 
for a tilted circle, but it was an ellipse that was in between that of the shape projected 
on the retina and its objective shape. Furthermore, many studies have shown that 
when subjects are asked to estimate the projective size of an item, or the amount it 
takes up in the visual field (ignoring depth), the results produce underconstancy, but 
the size selected is larger than retinal size (Carlson, 1960; Gilinsky, 1955; Singer, 
1952).  
It is also noteworthy that one technique used by painters to produce a 
perspective picture is to hold up their brush against things. This recalls the ruler 
experiment, and suggests that even painters do not directly experience perspectival 
size - or at least not without the assistance of tools. Perdreau & Cavanagh (2013) also 
present evidence that artists are not better at judging the perspectival size of images in 
the context of depth information than non-artists.  
The evidence then suggests that we typically do not have experiential access to 
perspectival properties.Visual experience is not the same as drawn in a perspective 
picture. Rather with the Gestalt psychologists I hold that much of the time 
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perspectival size is not part of experience at all (nor retinal size and shape). This being 
said it is likely that in some situations when depth cues are minimal that perspectival 
size and shape and apparent size and shape coincide, such as when we see the moon at 
its zenith. Also when the visible terrain is eliminated by viewing the moon through a 
tube the moon illusion is eliminated and the apparent size of the moon is the same as 
its retinal size (Rock & Kaufman, 1962). Also when depth cues are eliminated by 
viewing objects through a tube then apparent size reduces towards that of the size of 
the image on the retina (Holway and Boring, 1941). Thouless found the same result 
when visual cues were eliminated. We can then be aware of the perspectival size, but 
only in contexts where depth information is minimized. 
 One response to this evidence is to posit that perspectival properties do show 
up in perceptual experience however cognitive factors cause this overestimation. This 
explanation requires that participants systematically make false judgements about 
their experience. In fact something like this sometimes happens for judgements of the 
objective sizes of distant objects in which subjects will systematically overestimate 
size (Wagner, 2012). A plausible account of this is that subjects know that further 
things are larger than they look and they use this knowledge as a cognitive strategy in 
judging its size, but they overcompensate (Granrud, 2009, 2012). On the other hand 
subjects are good at estimating objective size at middle and close ranges. Thus it is 
only in situations when detailed depth information is lacking that these strategies are 
required.  
Does the same explanation work for perspectival properties? If a subject’s task 
is to estimate perspectival size and they know that things look smaller than they are, if 
anything, one would expect an underestimation of apparent size. Furthermore if the 
error is merely cognitive one would expect that with training one could overcome this 
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tendency, however as already mentioned there is evidence that even artists are poor at 
judging perspectival size (Perdreau & Cavanagh, 2013). Also we are not poor at 
estimating perspectival properties in all contexts. When depth information is 
minimized then subjects are accurate. This is exactly as would be predicted if depth 
information changes size experience. The alternative cognitive error hypothesis would 
need to explain why the cognitive error only occurs when depth information is 
present. Proposing systematic error in judgement is adhoc in that the only reason for 
positing this error is to preserve the hypothesis that perspectival properties are 
invariantly present in experience and that size variance does not depend upon context. 
It is also unnecessary given the phenomenal evidence that apparent size can be 
changed by depth information. The hallway illusion in figure 4.2, the mirror 
experiment, the moon illusion and many other cases demonstrate the reality of this 
phenomenon. This combined with the large amount of empirical evidence indicating 
altered size experience in the context of depth information makes the widespread 
reality of this phenomenon the more parsimonious hypothesis.  
Hence, the angle subtended at the eye and retinal size image only approximate 
the experience. The experience of the tree does not directly track objective 
perspectival properties in the environment. If experience does represent perspective-
dependent properties these are systematically misrepresented. Tye and Noë cannot 
reduce the experience to relations in the environment (except in restricted cases). 
Hence they can at best treat most size experiences as on par with illusions, awareness 
of uninstantiated properties, rather than in terms of actual objective properties. 
Perhaps the objectivist can identify a different relation in the environment other than 
visual angle or retinal images which could plausibly account for visual area. It is 
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difficult to know what this could be. The burden here is on the objectivist to supply a 
plausible candidate relation. 
David Hilbert (2016) proposes that the inference to subjectivism can be 
blocked by positing other mind-independent properties other than visual angle (V). He 
points out that visual angle is one function from physical size and distance (θ= arctan 
H/D), but that there are many alternative functions used in the literature (e.g., θ= 
arctan H/D
1/2
, θ= arctan H/D2). These alternative functions have been used to predict 
constancy judgements and there will of course be some other function (V*) which 
will also predict size judgements about how large things look. I agree there will be 
such a function, but my question is does this function express a property instantiated 
in the environment or an uninstantiated property? V is a property instantiated in the 
environment. V is the angle that light strikes the eye from the extremities of a distant 
object. This angle is a property of the stream of light from the object to the eye, and 
hence a property of a system that has causal effects. If you change the angle a 
different size image will be projected on the retina. The property is relevant to the 
causal powers of this system. If you change this property then the causal powers of 
the system changes. Hence V qualifies as a concrete macroscopic property of the 
environment. Furthermore, a physical system cannot instantiate contradictory 
properties. V and V* cannot be instantiated by the same system simultaneously. By 
definition there is no object at D
1/2 
which is reflecting light onto the eye. θ= arctan 
H/D
1/2
 does not express the property of a system that has causal powers and is hence 
an abstraction, not a real property instantiated in the macroscopic world. This 
relegates alternative visual angles such as V* to the catgegory of uninstantiated 
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properties. The question hence becomes the plausibility that we are aware of 
uninstantiated properties in variant size experience.
55
 
 
4.3. Phenomenal Size Variance as Awareness of Uninstantiated Properties? 
 
In the previous section I argued that size variance cannot typically be 
accounted for by actual objective relations between these objects and the person. If 
successful, to maintain objectivism it must be that these experienced size properties 
are not instantiated in the environment. This is a common response to the problem of 
hallucination and illusion (Dretske, 2003; Johnston, 2004; Lycan, 2001, Tye, 2014). I 
argue in this section drawing upon Brad Thompson (2008) that awareness of 
uninstantiated properties is an implausible fall-back position. 
As background, we need to clearly distinguish between content-based 
representationalism and vehicle-based representationalism (Thompson, 2008). 
According to content-based representationalism the phenomenal character of an 
experience is the intentional content, the represented property p. For example the 
story about dragons is in the book, but there are no dragons in the book. The dragon is 
an object of the representation (Dretske, 2003, p. 68). Likewise, phenomenal character 
is the property that is represented, it is not a property of the experience. This allows 
representationalists to take on a form of direct realism and hold that the phenomenal 
character of seeing the red of a rose is the property of the mind-independent object. 
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 I am not arguing that these alternative properties do not exist. David Lewis (1983a) argued for an 
abundant view of properties. He held that for any class at all, there is a property that everything in that 
class has. For example, there is the property of being a donkey which is a property possessed by all 
donkeys (Lewis, 1983a, p. 344). In fact, any class no matter how gerrymandered has a corresponding 
property. Donkey’s and the number 2 both belong to the class of things of donkeys or numbers and 
hence both have the corresponding property of being a donkey or a number. This makes the number of 
properties rather large! I am not arguing against the abundance of properties, only against the view that 
an entity can instantiate contradictory properties. 
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According to vehicle-based representationalism, on the other hand, the 
phenomenal character of an experience is the property of representing property p. 
Here the experience is typically a brain state that is representing p, and the 
phenomenal character is a property of that brain state. This then is like the story in the 
book which represents dragons. The words are in the book, the representational 
vehicle is in the brain. Vehicle-based representationalism is hence a form of 
subjectivism (or internalism) as I understand it as phenomenal character is identical 
with or supervenes on properties of the brain. It is internalist and indirect realist, 
rather than externalist and direct realist. In the argument below I will focus on 
content-based representationalism. 
 The case that I will consider is that of a blue afterimage. This can be 
experienced for oneself as follows: Stare at the yellow square in Figure 4.3 for 20-30 
seconds and then look at the white area next to it. For a few seconds you will see a 
persisting blue afterimage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Demonstration of the Afterimage Effect 
 
The afterimage has the properties of blueness, squareness and also importantly 
for current purposes it has a size. It apparently takes up an extended region in the 
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visual field. Here I will restrict myself to considering the properties of the afterimage, 
rather than whether the afterimage itself should be considered a mind-dependent 
object (sense data). 
 Representationalism accounts for afterimages by proposing that the visual 
system is mis-representing the presence of a blue square just as I can mistakenly 
believe that there is a dragon outside without there being any actual dragon. 
According to content-based representationism in particular, the phenomenal character 
is the content of the experience, that which is represented. This account works well 
for beliefs and desires because the intentional object, such as a dragon, not need not 
exist for me to believe in it or desire it. However, there is an important disanalogy 
when it comes to illusions and hallucinations. Beliefs and desires do not necessarily 
have any phenomenal character whilst illusions and hallucinations do. Unlike the 
properties of the dragon, the properties of the afterimage exist. I am sensorily aware 
of them. 
For me to seem to see blue is just for there to be a phenomenal property of 
blue. To seem to be in pain just is for there to be pain. For phenomenal character there 
is no appearance-reality distinction. It is therefore incoherent to say that in illusory 
and hallucinatory experience that the sensory properties I am aware of literally do not 
exist. Thompson (2008) points out that it would not work to say that the blue 
afterimage exists in the sense that the brain state (the representation) exists. If the 
phenomenal character just is a property of the representation then this would be to 
change the subject from a content-based representationalism (objectivist) to a vehicle-
based representationalism (subjectivist). 
The phenomenal character of illusions cannot be accounted for by non-existent 
properties. This provides the main motivation for representationalists to hold that we 
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are aware of properties which do exist, but which are uninstantiated. Dretske 
acknowledges as much when he says: 
 
In hallucinating pink rats we are aware of something—the properties, pink and 
rat shaped that something is represented as having—but we are not aware of 
any object that has these properties—a pink, rat-shaped, object. We are aware 
of pure universals, uninstantiated properties (Dretske, 2003, p. 73).  
 
On this view the phenomenal character of illusory and hallucinatory experience is 
constituted by universals. This is a common account of uninstantiated properties 
(Dretske, 2003; Forrest, 2005; Johnston, 2004; Tye, 2000). There are also independent 
reasons for thinking that universals do in fact exist (Armstrong, 1989), so if they can 
be put to work in explaining illusions and hallucinations this is an advantage. As these 
uninstantiated properties exist independently of my awareness of them they are 
objective properties. 
This provides an alternative to subjectivism but how plausible is this proposal? 
There is something counter intuitive about saying that the properties of the afterimage 
are uninstantiated as they clearly seem to be instantiated in the visual field. However, 
the opponent will say that these properties only seem to be instantiated in the visual 
field. 
The problem for this view is that it is difficult to see how these abstract 
properties which are not in space and time could constitute experiential properties 
(Pautz, 2007, p. 516-519). My experience of the blue afterimage has duration. There 
are no phenomenal properties of blueness and shape at an instant. A universal 
however is outside of time – it is timeless. How then can the phenomenal characters 
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of blueness and shape which do have duration be identical with timeless properties? 
Similarly the blue afterimage looks extended in space, it apparently has a size in the 
visual field. Universals by contrast are unextended. Since the blue afterimage is 
extended in time and space it is actual and cannot be identical with universals. As 
Pautz puts it: ‘Mabel cannot be aware of (universals). They are not potential objects 
of awareness. Maybe she can think of them; but they are not the type of thing she can 
see (just as she cannot see unextended spacetime points)’ (Pautz, p. 517). The same 
reasoning applies to numbers. I can think about them, but I cannot sensorily 
experience them. I can be aware of the symbols which represent numbers, but I cannot 
be sensorily aware of the abstract objects themselves.  
The problem can be further understood by considering how objectivism deals 
with phenomenal character in veridical cases. When I look at a square blue calculator 
the phenomenal character of squareness is the calculator’s squareness and the 
phenomenal character of blueness is the calculator’s blueness. Objectivism’s brilliant 
move in veridical cases is in promising to close the phenomenal-non-phenomenal gap 
by ‘kicking the phenomenal character downstairs, into the external world’ 
(Shoemaker, 2003, p. 256). My phenomenal character is blue, and spatially and 
temporally extended and so is the calculator. It reductively explains the phenomenal 
character by reducing it to properties of objects. However, in the case of illusions the 
properties are not just kicked downstairs, but out of the actual world entirely. But then 
the problem is how properties existing outside of the world could explain phenomenal 
character? 
An opponent might respond that the blue afterimage only seems to be 
temporally and spatially extended. But how it seems just is its phenomenal character, 
and this is that which needs explaining. If phenomenal character is identical to 
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universals then a new explanatory gap opens up of explaining how these apparently 
actual properties are really non-actual properties.
56
 
 In the case of illusion and hallucination, subjectivism has the advantage of 
over objectivism in holding that phenomenal properties are as they seem - not 
something quite different like universals. It hence has a more adequate account of 
their phenomenal character. Furthermore, according to subjectivism, variant size 
properties (and all sizes, shapes and colours) are currently instantiated in my visual 
field (which is a mind-dependent field of visible properties). This respects the 
experience, in that these size properties are actually instantiated where they seem to 
be located, so subjectivism also has the advantage of being more prima facie plausible 
than objectivism. This provides two reasons why subjectivism has an advantage over 
objectivism in accounting for variance in size experience. 
To summarise, as it is incoherent to hold that one can experience literally non-
existent properties. This provides the motivation for objectivism to posit that illusory 
properties exist, but that they are not instantiated in the actual world. They exist 
outside of space and time. This however raises difficult metaphysical questions such 
as how these properties can constitute phenomenal character. 
 
4.4. The Relational Determination of Size Constancy 
 
In sections 2 and 3 I provided support for the following argument for 
subjectivism: 
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 A modal realist could avoid the problem of the actual-non-actual gap in that when I see a blue 
afterimage I am seeing something that is actualised in another concrete world! A second problem for 
objectivism not discussed here is how universals could have a causal influence on my behaviour given 
that they are outside of space and time (Thompson, 2008, p. 404)? 
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1. In size variance experience I am directly aware of either: (A) instantiated 
objective properties in the environment, (B) uninstantiated objective properties or (C) 
subjective properties. 
2. In size variance experience I am not directly aware of (A) or (B). 
3. Therefore in experiencing size variance I am directly aware of (C) 
subjective properties. 
 
I argued against disjunct A in section 2 and disjunct B in section 3. As variant 
size experience could not be adequately accounted for by instantiated objective 
properties in the environment (A) nor uninstantiated properties (B), I conclude that 
the most plausible account is subjectivist. Having motivated this theory of size 
variance experience I now consider the objection that it cannot account for size 
constancy. 
One may suspect that all this talk about visual area must be getting the 
phenomenology wrong as it is just manifest in experience that things do not usually 
appear to grow as they approach me or shrink as they recede from me. As the distance 
between the observer and the object changes, the size of the objects looks to remain 
constant. This observation has been made by a number of contemporary philosophers:  
 
What must a sense-datum theorist say of the typical situation in which an 
object is seen to approach me? He must say that the sense-datum, that which is 
“given in sense,” that of which I am most fundamentally and immediately 
aware, gets bigger. But… what is given to me, does not appear to change at all 
in such a situation. This is a plain phenomenological fact (Smith, 2002, p. 
178). 
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A departing train does not appear to shrink as it moves away from you; but 
there is something like size (even if it is not the size of the train) that does 
appear to lessen (Siegel, 2014, section 3.3). 
 
As I walk towards the tree in the quad it takes up more of my visual field but 
does not appear to change in size (Quassim Cassam in Campbell & Cassam, 
2014, p. 163). 
 
These quotations are in direct contrast to Hume who seemed to deny that 
constancy showed up in visual experience at all. This observation can be turned into 
the following argument:  
 
1. If size experience was determined by visual area, as this is continually 
changing, then things would be experienced as continually changing in size.  
2. We do not experience things as continually changing in size.  
3. So size experience is not determined by their visual area
57
. 
 
Try viewing a street and watching as cars approach and recede. Do they look 
to be growing and shrinking in size? My experience is that they look to be changing 
size in terms of their visual area. However, the above authors are also correct that an 
approaching car does not seem to be growing in size like an inflating balloon and 
shrinking in size as it recedes into the distance. There is a sense of constancy of size. 
This is so, even though both the car and the balloon take up more visual area in the 
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 For a version of this argument against shape variability see Siewert (2006). 
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former case, and less visual area in the latter case. There is a phenomenal difference 
between an approaching car and an inflating balloon which the account in terms of 
visual area is not capturing. I think that this argument undermines an account of size 
experience based solely upon visual area and which denies constancy such as given 
by Hume and Russell. However, the premises only in fact entail the conclusion: 
 
3* Size experience is not solely determined by visual area. 
 
It does not follow from the argument that visual area does not partly determine size 
experience, in particular size variance. Hence, subjectivism is still on the table, but its 
proponents need to give a story for why there is also phenomenal constancy.  
A subjectivist theory can be rendered consistent with size constancy by taking 
a relational view in which size constancy is based upon the relations between the 
visual areas of things. The theory, which draws upon the relational theory of Rock and 
Ebenholtz (1959),
58
 is that the judgement of phenomenal size constancy of a car as it 
approaches is based upon relations between the visual area of items, in particular the 
constant relative visual area of the car and objects at the same or similar depths. The 
car takes up more visual area as it approaches, but so do the objects at each depth such 
as parked cars, people, light poles and the road. The ratio of the visual areas of the 
objects remains approximately constant (exactly constant for the car, the light poles 
and the road), and so we judge that the car looks to stay the same size. Relative to 
these objects the car is visually staying the same size. The same cannot be said for the 
inflating balloon, which takes up more visual area as it inflates while surrounding 
objects retain the same visual area. The relative visual areas change.  
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 See also, Hatfield (2012, p. 56-57; 2009, p. 196-197) and Palmer (1999, chapter 7). This is also 
consistent with the Direct Theory of Perception of Gibson (1950; 1966; See Mack 2010).  
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As another example, compare the case of a balloon that floats towards me 
down a corridor and a balloon that is inflating in front of me. The walls of the corridor 
expand visually as they approach me and visually contract into the distance away 
from me. The approaching balloon expands in visual area, however its ratio of visual 
area in contrast to the walls remains constant. The expanding balloon however 
remains fixed in depth and takes up more of the area in the visual space. Anything 
that does not maintain these relative visual ratios will seem to be altering its objective 
size. Surrounding objects provide a frame of reference for judging objective size.  
Since size constancy can be explained in terms of the relations between visual 
areas, we are not on account of constancy pushed towards denying that visual area 
contributes to the visual experience of size. On the contrary, it is a higher order 
property is grounded in visual area. The size of a car as it approaches seems to grow 
in terms of its extension in the visual field, but to stay constant in terms of visual ratio 
with its surrounding context. Since the phenomenal difference between an 
approaching object and an expanding balloon (e.g., the size constancy of the former, 
but not the latter) can be explained in terms of visual relations and depth, the 
objection that if visual area determined how things look it would be inconsistent with 
size constancy during relative movement does not succeed. Visual area determines 
how things look, but it is not the only determiner. Visual relations also play an 
essential role. 
The relational view may also be extended to provide a visual basis for the 
observations of Peacocke, Tye and Noë that the trees along an avenue look the same 
size. The thesis is that we experience the relations between the visual area of things 
across depth as well as at the same depth. From my own experience, looking down a 
flat road I could immediately see that the light posts were all the same size, yet at the 
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same time they reduced in visual area into the distance. Analysing the experience, the 
reason for this seemed to be that the light posts reduced in visual area and height in a 
systematic ratio as distance increased. Recall here that according to the current view 
parallel lines converge in visual space towards the horizon, not just on the horizontal 
axis (e.g., train lines) but also on the vertical axis (e.g., the heights of light posts). 
Though I did not explicitly make the judgement, I could immediately see that the tops 
of the light poles followed a straight line which converged in depth towards the 
horizon, and thus judge that they were objectively the same size. That is, in some 
cases we can be aware of objective size in virtue of ‘linear perspective’. Furthermore, 
if any of the light posts had a vertical visual area that was above this converging line, 
I would have been immediately able to see that it is objectively higher than the others. 
Hence, it is not merely a cognitive response, rather a relational account provides a 
visual basis for why the light poles, and trees in an avenue, look the same size. This 
account thus provides an experiential basis, in limited cases, for the description that 
size constant properties show up in experience at the same time as variant size 
properties.
59
 
 
4.5. Subjectivism about Size Experience 
 
I argued for a subjectivist theory of size experience by presenting 
phenomenological and empirical evidence that size variance experience cannot be 
accounted for by actual properties in the environment (perspectival properties or 
retinal images). I then presented reasons against an objectivist alternative which 
explains variance in size experience in terms of non-actual properties. In particular, 
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 This account also avoids positing contradictory experiences which is a charge that has been levelled 
at the objective dual aspect account (Overgaard, 2010; Siewert, 2006). 
124 
 
this alternative position cannot explain how phenomenal character could be 
constituted by uninstantiated properties. Finally, I presented a relational account of 
size constancy which provides an account of visual constancy compatible with a 
subjectivist framework. In this section, I will make some remarks about the positive 
features of the proposed view and respond to some objections.  
The current proposal is that in typical size experience I am directly aware of 
mind-dependent properties and relations. On this view size variability is posited as a 
direct awareness of visual area which is an intrinsic property of the visual field.
60
 
Peacocke (1983) also has a view like this. Here the visual field should be understood 
as being constituted by mind-dependent visible properties. The present account 
reverses the explanation of size experience of some objective dual aspect theories in 
which size variance is accounted for by objective relations, while objective size is an 
intrinsic property of perceived objects (e.g., Schellenberg, 2008). While visual area is 
an intrinsic property of the visual field on the present account, at the same time it 
qualifies objects of experience. There is weak intentionality. 
The present theory also posited a subjective relational account of size 
constancy. This account of size constancy uses relations in visual space to account for 
things looking to maintain the same size despite continual variations in visual area. 
The relations between the visual areas of things provide a visual basis for size 
constancy, but they are relations between subjective properties. Subjective properties 
ground size constancy. It is important to point out that an objectivist could also use 
such a relational account of size constancy. However, I argued that visual area is 
typically a subjective property in sections 4.2, hence making size constancy depend 
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 I follow David Lewis’s (1983b, p. 197) understanding that an intrinsic property of a thing is had ‘in 
virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is… The intrinsic properties of something depend 
only on that thing; whereas the extrinsic properties of something may depend, wholly or partly, on 
something else’. For an overview of different definitions of intrinsic properties, see Weatherson and 
Marshall (2014). 
125 
 
 
 
upon subjective properties. If realism about objective size is true, then experience 
represents size constancy via subjective relations, and hence it is an indirect realism. 
I conclude this section by considering some objections to the present view. A 
popular objection to subjectivist theories is the argument from transparency that in 
perceptual experience we are apparently aware of mind-independent objects and their 
properties, not subjective objects or properties internal to the mind (Campbell & 
Cassim, 2014, chapter 1-4; Dretske, 1995; Harman, 1990; Kennedy, 2008; Lycan, 
1996, 2001; Martin, 2002; Tye, 1995, 2000). One response is to grant the 
phenomenological data but to deny that this has any metaphysical implications 
(Hatfield, 2009, p. 328-329, 348-349). From the fact that I seem to experience mind-
independent properties it does not follow that these properties are in fact mind-
independent. Further argument is required to link the phenomenology with the 
metaphysics of experience. As the transparency observation is a phenomenological 
description it is compatible with a number of metaphysical theses including 
subjectivism. In fact, however, I am sympathetic with the intuition behind the 
transparency argument which involves taking experience seriously and moving from 
there to metaphysics. If there is a link between the phenomenology of experience and 
metaphysics it is that there is prima facie evidence for the experienced properties 
being mind-independent. That is, if the phenomenological data is correct, the burden 
of proof is on the subjectivist. 
My response to transparency is to deny the phenomenological data on which 
the argument rests. I visually experience colour, shape, depth, movement, but where 
in the visual experience is the property of being mind-independent? Do these 
properties come and go or are they always present? Are they like an aura that floats 
around the objects of experience? Where are the little flashing lights which pronounce 
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‘x is mind-independent’? One candidate for the property of being mind-independent is 
phenomenal constancy (Campbell & Cassim, 2014, p. 162-163; Smith, 2002; Tye, 
2000). However, phenomenal constancy, like shape and colour, is in itself 
metaphysically neutral. Perceptual experience is, as far as I can tell, silent about the 
metaphysical status of the objects and properties of experience. Constancies may 
strongly incline me to judge that what I experience is mind-independent, however it is 
not itself an experience of the property of being mind-independent (for more on this 
response to the transparency argument, see Spener, 2012). 
A second way in which the transparency argument fails is specifically in 
regards to size experience. I agree with the principle of taking experience seriously 
which I why first-person experiments play a crucial role in the current arguments. 
These experiments and empirical findings suggest that variance in size experience is 
not identical with objective properties such as perspectival properties and retinal 
image size. Although a common naive phenomenological description is that size 
variance is as if the thing was projected onto a plane perpendicular to the line of 
vision (like a perspective drawing), more sophisticated methods suggest that 
phenomenal size variance is not the same as size as represented in a perspective 
drawing. Thus even if there was a prima facie phenomenological case for objectivism 
(which I do not think there is), further investigation suggests that typical size 
experience is incompatible with typical candidate objective properties and relations. 
Prima facie evidence is defeasible, and the present arguments suggest that there is 
indeed a defeater for the naïve phenomenological description that we are apparently 
aware of objective size properties in typical size experience (in both cases of variance 
and constancy). 
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Another objection to a subjectivist view is that variant properties do not seem 
to be phenomenally basic. Armstrong asserts that ‘surely it is an exception, not the 
rule, for something to look larger as we get nearer to it, or for something round to 
look elliptical when viewed obliquely’ (Armstrong, 1961, p. 12). My response is that 
the fact that we tend to more frequently notice the relational properties of size 
experience rather than variant properties is merely a matter of our attentional habits. 
This does not reflect on what is more basic in experience. On the present account, the 
phenomenal size constancy of a thing with changing distance is not phenomenally 
basic, rather phenomenal size constancy supervenes on visual area. There is no 
difference in phenomenal size constancy without a phenomenal difference in visual 
area. This being said, constancy is also immediately present in experience along with 
phenomenal size variance, just as perceptual grouping (another arguably subjective 
relation) is immediately present in perceptual experience. Given its phenomenal 
immediacy, size constancy (when present) is easily recognisable, often more so, 
depending upon what properties or relations one is attending to. 
 In this chapter I provided reasons for why size variance supports subjectivism 
about size experience. This leaves open a disjunction of subjectivist views about size 
experience such as physicalist and non-physicalist, indirect realist and phenomenalist. 
Whichever of these theories turn out to be the most plausible, the present account is at 
the very least inconsistent with perceptual objectivism about size experience. 
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Chapter 5 
5. The Sense of Self 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Following Thomas Nagel (1974), philosophers typically characterise 
phenomenal experience as what it is like for a subject.
61
 There is something it is like 
for me to smell the sea breeze, feel the sand between my toes, and feel the sun on my 
face. Although this description is usually shortened to ‘what it is like’ this according 
some philosophers is to miss out on an essential element of phenomenal experience, 
namely that it is for me (Levine, 2001; Kriegel, 2003, 2009; Zahavi, 2005, 2011; 
Zahavi & Kriegel, 2015). There is a subjective character of experience which is to be 
distinguished from the qualitative character of experience (Kriegel, 2005, 2009; 
Levine, 2001, p. 105-111, 167-174). As David Chalmers describes it: 
 
One sometimes feels that there is something to conscious experience 
that transcends all these specific (qualitative) elements: a kind of background 
hum, for instance, that is somehow fundamental to consciousness and that is 
there even when the other components are not. This phenomenology of self is 
so deep and intangible that it sometimes seems illusory, consisting in nothing 
over and above specific elements such as those listed above. Still, there seems 
                                                 
61
 Nagel (1974) uses the term ‘organism’ (p. 436) and ‘subject’ (p. 440, 443) interchangeably. He does 
though say that ‘every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and 
it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view’ (p. 437). He 
further  asks ‘what would be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the 
bat?’ (p. 443).  ‘Point of view’ suggests the first-person use of ‘subject’ that we will be interested in 
here. 
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to be something to the phenomenology of self, even it is very hard to pindown 
(Chalmers, 1996, p. 10). 
 
This sense of self is different from the sense of personhood. One often 
experiences what could be referred to as a self-feeling. In my own case, there is 
frequently what could be described as the feeling of BR, often accompanied by a 
vague visual image of BR’s face. This feeling of personhood comes and goes. Daniel 
Dennett further holds that the sense of being a continuing self is maintained by the 
narratives that are spun about it which form a fictional ‘center of narrative gravity’ 
(Dennett, 1991, p. 418). However, we should distinguish between this sense of 
personhood and the sense of self. The sense of self, unlike the sense of being a 
continuing person, is purportedly an invariant character of experience which 
accompanies every experience. 
There are two main conceptions of the sense of self - a weak conception and a 
strong conception. ‘For-me-ness’ as it has come to be used is a weak sense of self 
(Kriegel, 2003, 2009; Zahavi, 2005, 2011, 2014; Zahavi & Kriegel, 2015). Gallagher 
and Zahavi (2010) attribute this view to the phenomenologists Husserl, Merleau-
Ponty, Heidegger and Sartre. For-me-ness is proposed to be an invariant dimension of 
consciousness in which every experience is ‘marked as my experience’ (Gallagher & 
Zahavi, 2010, p. 1). It is a pre-reflective self-awareness. It is contrasted with a 
reflective self-awareness such as when I think ‘I am confused’, feel that I’ve forgotten 
something, or recognise myself in the mirror. This self-awareness of experience is 
built into all experiences. This dimension of experience is non-intentional. It is not 
experienced as an object of awareness. It is also non-attentional. I cannot attend to 
for-me-ness. Rather ‘it is permanently humming in the background of our stream of 
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consciousness, but never shows up at the focal center of our overall awareness’ 
(Kriegel, 2003, p. 14).  
Although for-me-ness is often described as ‘self-consciousness’ (Gallagher & 
Zahavi, 2010) it is better thought of as an awareness of having experiences. It is a 
dimension of conscious experience, in the stream of consciousness itself, ‘a built-in 
self-reference, a primitive experiential self-referentiality’ (Zahavi, 2005, p. 122). 
Zahavi suggests that his view may be better understood by the phrase ‘the subjectivity 
of experience’ rather than by ‘subject of experience’ (Zahavi, 2005, p. 126, 2011, p. 
64; see also Williford, 2006, p. 121). For-me-ness refers to a subject which may or 
may not exist. Hence the proponent of for-me-ness could hold that there is in fact no 
self, the sense of self is illusory because it mistakenly refers to a subject that does not 
exist (Dreyfus, 2011; Krueger, 2011). Zahavi holds that there is no distinct subject to 
which for-me-ness refers, but also prefers to revise the term ‘self’ such that for-me-
ness just is the minimal self (2005, p. 125, 2011, p. 60).
62
  
A strong sense of self is a sense of being a single, unchanging subject of 
experience (Me). This latter sense of self could be illusionary or taken as a full blown 
self-awareness (if this apparent subject in fact exists). A strong sense of self is 
subject-presenting. One motivation for holding that there is a continuous, invariant 
strong sense of self comes from the phenomenology of meditation. A common 
experience is that of being the observer of thoughts, feelings and sounds as they arise 
and disappear. These phenomena keep changing but ‘I’ seem to remain unchanged. 
There is a phenomenal polarity between the objects of consciousness and the observer 
                                                 
62
 Krueger (2011) argues that given that subjectivity is in the stream of consciousness which is always 
changing moment by moment, Zahavi can at best talk of ‘a plurality of numerically distinct, minimal 
phenomenal selves’ (Krueger, 2011, p. 51). Albahari makes a similar point ‘ how can we phenomenally 
tell whether the situation is that of numerically discrete and contiguous (qualitatively invariant) for-me-
nesses, or just one unbroken for-me-ness, which may well point to an invariant observer?’ (Albahari, 
2011, p. 99-100). 
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of them (Albahari, 2009; Deikman, 1996). Strawson refers to self-experience as ‘the 
experience that people have of themselves of being, specifically, a mental presence; a 
mental someone; a single mental something or other’ (Strawson, 1997, p. 407). As 
Damasio expresses it: ‘like it or not we cannot escape the fact that the mind seems 
split, like a house divided, between the knower and the known’ (Damasio, 1999, p. 
191). This knowing aspect seems to go beyond the mere ‘mineness’ of experience, but 
suggests that there (at least) seems to be a full-blooded subject of experience. To hold 
that the sense of self is merely for-me-ness is to deny that there seems to be an 
observational or knowing aspect. Albahari states that  
 
while I agree that for-me-ness characterizes our experience, I contend that it 
structures our conscious life far more dramatically than as just a reflexive 
sheen on the bead of each experience. It necessarily bifurcates our experience 
into subject and object. For so long as our diverse experiences seem to be for 
me – and for the very same me over time, no less – there is no escaping that 
there will seem to be a perspectival ‘me’ that the experiences are for. Or to put 
it more simply: so long as objects are experienced as being given to a subject 
there must seem to be a subject to which they are given’ (Albahari, 2011, p. 
100-101: original emphasis).  
 
Proponents of the strong sense of self will hence hold that the ‘mineness’ of 
experience derives from the observational aspect of experience.
63
 Like the notion of 
                                                 
63
 Some philosophers influenced by Eastern traditions label the observational aspect ‘awareness’ 
(Albahari, 2009; Deikman, 1996; Forman, 1998; Gupta, 1998; Shear 1998). They further hold that 
awareness is the subject. I am sympathetic with the first usage of the term, though I am  less sure about 
the second. A number of other philosophers have assured me that awareness is a relation between a 
subject and an object. It certainly cannot be the subject. This is just the way that we use the concept. In 
the end, I am not sure which side is correct and do not have the space here to explore the issue in detail. 
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for-me-ness both Albahari (2009) and Deikman (1996) also hold that the subject is 
known implicitly and not as an object of experience. 
The existence of both senses of self is controversial. Many philosophers do not 
recognize it. Some deny that there is an invariant for-me-ness in experience (Dainton, 
2008, p. 242-243; Prinz, 2012, p. 127). Dainton (2008) agrees that there is often 
subject-object split in experience, but that it is not invariant. Rather there are times, 
such as ‘when we drift in reverie’ (Dainton, 2008, p. 147) when there is no sense of 
self. Others hold that there is a seeming invariant subject-object polarity, but then 
explain it in terms of something else. For example, Evans (1970) explains the 
apparent duality by means of the duality between attended and unattended 
experiences. There are always aspects of experience in the background of awareness 
such as bodily sensations and bird whistles. According to Evans (1970) the subject is 
just the sum of whatever is in the background of awareness. Albahari points out that 
this account has counter-intuitive consequences:
64
 
 
Imagine… that one is attending to an orchestra while enduring an unattended 
pain in the back. Does it seem to the person as if her back pain – along with all 
the other manifold of unattended items – is attending to the orchestra? That is 
how it would have to seem, if Evans was right in supposing that ‘the subject’ 
of experience seems to be nothing more than the cacophony of background 
experiences (Albahari, 2009, p. 73-74). 
 
In contrast to previous authors, I provide methods for explicitly recognising a 
strong sense of self. It is explicit because this strong sense of self relies upon orienting 
                                                                                                                                            
Here I use the terms ‘sense of self’, ‘me’, ‘observational aspect’ and ‘knowing aspect’ as these are the 
least controversial. I remain neutral here as to whether or not to call it ‘awareness’.  
64
 See Dainton (2008, p. 140-141) for further criticisms of Evan’s view. 
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attention to where I seem to be looking from – to the apparent location of the looker. 
The location to which I refer is 180 degrees from the text that you are currently 
reading. I further claim that once one has recognised this sense of self presence 
explicitly it is also possible to recognise that the awareness that I am here/looking 
from here is also present when I am not specifically attending to this location. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows: In section 2, I use first-person 
experiments from Douglas Harding for explicitly recognising: (1) a strong sense of 
self, and (2) a visual gap. In section 3, I argue this sense of self cannot be reduced to 
inference, thinking or feeling, or the viewpoint. Finally in section 4, I provide some 
preliminary reasons for thinking that the gap is a prima facie subject.  
   
5.2. First-person Experiments 
 
In this section, I use first-person methods developed by Douglas Harding as a 
means for distinguishing the sense of sense and a candidate for the subject.
65
 
The first-person method used here consists of three essential components: The first 
component, setting aside assumptions, is an essential initial step in many first-person 
methodologies (Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Varela, 1996, p. 335-338). This involves 
setting aside theories, common sense, and any other metaphysical assumptions, and to 
simply take your experience exactly as it is given. To look as if for the first time. In 
particular, we will be screening off the third-person perspective, and going solely by 
present first-person experience. The second component is distinguishing by 
phenomenal contrast (Siegel, 2007). Here two phenomena are compared so as to make 
salient the phenomenal difference between them. Thirdly, unlike standard forms of 
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 Experiment 5.2 is from Harding. Experiments 5.1, 5.3 and 5.4 are my own variants on his 
experimental method. 
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‘introspection’ these methods use apparatus such as one’s own body to both make the 
phenomenal contrast and to assist in orienting attention to the target phenomena. In 
particular, the aim of the following first-person experiments is to provide systematic 
methods, via the manipulation of attention, of isolating the sense of self and a gap-like 
aspect. I focus here on visual experience. 
 
5.2.1 Experiment 5.1: The Pointing Experiment – Part 1 
 
Where are you looking from? Hold up your hand in front of you. Are you looking 
from the left of the hand? The right of the hand? Or is the place you are looking from 
located at 180 degrees from the hand? I find the latter. I am looking from here. To 
further test this try pointing outwards at various objects. I find that I point at objects 
such as a table, a chair, and a wall. I see things and surfaces that are composed of 
shapes and colours, but I do not seem to point at myself. Now point to where others 
see your face. I now seem to be pointing at the looker. There is a sense of me-being-
here. 
 
I am certainly aware that the finger is presented to me, just as I am aware that 
the wall is presented to me. This so far is consistent with for-me-ness. However there 
is an additional character to the experience that is not there when I point at the wall. 
The finger is not just experienced as ‘for me’ or as being my experience of the finger. 
Rather the finger seems to be pointing directly at me. It is not just that the experience 
of the finger is mine, the finger non-linguistically and explicitly indicates me. The 
sense that I am here is the sense that I the subject of experience am located here. This 
is a strong sense of self, not merely for-me-ness or mineness.  
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What about when I point at my leg? Is not that also experienced as ‘me’? This 
seems to be ‘my’ leg, but it is also visually given as an object in the world over there. 
It does not seem to be the observing subject. I take a perspective upon it.
66
 By contrast 
when I point here I seem to be pointing at the looker or the observer, that which is 
viewing the finger (and the leg etc.). I seem to be the target of the pointing finger. 
Hence this is an explicit, strong sense of self rather than weaker senses of self such as 
for-me-ness or the sense of ownership of my body. I seem to be pointing at the 
observer. 
 
5.2.2 Experiment 5.2: The Pointing Experiment – Part 2 
 
I seem to point at myself when I point here. This seems to be me, but what is it 
like to be me in my current experience? We will now investigate a second aspect of 
the experience.  
 
Please do the following. Use your finger to point at a wall. Notice that you are 
pointing at a thing with colour, shape and texture. Point at the floor and notice its 
various colours and textures. Now point at your foot and then slowly trace your 
pointing finger up your body noticing its three-dimensional volume, and various 
colours and textures of your limbs and clothes. Finally turn your finger around so that 
it is pointing where others see your face. On present experience do you seem to be 
pointing at a face? Are there apparently any colours here? Shapes? Textures? 
                                                 
66
 There is an interesting question here as to whether my hand is experienced as both an object and the 
‘feeler’ particularly when bringing in the sense of touch. This idea is prominently found in Merleau-
Ponty (1968. p. 130-155). See Sartre (1956, p. 303-305) for arguments for the opposing view that the 
feeler cannot be experienced as an object. I set aside the sense of touch here and focus on vision. 
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Movement? None of these are experienced at this location. Rather I experience a 
gap.
67
 
5.2.3 Experiment 5.3: The Aware Spot 
 
I experience this location like a gap, but is it merely a gap? The question of 
this experiment is where seems to be the location of the looker?  
 
(1) Gaps: Point to the gap formed by an open doorway. In a sense you are pointing at 
nothing. I seem to be pointing at no shapes or colours and not at the looker. (2) Aware 
Spot: Now point here. There is a phenomenal difference between the gap of the door 
way and here. Again there are apparently no shapes and colours, but I also seem to be 
pointing at the looker. It does not merely seem to be a gap. I am seemingly pointing at 
where I am looking from, the locus of awareness. A gap in a doorway has a spacious 
emptiness to it simpliciter. By contrast, when I attend here there is both (1) a spacious 
emptiness and (2) a sense that I am here/looking from here. Harding refers to this as 
an ‘Aware-Space’ (Harding, 1996, p. 83; 2001, p. 135). 
 
5.3. The Strong Sense of Self 
 
 I seem to be located here. When I attend to the place I seem to be looking 
from, there is an explicit and strong sense that I am here. The experience is explicit 
because it involves directing attention. It is not the for-me-ness or mine-ness of 
experience firstly because it can be recognised explicitly, and secondly because this 
seems to be me - the subject to which things are visually presented to. Zahavi (2005, 
                                                 
67
 For examples of the pointing experiment see: Harding (1990, p. 8-9, 41-42; 2000, p. 8-9), Lang 
(2003, p. 7-8). 
138 
 
p. 119) also refers to for-me-ness as the ‘first-person givenness’ of experience. This 
locus of awareness by contrast seems to be the first-person to which things are given. 
The first-person itself seems to be given. For-me-ness refers to a subject that may or 
may not be present, whereas my pointing finger seems to be directed at the observer 
itself, not just a reference to the first-person. This is hence a strong sense of self. 
However, I do not need to attend to this location to have the sense that I am looking 
from here. Even if I attend straight ahead there is still the awareness of looking from 
here. This implicit sense of self is an invariant aspect of experience. Once one 
recognises this sense of self explicitly, the implicit sense of self is also evident. It is 
natural to hold that for-me-ness in the weak sense is derivative upon the strong sense 
of self.  
How can we account for this sense of self? I discuss a number of possible 
options including: inference, thought, and the view point. These proceed from less 
plausible to more plausible. 
 
5.3.1 Inference 
 
 Perhaps this seems to be me because I also have various facial and eye 
sensations. Is that why this seems to be the looker? However, when I point at my arm 
there are also various sensations felt in that location, without the unique sense of 
pointing at the observer.  
Perhaps when I point here I am inferring that this is myself. I have learnt that 
‘I’ am here. However I am not aware of making an inference that I am here. There are 
two problems with this suggestion. Firstly, it seems odd to think that there could be a 
subject that could for instance mistakenly believe that it was looking from the side of 
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the visual field. Surely it would not need to learn that it is looking from here. I do not 
seem to look from any old direction, but precisely from here. This is built into the 
experience (or so I claim). 
The second problem with this suggestion is that by itself it does not account 
for the phenomenal difference between pointing here and pointing elsewhere. To 
make a phenomenal difference there must be some phenomenology, and a mere belief 
or disposition to think makes no phenomenal difference. It must then be a disposition 
to think or feel that this is me which make the phenomenal difference. The suggestion 
then collapses into the next account that there is some sort of thought, feeling or 
imagining that I am here which accounts for the sense of self. 
 
5.3.2 Thought, Imagination and Sense of Self 
 
Perhaps the phenomenal difference identified in the previous experiments is 
due to thinking about myself whenever I point here. I simply think ‘me’, or have some 
vague sense of ‘me’ when I point here. Are thoughts necessary for me to seem to be 
aware from here? Test this by trying the following: 
 
Experiment 5.4: Thinking and Imagining 
 
Point here and at the same time think ‘me, me, me’. As you do so imagine yourself in 
as much detail as possible, including the vague sense of self you have when you 
wordlessly think of yourself. Is there a stronger experience of pointing at yourself? 
Now try thinking ‘Elvis, Elvis, Elvis’ and imagine Elvis in as much detail as possible. 
Elvis in a white jump suit, crooning and hip swivelling. I find that the difference in 
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thoughts doesn’t change the experience of pointing at the looker. Neither does 
thinking ‘Elvis’ make it feel like I am pointing at Elvis. None of these thoughts or 
images make a difference to this essentially perception-like experience.  
 
Perhaps I am somehow still thinking about myself even while thinking 
‘Elvis’? This seems highly unlikely as I cannot typically think two thoughts at once. I 
cannot have two simultaneous streams of ‘inner speech’ about myself and Elvis at the 
same time. I could think the conjunction ‘Elvis and me’ but I was not doing that just 
now, at least not consciously so. If I was thinking it unconsciously then this cannot 
account for the phenomenal difference. I can though think and imagine, and feel 
different things at once, but then all I need to do is load my mind’s eye with more 
conflicting imaginations, feelings etc. so as to crowd out any thoughts, feelings or 
imaginings about myself. Whether I am thinking of myself, or someone else, or 
nothing at all, the experience of looking from here does not change.  
Perhaps the problem with the above exercise is that I am not really immersing 
myself in the act of imagination. I need to imaginatively take on the point of view of 
someone else. One possible counter-example is provided by Bernard Williams (1973). 
He intriguingly supposes that I imagine that I am Napoleon such that I entertain 
‘images of, for instance, the desolation at Austerlitz as viewed by me vaguely aware 
of my short stature and my cockaded hat, my hand in my tunic’ (Williams, 1973, p. 
43). Now suppose that I point at the viewer. Is it not the case that I seem to not be 
pointing at myself, but at Napoleon? Afterall, I am imagining that I am not myself but 
that I am Napoleon. It is seemingly Napoleon’s point of view. 
As a response we need to distinguish between the personal self and the viewer. 
I am imagining that I am not BR, but rather I am Napoleon, so I will not seem to be 
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pointing at BR. However, I think that I will still seem to be pointing at myself (as the 
viewer). This is a pre-personal sense of self. ‘I’ will still seem to be looking from here 
even if that ‘I’ is not the personal I. Should we believe in this pre-personal sense of 
‘I’? It seems plausible that even if I lost all of my memories and hence did not know 
who I was as a person I would still seem to be looking from here. I would still be 
seemingly located here. We should also distinguish between different modes of 
seeming. There is a seeming of seeing, a seeming of hearing and a seeming of 
imagining. When I point here whilst imagining that I am Napoleon I imaginatively-
seem to be pointing at Napoleon and not BR. But nevertheless I non-imaginatively 
seem to be pointing at myself as viewer.  
Or to put it another way, how do I know that I imaginatively-seem to be 
pointing at Napoleon? The answer is because I seem to be pointing at myself (in a 
pre-imaginative way), who imaginatively seems to be Napoleon. Suppose that I 
somehow lost the sense that I was here, such that I had no awareness that I was 
looking from here at all. It seems then that I could not imaginatively-seem to be 
anyone let alone Napoleon because this minimal sense of self grounds the possibility 
of seeming to be a subject at all. I only know that I imaginatively seem to be pointing 
at Napoleon because I am aware of pointing at myself, who is imagining being 
Napoleon. Suppose that I took the imagining too far and started to genuinely believe 
that I am Napoleon. This would not be a problem either because then when I point 
here I will seem to be pointing at myself, who believes that he is in fact Napoleon. I 
am mistaken that I am Napoleon, but nevertheless I cannot be mistakenly that I seem 
to be pointing at the subject. Hence I do not think that William’s mind-bending case is 
a counter-example.  
Explicit thoughts, imaginings and feelings are variant. They come and go.  
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The sense that I am looking from here does not change. This is an invariant aspect of 
the structure of experience. I am not constantly having thoughts, feelings or 
imaginings that I am here. 
 
5.3.3 Spatial Visual Structure and the Viewpoint  
 
A more plausible proposal is that this strong sense of self is reducible to the 
viewpoint. Some may think that this is obviously so, though I will argue that the 
viewpoint is not sufficient to explain this sense of self. The viewpoint is a central 
point in the spatial structure of vision or egocentric space, that is, space as 
experienced from a first-person point of view. Examples include left, right, in front.
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Non-Egocentric space on the other hand has coordinates that are not relative to a point 
of view such as north, west and south. Campbell (1994, p. 119) distinguishes between 
monadic and relational egocentric information. ‘X is to the left’ is an example of a 
monadic egocentric property.
69
 ‘X is to the left of me’ is an example of an egocentric 
relation. He holds that the visual information does not have an inbuilt reference to the 
subject but rather is monadic. However, a relational description can also exclude a 
specific reference to a subject.
70
 Things are seen as located to the left of centre and 
right of centre, and at a distance from here.  
The central point in vision is the viewpoint. The visible side of things 
apparently face this centre in egocentric space. Perhaps then it is just built into visual 
experience that things are at a distance from here, but there is no sense of me being 
here. For example, Blanke and Metzinger describe a weak first-person perspective as: 
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 For further discussion on egocentric information see Peacocke (1992, chapter 3) on scenarios and 
Bermudez (1998, chapter 5) on self-specifying information in vision. 
69
 Colours are another example of monadic visual properties. 
70
 Casullo (1986, 1989) argues that objects have their positions in perceptual space in virtue of monadic 
position properties, while Falkenstein (1989) argues in favour of relations.  
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A purely geometrical feature of a perceptual or imagined model of reality 
possessing a point of projection functioning as its origin in sensory and mental 
processing, but is not linked with theoretically more charged notions such as 
‘subject of experience’ (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009, p. 8). 
 
The advantage of this proposal over thoughts, feelings and images is that it 
would provide an invariant structure to visual experience to account for the 
phenomenology. Do I seem to be pointing at myself because I am pointing at the 
viewpoint? The best way to test the adequacy of this alternative description is to close 
your eyes. If the experience is reducible to the spatial aspects of the visual field such 
as the viewpoint then closing your eyes should eliminate this sense of self. This 
experiment is a variant of an experiment by Arthur Deikman (1996, p. 351) who uses 
a method of contrast for distinguishing the subject (he uses the term ‘awareness’). 
 
Experiment 5.5: Eyes Closed Experiment 
 
Close your eyes. The visual scene and it objects have been suddenly replaced by a 
dark grey field. You may experience dynamic points of light somewhat like television 
static but no objects. Notice that while visual experience has changed the sense of 
observing has not. The phenomena presented to me have changed, but my presence as 
experiencer of the phenomena remains constant. 
 
When I close my eyes even though there is no three-dimensional spatial 
information and nothing to project, my sense of observing things does not change. I 
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now observe blackness. However, other relations are always present. For example, 
when the visual field is entirely black I can still attend to different positions in the 
field such as to the left, centre and right. Should this central point be treated as the 
viewpoint or does the viewpoint disappear when I close my eyes? It seems likely that 
there is a viewpoint only when there is three-dimensional spatial information. For 
example, a photo of a street scene has a viewpoint which things face and recede into 
the distance from. However, a photo of a totally dark room represents nothing but 
blackness – it does not represent a viewpoint. If it does depict a viewpoint it is only in 
a very abstract sense of the term, like a centre of gravity. When I close my eyes my 
sense of self-presence does not disappear, even though there is no three-dimensional 
spatial information and arguably no viewpoint. When the lights go out, if anything the 
phenomenal polarity between the observer and the observed (the blackness) and is 
even more salient. If correct, this shows that the sense of self we have been 
investigating is not reducible to visual geometric information. 
Perhaps there is other spatial information that can explain the continued sense 
of self. There is for instance proprioception. Is the sense of self a central point in the 
proprioceptive field? There is also auditory spatial information. Is the sense of ‘me’ 
the central point in auditory space? There are a number of problems with these 
proposals. Firstly, the central points in vision, proprioception and audition are all 
different. At which centre do I seem to be located? It is not even clear that there is a 
central point in proprioceptive experience. Neither do I suddenly seem to shift centre 
when I close my eyes. These sources of information are also erratic. I do not always 
hear sounds or have a sense of the position of my limbs. These sources of information 
are too variable to explain the invariance of my self-presence. I do not drop in and out 
of self-awareness (at least whilst I am conscious). 
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There is also the sense that I observe my thoughts and feelings, however these 
do not seem to have any particular location. Even if they do where is the central point 
in cognitive and/or emotional space? These questions do not seem to make sense. 
Given the variability in sensory experiences, their different central points and given 
that many aspects of experience arguably do not have spatial experience at all times it 
seems that we are forced to posit an unchanging multi-modal centre. This would 
account for the invariance of the sense of self. But now it is not clear what we are 
talking about. The viewpoint in vision is locatable and definable, but now it turns out 
that this cannot account for the continuing sense of self. Blanke and Metzinger refer 
to ‘a point of projection functioning as (the) origin in sensory and mental processing’ 
(Blanke and Metzinger, 2009, p. 8). What would it be like to experience this ‘origin’? 
This is not particularly mysterious when it comes to spatial experience, but what 
would it be like when it comes to non-spatial experience? In non-spatial experience an 
origin suggests a temporal or causal origin, but it is doubtful that either of these could 
account for the phenomenology. What would it even be like to experience the causal 
origin of thoughts? A multi-sensory central point or origin is so abstract that it is not 
clear that it could have any specific phenomenology. It seems more like a theoretical 
point like a centre of gravity than a point that could make a phenomenal difference to 
overall experience. 
A response to this the might be that ‘the sense of self is just as mysterious!’ 
This is true, but no supporter of a unique, irreducible sense of self is denying this. 
Here the question is not about metaphysical reduction but about phenomenal 
reduction.
71
 It is a question of whether there is a plausible aspect of ordinary 
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 Not to be confused with the Husserlian phenomenological reduction. 
146 
 
phenomenology which could account for the sense of self. Zahavi and Kriegel (2015, 
p. 50) entirely concede the mysteriousness of the phenomenology: 
 
Many philosophers will still feel that there is something elusive and slightly 
mysterious about for-me-ness. In fact we do not wish to deny this: we think that for-
me-ness is just as mysterious as phenomenal consciousness.  
 
A reductive account on the other hand should reduce the mysterious 
experiential phenomenon to a less mysterious experiential phenomenon. For example, 
Evans (1970) tried to reduce the apparent subject-object polarity to the polarity 
between attended and unattended experience. A similar reduction seems relatively 
straightforward in the case of the visual viewpoint. Once we move to other modalities 
this central point or origin arguably becomes just as mysterious as the sense of self.  
Finally, why should I seem to be at this central point rather than at a peripheral 
point? Let us return to the case of vision. With eyes open, when I point here I seem to 
be pointing at myself. I am also pointing at the viewpoint. But why should I seem to 
be located here rather than somewhere else? I honestly do not know! Locating a 
central point is not the same as me seeming to be located at that central point. It seems 
that we again need some sort of sense of me - a phenomenally irreducible self-
awareness. Without the sense of me it is just a central point. If this is correct then 
there is more to the phenomenology than just a central point, there is also the ‘me-
ness’ aspect which is arguably the essential feature of the sense of self. This suggests 
that a central point or origin is not sufficient to account for the phenomenology. 
Something further is required to fix ‘me’ at that point. There needs to be an apparent 
awareness of me. Suppose this invariant abstract centre in sensory-space is 
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constructed and it is also stipulated in experience (also invariantly) that ‘this is me’. 
We are then back to the invariant sense of self that we set out to explain in the first 
place. 
 
5.4. The Self as a Gap 
 
 I have argued that there is a strong sense of self, a sense of me looking from 
here. Pointing here is a way of noticing it, but it is always implicitly present. My self-
presence is continuous. The explicit sense that ‘I’ am here is stronger than a sense of 
‘mineness’ of experiences. It is not explained by for-me-ness. Rather it is plausible 
that the strong sense of sense explains for-me-ness. I also argued that this sense of self 
does not reduce to inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination or the viewpoint. 
 The second aspect to the experience of this location is its gap-like or space-
like character. This is different from both for-me-ness and the strong sense of self, as 
there is a character of spacious emptiness to it. This also distinguishes it from the 
view point. In fact, this apparently empty region is not experienced as a mere point, 
but as an extended region. It would be better not to say that I find a view-point here, 
but an open region or a view-space. Unlike a mere point which cannot contain 
anything, this openness allows this space to encompass the visual scene. 
 It is this last aspect which is a reason for positing that this is the subject – that 
this is me. By encompassing the visual scene it can function as a bearer for it. To 
account for the unity of consciousness, Bayne and Chalmers (2003) posit a total state 
of consciousness which subsumes all conscious states. They refer to it as a 
‘singularity behind the multiplicity’ (ibid., p. 27). Albahari (2009) also underlines this 
statement from Bayne and Chalmers. She calls it ‘mode-neutral awareness’ and 
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identifies it with the subject. This gap certainly seems to be me, or more neutrally, I 
seem to be looking from it. It is also aptly described as a ‘singularity behind the 
multiplicity’. Visually speaking this space is that to which things are visually 
presented. It is not a point, but a transparent opening which encompasses those very 
things. 
 This gap-like aspect is distinct from the background hum for which we were 
looking. It is not the sense of self - the sense of knowing or observing, but they seem 
to be intimately connected. Harding calls it an ‘aware-space’. A further question then 
arises as to the relationship between the observational aspect and the emptiness 
aspect. Are they identical, or is the knowingness aspect (awareness?) a property of 
this apparent space? These are intriguing metaphysical questions which go beyond the 
scope of the dissertation. Furthermore, I have not argued here that this actually is the 
subject, I am still talking about how things seem. However, if this is indeed me, then 
the explicit sense that this is me counts as self-awareness in the full sense of the term. 
In the next chapter, I argue that experiencing this gap or space meets the criterion for 
a self-experience, and that this provides prima facie evidence for this being me. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Self-Experience 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter investigated the sense of self. The sense of self is 
conceptually distinct from the self. The sense of self is the sense that I am present. 
There may be a sense of the self but no actual self, or there may be a self while there 
is no sense of self. The sense of self and the self come apart when it comes to 
recognising myself as a person. For example, I may identify the person wearing a blue 
shirt in a crowd reflected in a large mirror, but nevertheless fail to recognise that the 
person is in fact me. I identify the person wearing the blue shirt (myself), but there is 
no associated sense of self. There is also the sense of self from the first-person point 
of view of being the viewer of the scene. There may be a sense of being the viewer, 
but nevertheless there may be no viewer.
72
 I argue the sense of self is also 
phenomenally distinct from a direct experience of the self. On the other hand, in 
seeming to explicitly experience the viewer it is plausible that the sense of self would 
be an essential aspect of the experience. The goal of the present chapter is to argue 
that the visual gap identified in the previous chapter is a prima facie candidate for the 
self. That is, the self has a prima facie reality. 
What Am I? Methods for answering this question divide roughly into those 
which take a third-person approach, and those which take a first-person approach. The 
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 Though Zahavi (2005, p. 125, 2011, p. 60) insists that the sense of self just is the self. 
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third-person approach has been used to provide answers such as I am the human, the 
organism (Olson, 1997, 2003), the brain or functions/processes of the brain (Dennett, 
1991; Metzinger, 2004) etc. These selves are objects or processes in the world. There 
is also the first-person approach to the self which takes first-person experience as the 
methodological beginning point (Albahari, 2009; Edey, 1997; Evans, 1970; Dainton, 
2004; Dainton and Bayne, 2005; Deikman, 1996; Harding, 1986a; Strawson, 1997; 
Zahavi, 2005).
73
 I will be taking the latter approach here, in particular, I will be using 
a first-person experimental approach developed by Douglas Harding.  
One may recognise the puzzle of what I am by asking: who or what is 
currently aware of the objects before me? I am aware of this computer screen, I am 
aware of my hands, I am aware of my body, I am aware of my thoughts and emotions. 
These are all objects of awareness (objects in a broad sense), and hence 
(phenomenally speaking) are not the ‘I’ that is presently aware of them (Albahari, 
2006, p. 7-12; Bond, 2005; Deikman, 1996; Edey, 1997). What is this experiencer?  
This was the project that engaged Descartes in the first two meditations. 
Suppose that there is an evil demon feeding me all of my experiences and deceiving 
me into thinking that the world exists. My body does not exist. I am not even a 
human. Even so it cannot deceive me that I am currently experiencing. He concludes 
in the second meditation that ‘this alone cannot be detached from me’ and that at 
minimum I am a ‘thinking thing’74 (Descartes, 1641, p. 25). I know that I, the 
experiencer exists (whatever I turn out to be) even if I am deceived about everything 
else. It is not necessary to engage in Cartesian scepticism to ask about the nature of 
the experiencer. Doing so is just a vivid way of recognising that there is indeed a 
question to ask. It is a way of withdrawing from what I think I know of myself as 
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 For an overview of theories see Olson (2007).  
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 Descartes (1641, p. 26) uses ‘thinking’ in a broad sense to include doubting, understanding, willing, 
imagining and sensing. 
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learned from others, to focusing upon what I know of myself in my own first-person 
experience. Husserl (1960) takes this as the entry into phenomenology as a scientific 
practice. 
One can take the rational (apriori) route or the phenomenological route to 
uncovering the nature of the experiencer. Here I combine both approaches. The 
phenomenological route reached a road block with Hume, when he proclaimed that he 
could find nothing in experience that corresponded to a self. Hume’s negative finding 
has been re-confirmed by most philosophers since. As an example Bertrand Russell 
(1914) concurred with Hume that ‘we can easily become aware of our own 
experiences, but we seem to never become aware of the subject itself’ (Russell, 1914, 
p. 439). Contrary to Hume, I will argue that there can be an experience as of a subject 
(a self-experience) with the assistance of appropriate methods. 
Many will deny that phenomenology gives you metaphysics. However, there 
are reasons for holding that phenomenology does provide a guide to metaphysics 
when it comes to the subject. In fact, it is indispensable. As Strawson (1997) points 
out, first-person experience is the source of the problem of the self, so first-person 
experience is also the place to start in an investigation of the nature of the subject. 
Metaphysics is subordinate to phenomenology in this realm. Metaphysics is 
downstream of phenomenology. To ignore phenomenal experience in investigating 
the nature of the subject is like doing physics by analysing common sense concepts of 
the physical - an entirely fruitless endeavour if you are interested in the way things 
actually are. The same reasoning applies to the subject of experience. How can I 
decide what I am if I am not even sure what it is like to be me? 
Here I will argue for the prima facie reality of the subject. In particular, that 
there seems to be a subject. A phenomenological approach to the self like any 
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empirical approach does not need to establish a necessary connection between 
experience and metaphysics, rather all that is needed is that it provides prima facie 
justification for the metaphysical thesis. For example, suppose that I seem to see a 
duck. That which I seem to see meets the criterion for being a duck. It seems to have 
feathers, seems to waddle and seems to quack. It could of course be a hallucination or 
a robot duck and hence not actually a duck. It is defeasible evidence. However, in the 
absence of reasons against the experiential evidence, I am prima facie justified in 
believing that it is a duck. Analogously in this chapter, I provide criterion for 
characteristics of the subject and provide phenomenological evidence that there is a 
target of experience that meets this criterion. It may still turn out that there is no self, 
it may be undermined by further evidence, but there will at least be prima facie 
justification for holding that it is me (for discussions of prima facie justification see: 
Goldman, 2004; Pryor, 2000). 
On the other hand, I do not think that a sense of self reaches the threshold for 
providing prima facie evidence for the reality of the self. To continue the analogy, 
suppose that I have a vague sense of duckyness – a feeling that there is a duck. In this 
case, I would probably not be justified in believing that a duck is present. Even a 
strong intuition would not suffice. Someone would want to know what reason I have 
for the feeling or intuition that there is a duck. A perceptual experience of a duck on 
the other hand presents one with specific ducky properties which directly meet the 
criterion of duckhood and hence provides a case for the prima facie reality of the 
duck. Analogously, I use first-person experiments within the visual modality to 
identify a target with properties that could answer to being the self. Additionally it 
may be expected that experiencing the self would be necessarily accompanied by a 
sense of self (a sense that this is me). If a candidate for the subject can be identified, 
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and awareness of it is accompanied by the sense that this is me, then there would be a 
strong prima facie case for this being me.
75
 
Here I draw upon methods developed by Douglas Harding which provide step 
by step instructions for experiencing what it is like to be me. The main focus will be 
on the visual modality. Hume’s claim that I cannot experience myself applies to all 
modalities, so finding a candidate self-experience using vision would be sufficient to 
negate this finding. Instead of asking whether the experiencer can be experienced, I 
begin with the simpler question of whether the looker can be visually experienced and 
set aside a detailed investigation of other sensory modalities for another occasion. I do 
however provide a brief discussion of other modalities in section 8.3.  
I will be focusing on the synchronic properties of the subject (that is, its unity 
at a single moment), rather than its diachronic properties (that is, its continuity over 
time). The main aim of the chapter is identifying a candidate for self-experience, 
particularly a non-objectifying self-experience in which I experience myself but not as 
an object of experience. From there seeming to be a subject it does not necessarily 
follow that there is a subject. The main aim is not to argue for the further claim that 
the experience is veridical here. Rather the aim of the chapter is to provide support for 
the prima facie reality of the subject. 
The plan for the chapter is as follows: In section 6.2, I investigate the problem 
of experiencing the subject through Hume’s phenomenological description. I will be 
using Hume as an inspiration, not engaging in Hume scholarship. One outcome of 
Hume’s challenge is that the subject cannot be an object of awareness. In section 6.3, 
I provide criteria for what could count as a non-objectifying experience. In section 
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 An objection is that the analogy allows too much to be prima facie justified. It seems to allow that 
revelation can count as evidence. However, revelation is not intersubjectively reliable. A non-biased 
subject will not obtain the same results. By contrast the first-person experiments provide 
phenomenological evidence that I claim is intersubjectively reliable (the reader can test this for 
themselves).   
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6.4, I use apriori reasoning to derive the characteristics required for a minimal subject 
of experience, and hence provide criteria for a self-experience. In sections 6.5 and 6.6, 
I employ awareness exercises from Douglas Harding to show that there is an 
experience which fits these phenomenal criteria. In section 6.7, I discuss these 
findings. In section 6.8, I respond to alternative descriptions of the phenomenological 
data. I make some concluding comments in section 6.9. 
 
6.2. Hume’s Search for the Self 
 
Introspecting his experience, David Hume (1777/1975) famously reported: 
 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my 
perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I 
insensible of myself, and may truly be said to not exist. And were all my 
perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor 
love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely 
annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect 
non-entity. If anyone upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a 
different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him… 
He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls 
himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me. 
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An objection to Hume’s elusiveness thesis is that he can be aware of himself 
by looking in the mirror or at his hand. This would be a third-person awareness of 
himself, whereas Hume is searching for a first-person awareness of himself (Howell, 
2010). A third-person way of experiencing is the perspective available for others to 
take upon me, and I take upon myself when I look at my hand or my face in the 
mirror. Feeling pain is an example of a first-person way of experiencing. The 
difference for instance is between knowing that I am in pain by seeing the grimace of 
my face in the mirror (third-person way) and feeling the pain (first-person way). 
Peacocke (2014) makes a similar point in terms of attention. He distinguishes 
between derivative and original attention. Derivative attention is attending to 
something by attending to something else. An example is attending to another’s pain 
by attending to the grimaces of their face. I am derivatively attending to their pain by 
originally (or directly) attending to their grimacing face. On the other hand, I attend to 
my own pain, ‘given as the pain’ (p. 46) by original attention.76 I can also derivatively 
attend to myself by attending to the face in the mirror. I am originally attending to the 
face in the mirror (it is visually given as that face over there), and at the same time 
derivatively attending to myself. The elusiveness claim then is that, while I can attend 
to myself by derivative attention such as by looking in the mirror, I cannot directly 
attend to myself by original attention in a first-person way. 
A second objection to the elusiveness thesis is that I can attend to myself by 
attending to properties of my experience. This is analogous to attending to an apple by 
attending to it properties such as shape and colour. Thus the subject, if it is elusive, is 
elusive in the same manner that objects are elusive. Howell (2010, p. 474-475) replies 
to this objection by pointing out a disanalogy between the two cases. The properties 
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 I could of course derivatively attend to my pain by attending to the grimaces of my own face in the 
mirror. 
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of objects are ‘object-presenting’ whereas the properties of myself as subject are not. 
For example, when I see the redness of the apple, it is seen as qualifying the apple. It 
is not presented as qualifying my mind. When I feel pain, it is not presented as 
qualifying me as subject. It is pain for me, but it qualifies my stubbed toe, an object of 
experience. Even if the character of redness and painfulness are intrinsic properties of 
me, they are not presented as such. This is a point similar to Peacocke. I apparently 
attend directly to the apple, however, I do not typically apparently attend directly to 
myself as experiencer. This observation is related to the transparency 
(diaphanousness) of experience which is the observation that I can attend to (or am 
aware of) objects and their properties but apparently not properties of experience 
(Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000). Even love and hatred are just the properties of 
lovability or despicability of some person or object. The subject of experience is 
elusive in a way that objects and their properties are not. 
Having elucidated the way in which the subject is elusive, another important 
point is that Hume was not searching for just any phenomena in experience. He was 
looking for one that could play a very specific function of unifying all of my 
experiences both synchronically (at one moment) and diachronically (over time). This 
is presumably why he asks whether there is a property of simplicity - as it could unify 
disparate experiences into a single whole, and a property of continuity - as it could 
unify experiences over time. Hume was searching for a substance. 
The bundle theory of the self is thesis that the self just is a collection of 
experiences and the relations between them. There is no experiencer behind the 
individual experiences. There is no bearer of experience. This is a reductionist view of 
the self. This metaphysical thesis is distinct from the denial that there is a further 
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experiencible invariant factor present with all experiencing which could function as a 
subject. As Jesse Prinz puts it: 
 
Among the various phenomenal qualities that make up an experience, there is 
none that can be characterized as an experience of the self or subject in 
addition to the qualities found in perceived features of the world, sensations, 
and emotions (Prinz, 2012, p. 124). 
 
Although I argued in the previous chapter that there is a sense of self (a seeming of 
self-presence), I do not think that this is sufficient to provide a prima facie case for 
there being a self. In contrast to Prinz I argue for a more specific version of the 
phenomenal thesis: 
 
Self-Experience Thesis: There can be an experience that is distinct from 
qualitative and emotional experience which could be characterized as being as 
of the bearer of experience.  
 
The truth of the phenomenal thesis is not the same as establishing the metaphysical 
thesis that there is a self, but it would provide strong prima facie justification for the 
metaphysical thesis. 
When Hume and other philosophers say that they cannot find the self, I would 
like to know what method they used. It may be that the phenomenological method 
used by Hume and others was not sensitive enough for uncovering/locating the self. 
Unlike Hume and most philosophers since, I will argue that self-experience is 
possible if you know which direction to attend. Hence I will be arguing that it is false 
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that no original attention to myself as experiencer is possible. If successful, given the 
long history of philosophers who agree with Hume’s phenomenological findings this 
would be a significant result. Finding a candidate for self-experience, in the sense of 
experiencing the bearer of experience (rather than merely a sense of self) would also 
provide evidence in support of there being such a subject. I elaborate upon what I 
mean by a self-experience in the next two sections. 
 
6.3. Non-Objectifying Self-Experience 
 
 As a first pass a self-experience is an experience of the self. This 
understanding works if we for example count the body as the self. What however 
about a direct subject-presenting self-experience? Here we encounter a problem. 
There is (purportedly) a logical point against the possibility of such a self-experience, 
implicit in Hume: an object is presented to the subject and so cannot be presented as 
that very subject that is currently aware of it. For example, suppose that there was a 
yellow spot that was invariantly present in the visual field (Searle, 2004, p. 292). This 
would not be presented as the subject, but just as another object of visual experience. 
To many this point blows the possibility of a direct self-experience out of the water. I 
do not think this follows however. Even if there cannot be an experience of self, this 
does not rule out the possibility of a non-objectifying form of self-experience 
(Strawson, 2009, p. 177-179, Zahavi, 2005, p. 126). Evans points out that ‘from the 
fact that the self is not an object of experience it does not follow that it is non-
experiential’ (Evans, 1970, p. 145).   
 It is difficult to characterise what a non-objectifying self-experience is in 
ordinary English as our very language has a subject-object structure built into it. The 
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term ‘self-experience’ is an exception that does not include an of relation which is one 
of the main reasons following Strawson (2009) that I use this term. It can be 
characterised as: an experience (of) myself but not as object of experience. Here the 
first ‘of’ in brackets is to be understood as merely playing a grammatical role like the 
‘it’ in ‘it is raining’. 77 In this type of self-experience, there is no subject-object 
division. From here on I will tend to shorten ‘non-objectifying self-experience’ to 
simply ‘self-experience’.   
 The above characterisation raises the question of what is an object of 
experience. One way of cashing this out is to define an object of experience as 
anything that can be attended to. This would include my body as visually experienced, 
thoughts, emotions, and bodily sensations. The subject (or subjectivity) would then be 
that which can never be attended to (Albahari, 2006, p. 10-12; Edey, 1997; Evans, 
1970; Zahavi, 2008). For example, Evans (1970) identifies the subject of experience 
with any presently unattended experience such as the background hum of a fridge. 
Albahari (2009, p. 64) proposes the stronger constraint that the subject is a sort of 
unique background hum, but one to which I can never attend. Self-experience on 
these accounts is pre-attentive (or non-attentive). To anticipate, the results of 
Harding’s experiments suggest that I can directly attend to myself as experiencer, 
albeit via a unique inward directed attention. Hence I need another set of criteria to 
distinguish a genuine self-experience from objects of experience. 
I suggest that a non-objectifying experience can be defined by its not 
possessing the properties of standard objects of experience. Hence by identifying 
criteria of what is an object of experience, this establishes negative criteria for a non-
objectifying experience. That is, I use a via negativa definition. This is a common 
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 Sartre (1956, p. liv) also brackets the ‘of’ in ‘consciousness (of) consciousness’ to denote that 
consciousness is not conscious of itself as an object. 
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strategy in Eastern traditions for example, in the Upanishads the Self is often defined 
by long lists of what it is not.    
What are the characteristics of objects of experience? Visually speaking, 
experienced objects standout against a background (e.g., they are given in the visual 
field), have sensory properties such as shape and colour, are discrete in that they 
occlude each other, and tend to appear some distance from myself. Even thoughts are 
heard (and so have some sensory qualities) and stand apart from each other and from 
myself. I am aware of them. I take a perspective upon them. 
In principle then, a non-objectifying experience involving attention
78
 is one in 
which the target of attention lacks: a background, sensory properties, discreteness 
from other experiential phenomena, and is apparently at no distance from myself. This 
list of criteria allows that there can be degrees of object-of-experience-hood. For 
example, the darkness I experience with my eyes closed fills the entire visual field 
and hence has no background (there is nothing visually outside of the visual field). It 
is also not experienced as being at a distance from me. However, it has visual 
properties of black and grey and dynamically appearing points of brightness. Thus it 
partially fits the criteria for being an object of experience. A hole is another example 
of a phenomenon that partially satisfies the criteria for object of experience. A hole 
unlike darkness has no sensory properties. It however has boundaries (its edges). It is 
also typically experienced as being located at a distance from me.  
On these criteria almost every experience falls into the category of an 
objectifying experience. However, there does not seem to be any contradiction 
involved in the notion of a pure non-objectifying experience. Hence there does not 
seem to be an apriori argument against it. Perhaps there are no actual pure non-
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 Strawson (2011) argues that a self-experience in which the subject is ‘in attention’ (p. 294) is 
possible. We could call this reflexive attention to the subject. This would contrast with reflective 
attention in which there is a subject-object duality. 
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objectifying experiences, however, this is an empirical question as to whether we can 
find a candidate or not. So far this only provides criteria for what a non-objectifying 
experience would be like (or not like), not what a specifically non-objectifying self-
experience would be like. This is the question of the next section. 
 
6.4. Characteristics of the Subject 
 
To know what could count as a self-experience it is helpful to know what to 
look for. What properties must the subject of experience have in itself? If a subject is 
to be present with all experiences, that which takes them on (or bears them), then it 
must be compatible with them. Harding proposes that ‘to take on the shape of the 
hand that’s holding this book, you have to be free of shape; to take on its colour you 
have to be colourless; and to take on its opacity you have to be transparent; and to 
take on its complexity you have to be perfectly plain and clear’ (Harding, 1990, p. 51-
52). As Shear and Jevning (1999) point out, only an awareness that is devoid of 
sensory qualities in itself could be ‘omni-compatible’ with all sensory qualities. For 
example, if the phenomenal subject was coloured or shaped this would be 
incompatible with it taking on colours and shapes. If the subject was a red screen on 
which sensory experience was projected then everything would be tinted red (Shear, 
1998). The subject must, in itself, be colourless, silent, tasteless, feelingless and so 
forth. The subject needs to be neutral between all colours, and all sensory qualities. 
This way of stating it draws upon Albahari (2009) who defines the subject as a mode-
neutral awareness with intrinsic phenomenal character. I am extending the description 
here to include intra-modality neutrality. This neutrality would also allow that it could 
function as the unifying principle behind all experience. 
162 
 
Another essential property of the subject, if it exists, is that it is single. A 
trivial sense of singularity of the subject comes from the way we use the term 
‘subject’. It refers to a single being that has experiences. A more substantial sense of 
subject singularity comes from the close connection between being a single subject 
and the unity of consciousness.
 
I see the blueness of the sky, hear the birds chirp and 
feel the warmth of the sun simultaneously. This phenomenal unity is characterised by 
Bayne and Chalmers (2003) as the joint experience of multiple conscious states, that 
is when ‘there is something it is like for the subject to have all these states at once’ (p. 
32).
79
  
This being said subject unity and phenomenal unity are conceptually distinct 
(Bayne and Chalmers, 2003; Tye, 2003), and hence one could potentially account for 
one without accounting for the other. However, this fails to explain why they 
intuitively go together so strongly - why it is difficult to conceive of a single subject 
having disunified experiences at a single time. A collection of disunified phenomenal 
fields in a brain would intuitively not be a subject, but would be multiple subjects. A 
plausible reason for this is that the belief that I am a single experiencer derives from 
the unity of consciousness. Hence, it is plausible that an explanation for the unity of 
consciousness will also explain the singularity of the experiencer and vice versa. This 
makes sense particularly if we understand the subject as being the bearer of 
experience. I would go further and say that I am seemingly a single experiencer to 
which things are presented. There are then apriori grounds for considering the subject 
single merely by the way the concept is used. There are also phenomenological 
grounds based upon the unity of consciousness, which also strongly suggest that the 
subject is necessarily single.  
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 For definitions of the unity of consciousness, see Bayne (2010), Bayne and Chalmers (2003), Brook 
and Raymont (2014), Cleeremans (2003), Dainton (2000) and Tye (2003). 
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The above reasoning provides apriori criteria for deciding whether an 
experience counts as a self-experience. In particular, to count as a minimal self-
experience the target should seemingly (1) have no sensory qualities and (2) be 
singular. The goal of the experiments will be to show that is there is an experience 
conforming to the above characteristics. 
 
6.5. The Headless Observation 
 
I begin with some preliminary phenomenological observations that we will be 
exploring through the experiments. Can the subject be visually experienced? Not so 
according to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (1922, p. 74-75): 
 
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the 
world. 
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say 
that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you 
do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is 
seen by an eye. 
 
The subject cannot be found in the visual field. It cannot be experienced as an object 
of vision, but he proposes that it is like its limits. This is suggestive as to where we 
might begin to look. Douglas Harding proposes that instead of attending off to one 
side of the visual field, that I should attend to the point I am apparently looking from.   
The breakthrough for Harding in terms of self-experience occurred when he came 
across a picture drawn by Ernst Mach (figure 6.1). The image depicts Mach’s first-
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person self-portrait with one eye closed. In the background it shows a wall and a 
window, wooden floorboards and shelves of books along the wall. In the middle 
ground can be seen Ernst Mach’s body, in particular, his shoes, wrinkled pants, waist-
coat, and arms, and right hand holding a pencil. In the foreground, on the right can be 
seen a large nose blur and handle bar moustache, and at the top an eyebrow. At the 
edges the image fades out.  
 
                    
 
Figure 6.1. Ernst Mach’s First-Person Self-Portrait (Mach, 1890, p. 59).  
 
This first-person portrait is so striking because it provides a depiction of what it is 
like to be me for myself that is very different from how I appear to others. Most 
salient is the lack of a head in the picture. Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 108) has also 
pointed out this obvious fact: ‘In the matter of living appearance, my visual body 
includes a large gap at the level of the head’. That I cannot see my head is what I’ll 
refer to as the ‘headless observation’. This gap is usually explained away by common 
sense as merely a blind spot, however, I will be arguing that it in fact fits the criteria 
for characteristics the experiencer needs to possess. 
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Take some time to investigate it for yourself. Look down at your body. I find that 
my legs, torso and arms are given visually, but that my head is not. There is nothing 
visually above my shoulders. I usually think of myself as talking face-to-face with 
people, but this is to take a third-person perspective of my relation to others. 
Phenomenologically, only their face is given. Visually speaking, it is face-to-no-face. 
Actually my back is also visually absent and the rest of my body often disappears 
from the scene, also a wall is visually missing whenever I am ‘in’ a room. But as the 
visually missing head is such a notable absence I will continue to refer to the 
‘headless observation’. 
Harding describes his vivid version of this experience in the setting of the 
Himalayas: 
 
What actually happened was something absurdly simple and unspectacular: just 
for the moment I stopped thinking. Reason and imagination and all mental chatter 
died down. For once words really failed me. I forgot my name, my humanness, 
my thingness, all that could be called me or mine. Past and future dropped away. 
It was as if I had been born that instant, brand new, mindless, innocent of all 
memories. There existed only the Now, that present moment and what was 
clearly given in it. To look was enough. And what I found was khaki trouser legs 
terminating downwards in a pair of brown shoes, khaki sleeves terminating 
sideways in a pair of pink hands, and a khaki shirtfront terminating upwards in – 
absolutely nothing whatever! Certainly not in a head. It took me no time at all to 
realise that this nothing, this hole where a head should have been, was no 
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ordinary vacancy, no mere nothing.
80
 On the contrary, it was very much 
occupied. It was a vast emptiness vastly filled, a nothing that found room for 
everything – room for grass, trees, shadowy distant hills, and far above them 
snow peaks like a row of angular clouds riding the blue sky. I had lost a head and 
gained a world (Harding, 1986a, p. 1-2). 
 
It is important to point out here that this is an exercise in phenomenological 
description. The headless observation is not a claim about myself as a human being. 
Of course, ‘I’ (in the human personal sense) have a head. I also see my face in a 
mirror. Knowing what I look like that to others is central to my identity as a person. 
However, I am inquiring here into my apparent identity as experiencer. What I find 
when I look in the mirror is that the face is over there in the glass about a metre away, 
not here on my shoulders (of my experienced body). It is also facing the wrong 
direction.  
Some will object that they can see their nose. But what kind of nose does it 
seem to be? I find that it seems to be a large pink translucent blur that stretches from 
the top to the bottom of the scene. It is continually appearing and disappearing. In fact 
there seem to be two of them. They tend to appear one at a time on opposite sides of 
the scene. What are these blurs apparently attached to on present evidence? Again I 
seemingly find nothing, or a gap. There are also various aches, tickles, and other such 
facial sensations and proprioception of ‘head’ position.  Where are these occurring in 
present experience? Do they seem to be occurring on the surface of, or qualifying, an 
opaque spherical object with eyes, mouth, hair and ears? 
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 Harding distinguishes here between merely nothing or merely void and a nothing or void that is 
filled. He later clarifies what he means by ‘nothing’ and ‘void’ as ‘nothing here in itself’ (Harding, 
1986a, p. 18). 
167 
 
 
 
6.6. First-person Experiments 
 
The following are a series of first-person awareness exercises. They are not 
thought experiments, but an investigation of your first-person experience as it is 
given. If they are not carried out then this chapter will not make any sense. It is 
integral that during the following awareness exercises that you attempt to temporarily 
suspend common sense and metaphysical assumptions. Such a scientific attitude 
entails that one looks disinterestedly ‘to see and to describe adequately what they see, 
purely as seen’ (Husserl, 1960, p. 35). That is, at least for the moment, you attempt to 
describe your experience exactly as it is given. Harding’s procedure uses a method of 
phenomenal contrast. Here two phenomena are compared so as to make salient the 
phenomenal difference between them. Such a phenomenological method is also 
advocated by Susanna Siegel (2007).  
The goal of the experiments is to use apparatus (such as hands) as an aid for 
making a contrast between viewed objects and the apparent viewer of those objects, in 
particular for setting up the phenomena that are to be contrasted, and for orienting 
attention to the target phenomenon. The location of the target of interest is also 
precise: one should attend backwards, 180 degrees from the thing in front of you such 
as a computer screen, to who or what is seems to be seeing the computer screen.
 81
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 The experiments used here all come from Douglas Harding (or workshops by Richard Lang), with 
the exception of experiment 6.5 which is my own development on Harding’s experimental method.  
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Experiment 6.1: Exploring the Gap 
  
Hold up your hands in front of you as if you were holding a basketball. Now slowly 
bring them towards yourself, past your ears. Notice how your hands seem to grow 
larger (in the sense of taking up more of the visual field), and the gap between then 
also grows. They begin to blur and finally disappear altogether into an apparent void 
here. Bringing them forwards again watch as they reappear from the gap. Repeat this 
a few times to get a sense of what this seemingly empty region is like.
82
 
 
Experiment 6.2: Tracing Out the Gap 
 
How many eyes do you seem to be looking out of on present experience? Do you 
seem to be looking out of two small windows in a head or a single large opening? 
How large does the gap seem? Does it seem to be head sized? Put your arms out and 
trace out the apparent edges of the gap. I find that it is seemingly as large as the scene. 
This space
83
 seemingly encompasses the room from wall to wall. Also notice that it 
has nothing discernible outside of it. Use your finger to trace out the boundary of a 
chair or some other object. Notice that it is in a surrounding environment such as a 
room. Again trace out the boundaries of this opening. Does this gap have any 
boundaries? Does it have a visibly discernible surrounding environment? Or does it 
visually have nothing outside of it?
84
 Finally, is there one gap or multiple gaps? I only 
find one. That is, it is phenomenally singular. 
                                                 
82
 See Harding (1996, p. 5) for a version of this experiment. 
83
 By ‘space’ I do not mean the space of physics, but rather I use it as a descriptive term in the sense of 
a gap or opening, and also in terms of it seemingly functioning as room or capacity (in a container 
sense) for the scene. 
84
 Thank you to Richard Lang for introducing this experiment to me. 
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Experiment 6.3: The Frame Experiment 
 
Use your fingers to form a frame through which you can look. Compare your fingers 
to what is in the finger-frame. Notice that your fingers are coloured and opaque. You 
cannot see through your fingers, but the interior of the frame is transparent. Your 
fingers frame a gap. Also notice how when you move the frame around that it 
contains anything in the room: doors, books, parts of walls. It is because the frame is 
empty that is able to act as capacity for things. In fact, as empty and completely 
lacking in qualities there does not seem to be a dividing line between it and the things 
on show. Does this also apply to what you seem to be looking out of? To test this, 
slowly bring the frame back (towards where others see your face) and see if this 
absence seems to fit here. Notice how your fingers seem to grow larger as they come 
closer (take up more of the visual field), and how the gap in the frame also gets larger, 
and thus encompasses more of the room. Keep attending to the gap, bring the frame 
all the way back, and let your fingers drop. Notice that the gap seemingly fits here 
perfectly, but unlike the finger frame it has no discernible boundaries.
85
 
 
Experiment 6.4: The Pointing Experiment – Part 3 
 
Look at your finger and notice that it has colour, shape, texture, wrinkles etc. It is 
obviously a thing. Now with this thing, by pointing, direct your attention to a far wall. 
Notice that your finger (a thing, with shape, colour and extension) is pointing at 
another thing, with shape, colour and extension. Also notice that your finger and the 
                                                 
85
 This is a version of the Card Experiment, in which you use a card with a head sized hole in it. See for 
example Harding (1990, p. 114-116). This method involves a phenomenal comparison rather than a 
phenomenal contrast. It demonstrates that there is no phenomenal difference between the gap framed 
by your fingers and the gap from which you are apparently looking. 
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wall are separated by a gap. Now point to the floor. Notice the patterns, colours and 
textures. Now point to your foot. Once again you are pointing at a shaped and 
coloured thing. Now very slowly, tracing your pointing finger up your body, notice 
that this pattern of duality between object and object persists. Finger –gap- legs. 
Finger –gap- stomach. Finger –gap- chest. Now bring your finger up in line with 
where others see your face. Finger –gap- ??? Suddenly we have seemingly lost the 
duality. From your present experience is your finger pointing at an object, a thing? 
Does there seems to be a head or face here? Continue pointing and please go through 
this checklist. What is your finger pointing at? Do there seem to be: (1) Any colours 
here? (2) Any shape here? (3) Any texture here? (4) Any wrinkles here? (5) Any 
movement here? Is it true to say that this space seems to encompass everything on 
show, including your finger, hand, arm, body and the room? Finally, aren’t you also 
apparently pointing at the viewer or at least the looker?
86
 
 
6.7. Results and Discussion 
 
The goal of the experiments was to bring attention back to what it is like to be 
the looker in your own experience. Common sense says that I am looking out of a 
head – an opaque, solid thing. That is, I am a thing in the world that looks at other 
things. The results of the experiment were in complete contrast to common sense. 
What I found was: 
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 This is a form of meditation. The experiment is most effective if you do not rush through it. I suggest 
forgetting philosophy for a short while - relax, sit quietly, and point here for at least 30 seconds. For 
examples of the pointing experiment see: Harding (1990, p. 8-9, 41-42; 2000, p. 8-9), Lang (2003, p. 7-
8). 
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1. This spot seems to be lacking in colours, and shapes. The experience is as of 
transparency rather than opaqueness. 
2. There seems to be one gap here. It seems single. 
3. There was something it was like to experience the blank region. There was a 
phenomenal character – an experience of spacious emptiness. 
4. The apparent space here seemingly encompasses or is full of the scene.  
5. It does not seem to be in anything. 
6. When I point here I seem to be pointing at myself, or at least the looker. 
 
When I attend to where I am apparently looking from, I find no visual features. 
Recall, that lack of colour, shape etc. is exactly what was predicted to be a defining 
characteristic (or lack of characteristic) of the minimal subject. It is also seemingly 
single. There is only one gap. This was the second predicted characteristic of the 
subject. 
Harding refers to this location as a ‘visibly boundless Space’ (Harding, 1988, 
p. 109). I read ‘visible’ as saying that there is something it is like to experience it. In 
particular, there is a character of emptiness to the experience.
87 
This is an important 
finding. As Dainton (2002) points out, phenomenal character need not be exhausted 
by sensory qualities such as visual, auditory and tactile properties: 
 
The notion of phenomenal character need not be restricted to qualities of this 
sort. A consciousness which consists of nothing but a feeling of void-like 
emptiness has a definite (if difficult to describe) phenomenal character. An 
‘awareness’ of this kind is tangible rather than pure, even if it is natural to 
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 An objection to calling this space visible is the stipulation that only that which is in the visual field is 
visible. If one insists on this, then let me stipulate that this space is visible* by which I mean that there 
is a visual phenomenal character to experiencing it. 
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describe it as ‘pure’. By contrast, a truly bare Awareness has absolutely no 
phenomenal character of any kind, and so is subjectively indistinguishable 
from non-existence (Dainton, 2002, p. 45-46). 
 
This reasoning about awareness also applies to the subject. If there is nothing it is like 
to experience myself apart from the properties of sensory qualities then Hume is 
correct that a unique self-experience does not exist. If, however, there is a unique 
phenomenal character involved in apprehending myself, then self-experience is 
indeed possible. The subject can then make a phenomenal difference. 
Does this experience also fit the criteria for being non-objectifying? These 
were lack of: a background, sensory properties, discreteness from other phenomena, 
and apparently at no distance from myself. Visual objects always appear in the visual 
field. Here on the other hand, I am pointing outside of the visual field and so this 
location is already a good candidate for not being an object of experience. Neither are 
there apparently any sensory qualities here. This gap is not seemingly discrete as it is 
never experienced without contents such as the scene or blackness (with eyes closed). 
Thoughts, visual images and sounds interfere with each other, however, this gap is 
does not interfere with any other experienced phenomena. It is compatible with every 
experienced phenomena. Neither does this gap apparently have a background against 
which it stands out.  
I also seem to be pointing directly at myself or at least the looker. Here there is 
no separation in terms of experienced distance between the observed and the observer. 
Here the observer apparently coincides with the observed. Even though this gap can 
be attended to it fits none of the criteria for being an object of experience. I hence 
conclude that this is an attentionally directed yet a non-objectifying experience. 
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 This gap seems to be me, or I at least seem to be looking from here. There is a 
sense that I am here (a sense of self) – as discussed in chapter 5. This provides one 
motivation for thinking that this gap is me. Importantly, the target of experience fits 
the criteria of being a self-experience outlined in section 4. This was an experience in 
which the target seemingly (1) has no sensory qualities, and (2) is singular. These 
were characteristics which were inferred to be required for the target to function as the 
bearer of experience. The gap also apparently encompassed the visual scene which is 
also consistent with it being a bearer. 
 
6.8. Objections 
 
I argued in the previous section that the experiments provide a candidate self-
experience. We are not yet considering whether or not the experience is veridical. 
Rather in this section I consider some objections to calling this a ‘self-experience’ in 
the thick sense of a prima facie direct experience of myself as subject of experience. 
These objections describe the experience in alternative terms that do not mention or 
qualify as a subject. I consider two such alternatives here. 
 
6.8.1 A Pure Visual Absence? 
 
 According to commonsense there is nothing special about this spot, it is just a 
visual blind spot. My eyes do not look backwards, so of course there is nothing to see 
here. Perhaps we can say that here is just a pure visual absence. I am pointing outside 
the visual field, and thus of course what I find is a lack of visual experience, a visual 
blank. It is natural then to explain this phenomenon as merely a pure visual absence. 
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There is something right about calling this a visual absence, but what kind is 
it? Take, for instance, a blind spot where I cannot see a car because it is behind a 
truck. I see the truck but not the car. This is a blind spot by occlusion. There is also a 
visual blind spot where the optic nerve passes through the retina. The blind location is 
filled in by the other eye so that we do not typically notice the loss of information. It 
is important to note that these types of visual absences are not seen as nothing but 
have a sensory phenomenal character. Even the nothingness of outer space appears 
black not as a pure absence. This gap is not like this, nor like any other direction. 
Neither is it a ‘perception of absence’ in the sense that I see the absence of my laptop 
on the desk when it has been stolen (Farennikova, 2013). Another type of blind spot 
or absence are holes and gaps. For example, I experience the gap where something is 
missing, and there is a character of emptiness to the experience. These are blind spots 
by absence. Finally, there is a blind spot where there is a complete lack of experience 
altogether. This type of absence has no phenomenal character. This is a pure blind 
spot. Is this a complete absence of experience, a pure visual absence or is more like a 
gap? Perhaps the target is best described as a complete absence of visual experience. 
We can test this by contrasting ‘it’ with the location out of your visual field on the 
horizontal axis. 
 
Experiment 6.5: Pure Blind Spot and Blind Spot by Absence  
 
Look directly ahead and move your hand slowly to the left. Notice that your hand 
begins to look blurry and eventually visibly disappears altogether. You have found the 
‘edge’ of your visual field. Off the edge of the visual field, I find a true blind spot, a 
pure visual absence. If I merely experience nothing here, if it is an absolute absence of 
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experience then what it is like to attend there should be exactly the same as here. 
Point off to the side and attend to that location. I find that I am pointing at nothing 
whatsoever, no things, no colours, no shapes. This is as close to a bare nothing as I 
can find. The visual field just ends. Now by contrast point here. There is a tangible 
phenomenal difference between the two spots. I am again apparently pointing at no 
thing, colour, or shape, but there is also an experience of spacious emptiness. It is like 
a hole. There is something it is like to experience it. Hence, this is not merely an 
absence of experience. Furthermore this is not a mere nothing as it is filled by the 
scene – it seemingly encompasses the finger and the room, there is no dividing line 
between this gap and the room. I cannot attend in this direction without also seeing 
the scene, but off to side the scene just ends.  
 
A difference between the target and prototypical gaps is that holes are gaps in 
the visual field. They are defined by the edges of things. This gap by contrast is not 
seemingly framed by anything. Furthermore a hole, in contrast to this location, is 
experienced as being as some distance from myself. By being bounded and 
experienced at a distance from me, holes count as objects of experience (in the broad 
sense of ‘object’ provided by the criteria in section 6.3). By not being experienced as 
an object, at the same time as apparently encompassing the visual scene this gap is 
perfectly suited to be the subject. This spot can certainly be categorised as a type of 
visual absence. However, there are many types of visual absence, and this is a unique 
absence which has properties consistent with those hypothesized to be possessed by 
the subject of experience. Also importantly, I seem to be looking from here. This is 
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not a mere gap. I conclude then that this is not a pure visual absence but rather is the 
best candidate for myself that I can find.
88
 
 
6.8.2 From Looker to Experiencer? 
 
Experiments 6.1-6.5 investigated what it is like to be the looker using the 
visual modality. The looker seemed to be a space-for-the-visual-scene. Does this 
result generalise to the experiencer? The experiencer does not just see, but also hears, 
smells, feels etc. Suppose someone accepts that they can distinguish a space here 
which functions as a bearer for the visual field. This would not be sufficient to count 
as the experiencer unless it encompassed all sensory modalities. The objection is that 
the experiments do not provide a phenomenally singular experiencer, and hence it 
provides an inadequate candidate for self-experience. Certainly the gap here is 
experienced visually (as a lack of colours and shapes), but is it merely encompassing 
the visual scene?  
I do not just experience the coffee cup that I pick up as white, and cup-shaped, 
but as feeling hard and warm, and that felt hardness and warmth is out there with the 
cup – perfectly integrated with the visual features. I find that this space seems to 
encompass not just visually experienced properties and objects but that it includes 
items from other sensory modalities. Consider also when someone speaks the sound is 
not just an additional element, but is heard as coming from their mouth. I do not 
experience a separate field of sound layered on top of the visual field. Or consider the 
experience of lying in bed in a dark room. My thoughts, the feeling of warmth, 
bodily-sensations and the sounds of traffic all occur in the same awareness. These 
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 See Lewis and Lewis (1970) on the metaphysics of holes. Sorenson (2007) also theorizes that the self 
is a kind of absence and touches on many points that I discuss here. I differ from Sorenson in 
emphasizing the affinities between this absence and substance theories of the self.  
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visual, bodily and auditory elements are unified in a single experiential field. There is 
only one single multimodal phenomenal field from which we abstract out fields of 
different modalities.
89
 Certainly I do not always hear sounds at the same time as 
visually experiencing a scene (for example when I hear things behind me), but this 
does not show that there are separable fields, only that some of the contents of the 
single multi-modal phenomenal field can occur without others. 
 
6.9. Conclusion 
 
The question of this chapter was whether there was a candidate for a unique, 
non-objectifying self-experience. The subject cannot be presented to itself as an 
object. I argued that a non-objectifying experience involving attention is one in which 
the target of attention lacks: a background, sensory properties, discreteness from other 
experiential phenomena, and is apparently at no distance from myself. I also used 
apriori reasoning to infer that a minimal synchronic subject (a bearer) should be 
lacking in sensory qualities and single. This provided criteria for what the experience 
should be like to count as a minimal non-objectifying self-experience. With the 
assistance of experiments designed by Douglas Harding I found that there is such an 
experience. I seem to be looking out of a gap. This gap was found to lack the 
properties of an object of experience, at the same time as apparently lacking in 
sensory qualities and being seemingly single. As the experience meets the criteria for 
a non-objectifying self-experience, it hence provides prima facie justification for the 
reality of the subject.   
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 See Tye (2003) on the single experience view. On this view the question of whether there are 
different bearers for each sensory modality would not even arise. 
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This outcome is contrary to Hume, in that there is an experience which could 
count as a unique self-experience that goes beyond qualitative and emotion 
experiences (the Self-Experience Thesis). This result then arguably undermines one of 
the primary motivations for (standard) bundle theories of the self. I cannot claim, 
however, to have refuted the bundle theory nor the other arguments in its favour. 
The current findings suggest that Hume, and countless others since, failed in 
the search for the experiencer because they were attending in the wrong direction. 
They were attending outwards when they should have attended inwards. The current 
proposal differs from previous interpretations of the elusiveness of the subject. Others 
have held that the subject by definition cannot be attended to (e.g., Albahari, 2009). 
This is a necessary, or built in elusiveness. The present findings suggest, on the other 
hand, that the elusiveness of the subject is contingent rather than necessary. It just 
happens to be the case that we rarely (if ever) attend inwards, and so fail to find the 
experiencer. We overlook the place from which we are looking. In fact, it is common 
within meditative traditions to hold that the method for recognising the essential 
nature of one’s self requires a reversal of attention away from the objects of 
experience (Shear & Jevning, 1999, p. 190-191). Harding provides precise 
instructions on how to do this: attend 180 degrees from the black markings you are 
currently seeing to who or what is apparently seeing them.  
A further question is whether this experience veridical? Many hold that 
phenomenology alone does not give you metaphysics. Even if there seems to be a 
subject it does not follow that there is a subject. How exactly does one move from 
phenomenology to metaphysics? The answer I offered was that there does not need to 
be a necessary connection between phenomenology and metaphysics. Rather all that 
needs to be claimed is that the experience provides prima facie justification for 
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believing that this is me. Furthermore, if experience can indeed provide prima facie 
justification, then this justification is bolstered by the independent apriori 
considerations on the nature of the subject as discussed in section 6.4. In the reverse 
direction, the experience provides a prima facie verification of the hypothesis that 
there is a bearer of experience. As the experience and the apriori considerations were 
arrived at independently of each other they can be used as mutually supporting 
sources of justification. The phenomenological and rational routes converge on the 
same conclusion. Despite giving justification for the view, its prima facie status 
means that it can be undermined by further evidence. In particular, this theory also 
needs to be consistent with scientific findings and the third-person perspective in 
general. More needs to be said as to how theory fits with the standard scientific 
picture of the world. I set aside this question for another time. 
If we assume that the experience is veridical, then the minimal subject is 
single and lacking in sensory qualities (in itself). Assuming that the experience is 
veridical, I take the phenomenological findings to support a substance view of the 
subject in which the subject is a bearer of experience, but in which this bearer is not 
the body or the brain. There are a family of substance views of the subject. The 
traditional, prototypical, non-bodily substance theory is substance dualism. However, 
the existence of a minimal subject does not entail the possibility of ghostly free 
floating subjects. Alternatives to substance dualism are substance monist views such 
as idealism and panpsychism. I find panpsychism to be plausible on independent 
grounds (Chalmers, 2015; Mørch, 2014; Strawson, 2006). There is also a non-
standard bundle theory in which there is a master property that bears phenomenal 
properties. Neither is a non-bodily substance necessarily non-physical. There are 
many possible physical bearers which are not the body or brain, such as the various 
180 
 
fields in physics (though this will entail a form of panpsychism). A non-bodily 
substance does not imply that the subject of experience is soul-like in the sense of 
being atomistic and separate from other subjects. Subjects may overlap (be molecular) 
or perhaps there is ultimately only one Self or Consciousness as held in the tradition 
of the Advaita Vedanta and the Perennial philosophy (and by Harding, 1992).  
A substance view is also compatible with subject-object non-duality. I never 
experience this space without its contents such as the scene, thoughts, feelings, 
sounds. I interpret this as a ‘thin subject’ which by definition necessarily has 
experiences (Strawson, 2009). That is, there cannot be a subject without objects of 
awareness (and vice versa). A substance as a thin particular is nothing in itself apart 
from its properties, and hence the theory does not entail the possibility of substances 
existing without properties (bare particulars).
 90
 That there is a phenomenal distinction 
between the subject and objects of awareness does not imply that they are 
ontologically distinct. I agree then with Descartes who states in the Principles of 
Philosophy that a substance and its properties is a ‘distinction of reason’ (conceptual 
distinction) rather than a ‘real distinction’ (an ontological distinction) (Descartes, 
1644, p. 135-137). However, I also hold that subject and objects of awareness are also 
phenomenally distinguishable, it is not merely a conceptual distinction. The common 
view that subject-object non-duality involves the rejection of a substance seems to be 
based upon a rejection of substance dualism, that is of atomistic, separable subjects, 
rather than other concepts of substance. 
Finally, it will be recognised by some that there is nothing new in the present 
phenomenological findings. Reference to the void-like nature of the self (or Self) is 
found in many Eastern and mystical traditions (See Harding, 1986a, 1992). These 
                                                 
90
 Sider (2006) provides a defence of the intelligibility of substances (substratum), and even allows for 
the possibility of bare particulars. See also Martin (1980) for a defence of substances. For a review of 
theories of substance see Robinson (2014). 
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diverse first-person investigations across many cultures, ancient and contemporary, 
describe my essential self (Self in Advaita Vedanta or Buddha-Nature in Buddhism) 
as empty, still and void. Others call it No-Self. Here are three examples from among 
many from the Chinese Ch’an (Zen) tradition:91  
 
Hui-neng: Learned Audience, the illimitable Void of the universe is capable of 
holding myriads of things of various shape and form, such as the sun, the 
moon, stars, mountains, rivers, worlds, springs, rivulets… Space takes in all 
these and so does the voidness of our nature. We say the Essence of Mind is 
great because it embraces all things, since all things are within our nature 
(Hui-Neng, Christmas Humphreys, and Wong Mou-lam, 1973, p. 28). 
 
Hui-hai: Mind has no colour, such as green or yellow, red or white; it is not 
long or short; it does not vanish or appear; it is free from purity and impurity 
alike; and its duration is eternal. It is utter stillness. Such, then, is the form and 
shape of our original mind. (Blofeld, 2007, p. 47). 
 
Shen-hui: Seeing into one’s Self-nature is seeing into Nothingness. Seeing into 
Nothingness is true and eternal seeing. (Suzuki, 1956. p. 191). 
 
                                                 
91
 An objection to linking this experience with Zen Buddhism is the traditional view that Buddhism 
denies the existence of the self in any form (e.g., Rahula, 2007), and hence any minimal subject. 
Buddhism is a multifaceted tradition and it is difficult to identify any one core metaphysical view 
which its adherents unequivocally assert. An alternative interpretation to the traditional view is that 
Buddhism denies the existence of personal selves that are metaphysically separable from the world, as 
well as denying atomistic souls, but it does not rule out Upanishadic notions of Self (for a defence see 
Albahari, 2002). On this interpretation it allows for, and in Zen Buddhism seems to assert, an 
unchanging essence of the subject (Buddha Nature) which is impersonal and the same in all beings.  
There are certainly no personally identifying characteristics to this gap, and in this sense it could also 
be described as No-Self. An outright denial of a subject in any form is ‘annihilationism’ which the 
historical Buddha officially opposed. 
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Harding’s experiments shed light on otherwise mysterious statements such as 
these. However, his methods are not ‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ at all, but coldly 
scientific. Rather they provide systematic and repeatable means for investigating what 
I am for myself. 
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